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Abstract 
 
With its focus on the relationship between dreamscape and death, this study examines the 
possibility of indirectly experiencing – through writing and dreaming – that which cannot be 
directly experienced, namely death. In considering this possibility, the thesis engages at length 
with Maurice Blanchot‘s argument that death, being irrevocably absent and therefore 
unknowable, is not open to presentation or representation. After explicating certain of this 
thinker‘s theories on the ambiguous nature of literary and oneiric representation, and on the 
forfeiture of subjective agency that occurs in the moments of writing and dreaming, the study 
turns to an examination of the manner in which such issues are dealt with in selected 
dreamscapes. With reference to David Malouf‘s An Imaginary Life, Alan Warner‘s These 
Demented Lands, Cormac McCarthy‘s The Road, and Richard Linklater‘s Waking Life, the thesis 
explores the literary and cinematic representation of human attempts to define, resist, or control 
death through dreaming and writing about it. Ultimately, the study concludes that such attempts 
are necessarily inconclusive, and that it is only ever possible to represent death as a 
(mis)representation. 
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Introduction 
 
Writing changes us. We do not write according to what we are; we are according to what 
we write. (Blanchot, ―Death as Possibility‖ 89) 
 
We cannot recall our dreams, they cannot come back to us. If a dream comes—but what 
sort of coming is a dream‘s? Through what night does it make its way? If it comes to us, 
it does so only by way of forgetfulness, a forgetfulness which is not only censorship or 
simply repression. We dream without memory, in such a way that the dream of any 
particular night is no doubt a fragment of a response to an immemorial dying, barred by 
desire‘s repetitiousness. 
    There is no stop, there is no interval between dreaming and waking. In this sense, it is 
possible to say: never, dreamer, can you awake (nor, for that matter, are you able to be 
addressed thus, summoned). (Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster 35) 
 
The dead person is no one everywhere, / is nothing but the loss and absence of the world. 
(Borges, ―Remorse for Any Death‖ 6–7) 
 
The similarity between literature and dreams has been the subject of much critical debate. For 
example, Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan state that ―literary texts are like dreams‖ (125). Much 
the same is maintained by both Peter Schwenger, who writes that ―narrative and dream clasp 
hands‖ (―The Dream Narratives of Debris‖ 75), and David Malouf, who says that he thinks ―of 
writing as public dreaming‖ (qtd. in Levasseur and Rabalais 172). In this study, my interest is in 
the literary representation of dreams, or dreamscape.
1
 Discussions of dreamscape generally focus 
on what dreams might symbolise in individual works.
2
 While my study will also focus on 
specific dreams in selected narratives, namely David Malouf‘s An Imaginary Life (1978), Alan 
Warner‘s These Demented Lands (1997), Cormac McCarthy‘s The Road (2006), and Richard 
Linklater‘s Waking Life (2003), my principal interest lies in the relationship between dreamscape 
and death. I shall discuss the possibility of indirectly experiencing, through writing and 
dreaming, that which cannot be directly experienced, namely death. In this regard, I shall rely on 
                                                     
1
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ―dreamscape‖ as a ―literary description of a dream‖ 
(―Dreamscape‖). 
2
 For examples of literary dream research, see Currie Kerr Thompson‘s ―The Use and Function 
of Dreaming in Four Novels by Emilia Pardo Bazán,‖ Jacqueline C. Nanfito‘s ―El Sueño: The 
Baroque Imagination and the Dreamscape,‖ and Peter Egri‘s ―The Function of Dreams and 
Visions in A Portrait and Death in Venice.‖  
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Maurice Blanchot‘s argument that ―no one is linked to death by real certitude‖ because it is 
ultimately unknowable (―Death as Possibility‖ 95). Because of its unknowability, death provides 
the processes of writing and dreaming with an infinite variety of possibilities. In my thesis, I 
shall focus on the ways in which these two subjective experiences represent death, the last of our 
subjective experiences. 
For the most part, the study of dreams and dreaming is the preserve of psychoanalysis. 
Drawing principally on Sigmund Freud‘s foundational text, The Interpretation of Dreams, 
psychoanalysis has focused on discovering the significance and meaning of dreams to waking 
life. According to Geoffrey Hartman, though, ―[t]he more interpretation [done to dreams], it 
seems, the less closure‖ (424). This insight also holds true for the reading of literature, in that, 
like Freud‘s dream analysis, literary analysis ―does no more and no less than disclose a life in 
images or words [. . .]. Ambiguities, overdetermined meanings, and strange linkages are more 
obvious than the coherent design they seem to flee from‖ (413). Such ambiguity is fundamental 
to a phenomenological approach to dreams, which focuses on the individual‘s subjective 
experience of them. Medard Boss, for instance, argues that a ―new dream theory – a 
daseinsanalytical, phenomenological dream theory – has become necessary‖ because ―it has 
become increasingly evident both that and how all previous depth-psychological dream theories 
do violence from the start both to our dreaming and to what we dream by means of biases and 
abstract conceptualities‖ (7). Accordingly, a focus on the subjective experience of a dream 
implies an emphasis on the dream as dreamed by the dreamer within his/her subjective memory, 
immediate experience, and imagination. When applied to literature, such a focus entails an 
emphasis on the text as read by the individual reader. In my thesis, I shall liken dreaming to 
reading in that the reader‘s search for the meaning of the literary text, like the dreamer‘s search 
for the meaning of a dream, is inconclusive. It follows that it is the very impossibility of an 
entirely comprehensive study of either literature or dreams that opens the way for literary dream 
research. 
Psychoanalysis has focused not only on the significance of dreams to waking life, but 
also on the meaning of death to life. In his essay ―Blanchot and Freud: The Step/Not Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle,‖ Alan Bourassa distinguishes between Freud and Blanchot‘s conceptions of 
death. Freud separates the ‗death drive‘ from the pleasure principle in order ―to provide a 
scientific discourse on death‖ (Bourassa 111). Indeed, Todd Dufresne explains Freud‘s 
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endeavour ―to think ‗beyond the pleasure principle,‘‖ as one in which ―he is simultaneously 
flirting with a beyond of science, or, more exactly, a beyond of the science of the pleasure 
principle‖ (15). Freud, for whom death is a drive, finds at the end of his project ―a still 
unresolved disjunction between life and death,‖ and reductively concludes that it ―does not 
escape libidinal investment‖ (Bourassa 105). The failure of his hypothesis results in inconclusive 
―entanglements‖ in ―impossibility and paradox,‖ which then only direct him back to the pleasure 
principle (105). 
By resisting ambiguity in his study, Freud ―insists‖ that death must provide conclusive 
meaning in relation to life (106). By contrast, for Blanchot, as Bourassa correctly argues, it is the 
very ―insistence of dying, its impossibility, its incompleteness,‖ that is ―the starting point of any 
speech that tries to speak of dying‖ (106). In Blanchot‘s estimation, Freud‘s death drive ―does 
not displace libido,‖ and therefore ―functions not as a drive, but as a set of intervals, differences, 
displacements,‖ all of which conclude nothing about death (Bourassa 111). With reference to 
Freud‘s failure to comprehend death, Blanchot observes as follows: ―If it is true that for a certain 
Freud, ‗our unconscious cannot conceive of our own mortality‘ (is unable to represent mortality 
to itself), then it would seem to follow that dying is unrepresentable, not only because it has no 
present, but also because it has no place, not even a time‖ (The Writing of the Disaster 118). As 
Bourassa puts it, ―there is nothing more elusive, nothing that evades experience more 
completely‖ than death (111). 
While Bourassa emphasises Freud‘s inability to provide a comprehensive study of death, 
he does add that his presentation of ―an incomplete, a duplicitous, or manipulative account of the 
death drive‖ is not simply to be criticised: ―Freud‘s inevitable error marks not a failure of his 
project but the very engagement of the project with an impossible question‖ (113). Precisely that 
which keeps ―Freud‘s project from reaching a completion in which it can declare itself at an end‖ 
forms the focus of Blanchot‘s philosophy (113). To be sure, Blanchot‘s work is preoccupied with 
the ambiguity of death. Bourassa explains that the theoretical stance of this thinker, for whom 
inconclusiveness is unavoidable, ultimately questions the reductive agenda of psychoanalysis: 
 
It would be a radically different psychoanalysis that would take this endless thought into 
it. Is analysis terminable? This question is asked, in psychoanalysis, perhaps out of the 
belief that, if interminable, an analysis simply does not reach its goal. Blanchot, on the 
  
4 
 
contrary, might ask whether there is a goal to be reached, and whether there is any 
connection between strategies for maintaining a unified ego, and those movements that 
are beyond the ego, that set it aside, render it empty, exactly by allowing it to think itself 
the full and present object of psychoanalysis. (119) 
 
Bourassa‘s thought on the disparity between the tasks of Freud and Blanchot explains why my 
study will not include a psychoanalytical perspective. Blanchot‘s agenda, by default, lacks 
agenda, and indeed questions the very assignment of literary analysis in much the same way as it 
does psychoanalysis. Emmanuel Levinas suggests as much when he states that the ―signification 
which Blanchot gives to literature places in question the pride of philosophical discourse – this 
totalizing discourse – capable of saying everything and that to the point of its own collapse‖ (qtd. 
in Gillan, ―About Blanchot: An Interview‖ 54). 
What emerges repeatedly in all of Blanchot‘s reflections on literature is that any 
engagement with it is an interpretative and representational endeavour that always results in 
ambiguity and inconclusiveness. For him, ―literature begins at the moment when‖ it ―becomes a 
question‖ (―Literature and the Right to Death‖ 21). Furthermore, the ambiguity attendant on any 
engagement with literature cannot be divorced from the moment that the writer writes. As I 
previously mentioned, the moment of writing assumes a focus on the subjective individual‘s 
experience of writing. Blanchot‘s argument, however, is that writing is a process that requires a 
fundamental relinquishment or ―collapse‖ of subjective agency (Holland 10). As Garth Gillan 
suggests, ―the adventure of the writer is the experience of the dispossession of self‖ (―About 
Blanchot: An Interview‖ 55). Blanchot‘s writer is faced with the ―curious problem‖ of 
attempting to write as an agent, attempting to act with language, only inevitably to relinquish all 
agency by writing (Marshall 226). With agency foregone, the writer is effectively rendered 
impotent, and his/her ―literary exercise‖ is consequently concerned with the ―rupture of order, 
with unification, with the collection of terms, with their synchrony,‖ and therefore with a 
―dispersion‖ of meaning that literature cannot ―express‖ (Levinas, qtd. in Gillan, ―About 
Blanchot: An Interview‖ 54). For Blanchot, such dispersion of meaning is not only unavoidable 
in literary encounters, but is also, as Levinas explains, the very ―event‖ of literature (qtd. in 
Gillan, ―About Blanchot: An Interview‖ 54). 
 In Blanchot‘s philosophy, the loss of agency for the writer in writing is articulated as a 
continual death of selfhood. For him, writing is therefore a process that relates to death. The 
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writer‘s engagement with death‘s representation is a radically ambiguous paradox: already 
subjectless, and so continually dying, he/she enters into a literary encounter that seeks to define, 
delineate, and conceptualise death, which is not a representational possibility but an ―inauthentic, 
impersonal, and impossible‖ absence that is ―profoundly anticultural‖ (Gregg 48).  
In my first chapter, I shall discuss the notions of ―possibility‖ and ―impossibility‖ that 
inform Blanchot‘s understanding of literary writing (―Death as Possibility‖ 100),3 and argue that 
the (im)possibility of literature, which is possibility and impossibility occurring simultaneously, 
is analogous to ambiguity. I shall explain how the (im)possibility of literature ‗occurs‘ in a space 
called expérience, which is the moment of writing. In expérience, whatever is written simply 
exists in the mind of the writer, and cannot be located in relation to any other reality. As I shall 
elucidate, expérience also presupposes the relinquishment of subjective agency on the part of the 
writer. In the subjectless realm of expérience, the writer becomes what Blanchot terms the 
‗neuter,‘ which is, as Levinas describes, ―neither someone, nor even a thing. It is only an 
excluded third term which, properly speaking, does not even exist‖ (qtd. in Gillan, ―About 
Blanchot: An Interview‖ 57). I shall argue that the possibility of literature is bound to 
expérience, where the neuter‘s imaginative capacity to represent seems limitless. 
Since my thesis is preoccupied with dreamscape, I shall show how the writer‘s 
expérience can be extended to that of the reader and dreamer. I shall also explain that the space 
of expérience is limited by impossibility. Because the writer, reader, and dreamer lack agency, 
whatever it is they write, read, or dream cannot be made a tangible reality. They are limited by 
their inability to position any reality in relation to themselves or their writing, reading, and 
dreaming expérience. Not only is subjectivity impossible in expérience, but also rationality, 
which presupposes a thinking subject. 
Through a consideration of Blanchot‘s essay ―Orpheus‘ Gaze,‖ I shall discuss the writer 
and dreamer‘s problematic position on the cusp of an (im)possible paradox. In Blanchot‘s 
description, Orpheus‘ journey to the Underworld to retrieve his wife Eurydice inevitably fails. 
As such, it is a task that cannot be completed. While Blanchot‘s allegory likens Orpheus‘ task to 
                                                     
3
 For the sake of clarity, consistency and readability, Blanchot‘s juxtaposition of possibility and 
impossibility will be recast in my study as ‗(im)possibility,‘ a term which I have adopted from 
John Gregg‘s essay ―Blanchot‘s Suicidal Artist: Writing and the (Im)Possibility of Death.‖ 
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the writer‘s representational endeavour, I shall extend this argument to the activity of dreaming. 
As I shall make clear, the writer and dreamer, who are both the neuter of expérience, are 
synonymous with the Orphic figure. Significantly, Blanchot‘s essay explains how the Orphic 
figure‘s (im)possible paradox, namely to represent that which cannot be adequately represented, 
necessitates both delusion and desire. I shall ultimately argue that the writer and dreamer, despite 
losing agency in their engagements with dreamscape (which, of course, renders their endeavours 
impossible), essentially delude themselves into thinking that their representational tasks may be 
completed. This argument, as I shall show, may be extended to the reader‘s interpretative 
engagement with dreamscape. 
 I shall then turn to the problematic and inconclusive nature of the attempts of the writer 
and dreamer to represent death. With reference to his essay ―Death as Possibility,‖ I shall explain 
Blanchot‘s notion of the ‗double death,‘ which juxtaposes the Orphic figure‘s continual death of 
selfhood – that is, dying – with the ungraspable, unknowable absence of death. By attempting to 
represent death in literature and dreams, the writer and dreamer continually die in losing the 
agency necessary to fulfil their task, which is already impossible because death is not a 
representational possibility. I shall include in my discussion an explanation of Blanchot‘s 
conception of suicide, of the person who wishes to master death, but cannot achieve this aim. 
While he likens the suicide to the writer, I shall extend this analogy to the reader and dreamer. 
With specific reference to dreaming, I shall also elucidate Blanchot‘s thoughts on the similarity 
between sleep and death, both of which involve a state of restfulness that is impossible for a 
dreamer precisely because he/she dreams in expérience. 
My introductory chapter will therefore unpack the complex relation between literature, 
dreams, and death, and reveal that the writer, reader, and dreamer are troubled by a loss of 
agency which inhibits the completion of their literary and oneiric endeavours. Before I provide 
an outline of my second and third chapters, it is necessary to explain briefly why I have decided 
upon the specific literary and cinematic dreamscapes that will be examined in this thesis. 
In his literary analyses, Blanchot always chooses writers ―for whom writing is a 
question‖ (Marshall 227). Among these, are authors like ―Kafka, Rilke,‖ and ―Mallarmé,‖ whose 
―very existence is founded on their relation to writing‖ (227). Indeed, it would be a reductive 
task to ‗apply‘ Blanchot‘s ideas to literature which does not self-reflexively question its own 
linguistic limitations. Like Blanchot, I turn to works that are preoccupied with the very question 
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of literature. All the texts under discussion in my study simultaneously manifest and 
problematise the irreducibly ambiguous relation between literature, dreams, and death. 
My exploration of dreamscape and death will proceed through a consideration of three 
novels and a film, all of which not only represent dreams, but also depict journeys towards death. 
As of yet, there has been no literary examination of the script of Linklater‘s film Waking Life. 
While Malouf‘s novel, An Imaginary Life, is often discussed as ―a post-colonial conception of 
language, world, and subjectivity‖ (Nettlebeck qtd. in Randall 4), I shall show how this work 
highlights the ambiguous relationship between dreaming and waking reality in its depiction of 
the narrator Ovid‘s departure from Tomis in order ―to prepare a death‖ for himself (Malouf 47). 
Most criticism of Alan Warner‘s writing has focused on national identity, gender, and his novel 
Morvern Callar, rather than on its ludic and fragmentary sequel These Demented Lands, which 
depicts an ambiguous death. Similarly, there has been no comprehensive study of the 
dreamscape of Cormac McCarthy‘s The Road. None of these works has been analysed in relation 
to Blanchot‘s theory of the (im)possibility of representing death through writing and dreaming. 
In my second chapter I shall analyse each of the aforementioned narratives in relation to 
the (im)possibility of dreamscape, focusing on specific characters who are writers, readers, and 
dreamers, and for whom the literary and oneiric representation ‗occurs.‘ Each of the characters 
concerned necessarily foregoes subjectivity in engaging with literary language and dreams, and 
emerges as an Orphic figure, or il y a of expérience. From my discussion of the various 
characters‘ loss of subjective agency, it will also emerge that they are unable to situate 
themselves within a rational framework. In certain instances, I shall also discuss the 
viewer/reader, who is similar to writers and dreamers in that he/she necessarily relinquishes 
subjectivity in the moment of reading. 
In my third chapter, I shall analyse the novels and film in relation to the (im)possibility of 
encountering death in the moments of writing, reading, and dreaming. Throughout, my argument 
will draw on Blanchot‘s aforementioned notion of the double death. While the characters in the 
various texts attempt to conceptualise death, their loss of agency in writing and dreaming means 
that they are continually dying, and are therefore unable to experience, realise, or control it. All 
endeavours to represent death, driven by desire and delusion, only emphasise the characters‘ 
inability to do so. 
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Throughout my thesis, I shall reflect on the ways in which representation is 
simultaneously both possible and impossible for the writer and dreamer. Overall, my argument 
will be that representational endeavours in dreamscape are limited by a necessary relinquishment 
of agency, which precludes a conclusive conception of that which is already elusive and 
intangible, namely death. 
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Chapter One: Maurice Blanchot and the (Im)Possibility of Death 
 
Whenever thought is caught in a circle, this is because it has touched upon something 
original, its point of departure beyond which it cannot move except to return (Blanchot, 
―Death as Possibility‖ 93). 
 
According to Maurice Blanchot, the meaning of a literary text is never singular but always 
multiple and ambiguous. For him, literature is ―language turning into ambiguity‖ (―Literature 
and the Right to Death‖ 59), and, as Simon Critchley maintains, ―the form in which the original 
double meaning at the heart of meaning has chosen to show itself‖ (56). Importantly, Blanchot‘s 
idea of ambiguity is directly related to his notion of (im)possibility, which manifests itself at the 
instant in which the writer writes, and may be extended to that in which the reader reads and the 
dreamer dreams. This instant is the space in which both literature and dreams ‗occur,‘ where the 
subject‘s engagement with them is simultaneously possible and impossible, and where 
interpretation is therefore inconclusive and excessive.
4
 
As briefly discussed in the introductory pages to this study, expérience is central to 
(im)possibility in that any engagement with literature – in the form of writing or reading – opens 
a space between the physical text and the subject who writes or reads, thereby allowing for 
ambiguity in the work. When inevitable gaps emerge between interpretation and the work, 
literature, as Jacques Derrida puts it, ―can only exceed itself‖ (qtd. in Attridge 48). It is for this 
reason too that, in his discussion of Derrida‘s notion of the supplément, Derek Attridge argues 
that literature has ―a double, contradictory, undecidable value‖ at its heart (174): the supplément 
is that which ―adds itself‖ to literature (83), haunting its origin by revealing the work to be 
indeterminable and incomplete. For Blanchot, the inconclusive nature of literature and dreams is 
an epiphenomenon of the fact that, in the moment of creating a work, be it through writing, 
reading or dreaming, the subject is both capable and incapable of imaginative endeavour. 
Before expanding on this notion of (im)possibility, it is necessary to discuss further and 
clarify Blanchot‘s notion of expérience, which troubles the writer, reader, and dreamer in the 
                                                     
4
 The term ‗excessive‘ or ‗excess‘ here designates the inconclusive nature of encounters with a 
text or dream, of which a totalised or fixed interpretation is impossible. The attempt to assign 
specific interpretation to a text is always met with the inability to do so. 
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moments of writing, reading, and dreaming, by requiring a dissolution of subjective agency and 
positing in its stead the passive neuter.
 
Expérience is fundamental to Blanchot‘s thought on 
literature because it explains where and how the work occurs. Indeed, for him, the ―work is 
mind‖ – as opposed to the work ‗occurring‘ in the mind of a subject, who is therefore able to 
situate it in relation to reality – the ―realization of the mind‘s infiniteness,‖ and is thus ―never 
real, never finished‖ (―Death as Possibility‖ 88). Expérience is the space in which the ambiguity 
of (im)possibility occurs for the il y a (which, as I shall explain later in my chapter, is analogous 
to the imaginative mind at the centre of the work), and is fundamental not only to my discussion 
of (im)possibility, but also for understanding the (im)possibility of representing death in the 
ambiguous quintessence of literature. 
Blanchot‘s essay ―Death as Possibility,‖ which explores the unknowability of death, the 
continuum of dying, and the paradoxical nature of the double death, is crucial to my discussion 
of (im)possibility. Blanchot argues that, while ―a man‘s goal might be the search for death‘s 
possibility,‖ death is unknowable and therefore evades a conclusive interpretation and 
understanding (―Death as Possibility‖ 95). The potential for comprehending death, be it in 
reading literature or dreaming, thus appears to be limitless. When conceived of in relation to the 
notion of (im)possibility, though, the potential of death only allows for a continual process of 
dying. As Ann Smock observes, there is ―no break between life and death,‖ and an engagement 
with the latter ―is dying‖ (Translator‘s Remarks x). In other words, the opposition between life 
and death is blurred into a spectrum of progressive living and dying and unachievable death. 
Significantly, as I shall explain later in my chapter, Blanchot also suggests that the ambiguity of 
literature is ―ultimately an ambiguity about death‖ (Critchley 77): the writer, reader, and dreamer 
are also in a ―relation with death‖ (79). 
Ultimately, Blanchot‘s writing is concerned with the tension between subjective 
possibility and impossibility in the interpretation and comprehension of phenomena such as 
literature, dreams, and death. For him, expérience enables the work to ‗occur‘ and involves a 
continual encounter with death in the guise of the writer, reader, and dreamer‘s loss of subjective 
ability in attempting to represent the unknowable. In forfeiting agency, the writer, reader, and 
dreamer – all Orphic figures – may be said to die continually in the moments of writing, reading, 
and dreaming. Through a close analysis of Blanchot‘s writing, this chapter introduces and 
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discusses the complexities associated with the (im)possibility of representing death through 
dreamscape. 
  
Expérience 
 
The Writer, Reader, and the Moments of Writing and Reading 
 
While the focus of this section of my chapter will be Blanchot‘s notion of expérience, which is 
primarily concerned with the writer and the moment of writing, it also necessarily demonstrates 
how Blanchot‘s writer occupies a space related to that of the reader. Both writer and reader are 
similar in that writing and reading are subjective and excessive processes of interpretation. For 
Blanchot, subjective interpretation is where the work occurs. Furthermore, art is, for him, ―not 
simply a way of exercising the mind; it is mind – which is nothing if it is not a work‖ (―Death as 
Possibility‖ 88). An individual‘s interpretation of a literary work in writing and reading can be 
considered a text in itself because ―works of art happen not in the world but in the theater of the 
human mind‖ (Dutton 103). Indeed, reading can be seen as a process of writing, or rather an 
interpretative process of re-writing: the work belongs to itself and is interpreted differently and 
subjectively by both the writer at the moment of writing, and the reader in the moment of reading.  
Ultimately, both reader and writer are acted upon by language in the moments of reading 
and writing insofar as neither controls language. Language does not speak on behalf of a subject 
or person, but rather becomes Blanchot‘s ―le dire,‖ or écriture: that is, language speaking for 
itself. Accordingly, language cannot be understood as an instrument employed by someone. 
Instead, it exists as its own text within the mind of whoever engages with it, regardless of 
whether it is a writer or reader. In their encounter with literature, the writer and reader are similar 
since both writing and reading are processes of interpretive representation. Expérience, an 
engagement with literature, is not an expérience of the moment on the part of a subject, but 
rather ―the experience of writing understood, itself, as experience‖ (Farbman 118). Blanchot 
focuses on the instant in which a writer puts pen to paper, or a reader reads a literary work, and 
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explains that these processes of representational interpretation preclude active agency. Indeed, a 
subject is necessarily indeterminable and absent in Blanchot‘s expérience. 
Since subjective agency is indeterminable, Blanchot posits that the writer or reader might 
be defined as the neuter. According to Simon Critchley, there is ―perfect accord‖ between 
Blanchot‘s neuter and Emmanuel Levinas‘ il y a (68).5 For Levinas, the il y a – or ‗there is‘ – 
rejects the idea that a subject exists at all. While he does not discuss the notion of the il y a in the 
context of reading, I shall apply it to writing, reading, dreaming, and later to dying. In the context 
of this study, it is used to signify the dream or text as a moment of expérience. That is, in 
expérience, dreams and literature simply exist. As will be discussed, in this space, a subject is not 
present to control or witness such an engagement from a rational perspective. Rather, it is the 
passive il y a, as neither subject nor object, that inhabits the space of the writer and reader‘s 
mind. Indeed, in the moments of writing and reading, both writer and reader become the il y a – 
that is to say, they are not subjects. Writing and reading occur for the il y a which is the passive 
mind of the imagination. 
For Blanchot, the ambiguous and indeterminable il y a is ―the origin of the artwork,‖ and 
inhabits the neutral realm of expérience (Critchley 40). As Critchley observes, passive neutrality 
is the continual state of the il y a in which ―I am neither myself nor an other‖ (67). Writing 
introduces ―into the Subject a certain impotence and passivity that escapes the movement of 
comprehension‖ (38). No longer able to situate the self within the coordinates of a 
comprehensive, rational, and referential framework, the subjective writer or reader becomes 
indeterminable, and this loss of subjectivity results in his/her inability to locate his/her self in 
relation to his/her environment. That the writer and reader forfeit subject-centred consciousness 
in the acts of writing and reading is significant because such absence of controlled agency allows 
for freedom of interpretation. In expérience, the writer and reader encounter the limits of 
language and thus the limits of subjective interpretation beyond the jurisdiction of agency. 
                                                     
5
 Although the term ‗neuter‘ is used by Blanchot, for the purposes of this study il y a is a more 
appropriate term because of its literal translation, ‗there is.‘ Instead of naming the lack of subject 
as no subject, like the neuter does, the il y a does not allow even for the naming of a person or 
thing. Its application therefore lies in its ability to indicate the existence of literature in its 
engagement without pointing toward the presence or absence of a subject. 
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The realm of expérience, which presupposes the dissolution of the writer and reader‘s 
subjective rationality, is a space of heightened alterity that allows for the limitlessness of the 
imagination. Such limitlessness is a product of the lack of agency. Since the il y a or the 
imaginative mind is not confined by a subject, it has the imaginative capacity and possibility to 
be that which is written or read. In expérience, the work itself cannot be named a work because 
this would imply the presence of a subject who labels and thus places the work at a distance. 
Additionally, a work is an achievement, an accomplishment, something that is undertaken and 
followed through to completion. The work itself cannot be called a work because it simply exists 
in the imaginative mind of the il y a. In moments of writing or reading, the il y a is incapable of 
defining the work as a work. The relationship of the il y a to language is not distanced from 
rational space because it simply is space. In short, expérience is a space of alterity in that it 
allows for the possibility of transgressing language, conceived here as a rational system of codes 
for naming the self and that which is other to the self. The possibility of the il y a, then, is the 
possibility of the work. Paradoxically, though, it is precisely because of a lack of subjective 
agency that expérience is also impossible: without a subjective agent to claim an expérience of 
the imagination as his/her own, expérience is impossible. This is the circular and paradoxical 
continuum of Blanchot‘s (im)possibility. 
Before expanding on the inevitable dissolution of subjective rationality and the 
simultaneous occurrence of possibility and impossibility in expérience, it is necessary to examine 
the ways in which Blanchot likens the dreamer and dreaming to both the writer and writing and 
the reader and reading. 
 
The Moment of Dreaming and the Dreamer 
 
Since the focus of this thesis is the (im)possibility of representing death through dreamscapes, an 
understanding of the relationship of the dreamer to dreaming is crucial. As I have already 
intimated, dreaming, like writing and reading, also occurs in expérience. Moreover, the dreamer 
of expérience is similar to Blanchot‘s writer and reader. The il y a, which emerges as both a 
cause and result of the absence of subjective rationality, is already understood as the imaginative 
mind allowing for literature‘s possibility. In the dreaming expérience, though, the il y a, in that it 
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is free from the confines of subjective agency and language, opens up to unlimited imaginative 
possibility. Significantly, in this regard, Charles E. Scott suggests that dreaming has ―meant 
freedom for as long as human memory stretches‖ (1), and Gordon Globus observes that 
dreaming ―frees us from the actual world to the set of all possible worlds‖ (3). The dreaming 
expérience, then, is an imaginative process, seemingly permeated with possibility. Encountering 
dreamscape – that is, the literary representation of dreams – is also something of a conundrum 
because it reduplicates the moment of expérience. On the one hand, both writer and reader forfeit 
their subjective agency in the moment of writing or reading a dream, which in itself presupposes 
a loss of agency. On the other hand, the dream is already limited by the absence of the dreamer‘s 
agency. 
Just as the reader, in the expérience of reading, cannot assume the position of a subject, 
so too can the dreamer of the dream not ―be identified with the conveniently collected figure of 
the sleeper‖ (Farbman 119). According to Blanchot, as Herschel Farbman indicates, a subject 
cannot sleep, and it therefore follows that the il y a ―that displaces the subject in the experience 
of writing also marks [. . .] what wakes in the dream, separating it from the sleeping subject‖ 
(120). Like the literary work, the dream exists autonomously, belonging to itself in the moment 
in which it is dreamed. By extension, it is expérience itself which makes the dream 
indistinguishable as a dream dreamt by a sleeping subject – just as the work cannot be named as 
a work for the writer or reader. Smock elaborates on this point when she observes that, in dreams, 
―one sometimes thinks one knows one is dreaming, but only dreams this‖ (Translator‘s 
Introduction 3). Since the very term il y a signifies the absence of subjective intent, the work and 
the dream cannot be identified as ‗the work‘ or ‗the dream‘ because they simply exist for the il y 
a or imaginative mind. In short, to label the work or the dream is to present it as other than it is. 
Blanchot‘s explanation of ―the night‖ and ―insomnia‖ (The Writing of the Disaster 48, 
49), adds another dimension to his already complex theorisation of the dreamer and sleep. He 
argues that sleep implies rest, but that rest is impossible in sleep because, in Farbman‘s words, 
‗waking‘ into the dream is ―a kind of insomnia―an impossibility of sleeping―in the heart of 
sleep‖ (121). The ―[l]ucidity‖ of insomnia is ―the wake‖ of the dream, its ‗occurrence‘ in ―the 
impossibility of sleep at the heart of sleep‖ (Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster 48). This 
argument is remarkably similar to Jorges Luis Borges‘ notion of the ―terrible lucidity of 
insomnia‖ (―An Interview with Jorges Luis Borges‖ 319), which alludes to the inability to rest in 
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sleep because dreaming disables subjectivity. Indeed, as Peter Schwenger suggests, ―the 
restlessness of dream moves, interminably, away from the presumptions that govern the state of 
waking: the subject‘s coherence‖ and ―the connectedness of thought‖ (Review). In this regard, as 
Levinas notes, the night may be described as ―the very experience of the il y a‖ (qtd. in Critchley 
67). Any ―definite subject position‖ thus becomes impossible for the il y a, who is disallowed 
sleep (Farbman 121). 
The space in which the dream occurs should not be mistaken for a space in which the ‗I‘ 
dreams because the dream itself wakes into passivity – that is, expérience – where, as Bert O. 
States indicates, ―there is no inside-outside division‖ (Seeing in the Dark 3). Blanchot argues that 
an ―I‖ does ―not wake‖ in the dream because the process of dreaming ―is neutral‖ (The Writing 
of the Disaster 48). Indeed, States uses the word ‗cela,‘ which means ‗that which‘ wakes, to 
suggest as much. In addition, he links the coexisting states of dream and wakefulness, by 
suggesting that ―dream sleep‖ is ―paradoxical sleep‖ (―Dream: The Royal Road to Metaphor‖ 
108), in that, as Blanchot states, ―where I dream, it is awake‖ (qtd. in States, ―Dream: The Royal 
Road to Metaphor‖ 108). Borges‘ notion of ―the terrible lucidity of insomnia‖ (―An Interview 
with Jorges Luis Borges‖ 319), brings to mind Blanchot‘s idea that reading and dreaming 
presuppose ―the same insomniac vigilance without subject‖ (Farbman 121). Insomniac vigilance 
precludes the dream from being placed in categorical opposition to waking life. In the dream, 
insomniac vigilance would signify the possibility of the imaginative mind residing in the 
impossibility of sleep. Being the dissolution of subjectivity in sleep, it is a state that can also 
affect the writer and reader in the moments of writing and reading. Indeed, as Critchley notes, 
Blanchot describes the writer as ―the insomniac of the day‖ (37). 
Blanchot‘s understanding of the writer and the reader can therefore be expanded to 
include the dreamer. Insomnia, for instance, is clearly a state that is not limited to dreamers. 
From this discussion, it should also be clear that dreaming is possibility within the impossibility 
of sleep. In dreaming – where insomnia is a prerequisite for sleep – the subject cannot sleep and 
because of this no longer knows itself. The impossibility of sleep thus enables the ultimate 
excess of the imaginative mind: the expérience of the il y a that allows for the dream‘s 
possibility. Yet the very existence of the il y a and its ever-present occurrence within the dream 
results in impossibility. In the next section of this chapter, subjective agency in expérience, as 
well as its relation to subjective rationality‘s (im)possibility, will be discussed. 
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The Dissolution of Rationality 
 
It should be clear by now that expérience is not a space in which binary opposites exist. While 
the position of the subject collapses in expérience, it is not simply replaced with its binary 
opposite, the object of its perception. Similarly, rationality, which is forfeited with the loss of 
subjectivity, is not replaced with irrationality. In the absence of such oppositions, what emerges 
is an entirely new being – the il y a – which inhabits a space of not rationality or irrationality, but 
irreality, that is, a paradoxical state, which is ―the presence of absence, the night, the dissolution 
of the subject in the night, the horror of being, the return of being into the midst of all the 
negative moments, the reality of irreality‖ (Gillan, ―Levinas on Blanchot: Commentary‖ 50). In 
short, irreality is the possibility and impossibility of writing, reading, or dreaming something into 
being in its own framework, sans the coordinates of a subject‘s reality. So, just as language 
belongs to itself, the dream, which has its own logic, must be accepted ―on its own terms‖ (Scott 
6). 
The very notion of expérience precludes a subject from experiencing some thing in 
relation to something other. According to Critchley, in expérience, ―writing produces itself 
ironically and wittily as a refusal of comprehension, an enactment of a field of fragmentation that 
produces an alterity irreducible to presentation or cognition, an alterity that can variously be 
named with the words absence, exteriority, the night, the neuter, the outside, dying‖ and the ―il y 
a‖ (39). Writing produces a ―refusal of comprehension‖ simply because the il y a – in its essence 
a simple imaginative occurrence – does not rely on processes of comprehension (39). Without a 
subject who might ‗know,‘ name, or grasp his/her position, however, the possibility of the il y a 
only ever remains within the mind of expérience. In order for possibility and impossibility to 
exist simultaneously, a being that is both limited and unlimited is required – the il y a. Since the 
subject is limited by its absence in expérience and the il y a of expérience is limitless, neither is 
able to grasp or see (im)possibility as it happens. 
 When entering the continuum of (im)possibility, the writer, reader, or dreamer must 
necessarily be self-deceived in order to fulfil his/her task – the completion of the work or its 
interpretation – which, as I have already explained, is impossible. In the ensuing discussion, I 
shall use Blanchot‘s reading of the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice to examine such self-
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deception in the instant that expérience and (im)possibility occur. I shall also show that 
Blanchot‘s Orphic figure is synonymous with the writer, reader, and dreamer as il y a. 
 
Orpheus and Eurydice 
 
Blanchot‘s ―Orpheus‘ Gaze‖ allegorises the moment of writing by exploring Orpheus‘ journey 
into the Underworld to retrieve his wife Eurydice and bring her back to the light of day. The 
protagonist of the narrative is an artist and, in Blanchot‘s reading, his wife Eurydice represents 
his artwork in the sense that she is the work he must complete by bringing her out of the 
Underworld and into the daylight. Orpheus‘ quest is, however, complicated by the fact that he is 
bound to a law devised by the gods that permits him to complete his work only if it is obeyed: he 
is not to look back at Eurydice on their journey to the light. Orpheus, though, turns to see her, 
and she is therefore immediately reclaimed by Hades‘ Underworld. He has no choice but to 
return to earth alone. While the law is severe, it is the only structure by which the artwork is able 
to exist. Without Orpheus‘ desire to bring Eurydice back to the light of day, the work would not 
exist in its necessarily flawed state. Similarly, without the law which Orpheus disobeys, the work 
would have no grounds and no linguistic structure in which to exist. 
What is allegorised by Orpheus‘ defiance of and subsequent inability to complete his task 
is the failure of representation. Blanchot‘s primary focus is the failure of literary language to 
signify adequately, and, by extension, as I shall argue, the failure of literature to represent 
dreams. For the subjectless writer or reader, language cannot adequately represent that which it 
seeks to represent because the moment the writer puts pen to paper, he/she, like Orpheus, 
metaphorically looks back. In attempting to represent something as a work, the subject is absent 
and therefore cannot grasp that which it seeks to in its representation. The writer and reader‘s 
attempts to represent – that is, to hold that which he/she wants to depict within reach – are futile. 
Similarly, the dream cannot be reality for a subject because, like Orpheus and the artist, what 
he/she attempts to frame in the structures of language is lost. As il y a, the artist is stripped of 
subjectivity in the moment of turning back and, once lost in the space of irreality, no longer 
possesses the capacity to name or be named. Basically, this is because the process of naming 
always requires that a subject be present in order to determine what is real. Orpheus‘ failure is a 
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necessary one and exemplifies the paradox of engaging with literature and dreams: the 
unavoidable failure of the artist is the (im)possibility of the work or dream. 
For Blanchot, what inspires the work is this necessary failure, due, in part, to excess – 
that is, the residue of an engagement with literature, which is also the possibility of a never 
totalised interpretation. The excess of such engagement occurs in the mind of the writer, reader, 
and dreamer, and cannot be reduced to language. Because of the excessive nature of engaging 
with a literary work or dream, representation ultimately fails, and, since failure haunts the dream 
or work, it is incomplete, and it is its resultant inconclusiveness that enables its possibility. By 
definition, a subject does not exist in expérience, the space necessary for the existence of excess 
and imaginative possibility. Accordingly, the work or dream is limited by its very inaccessibility 
to a subject. Without a subjective agent, the work or dream simultaneously becomes impossible.  
In Blanchot‘s reading, the notion of (im)possibility is staged by Orpheus‘ belief that he is 
able to complete his task while being governed by his own desire to look upon Eurydice. The 
possibility of the work is Orpheus‘ desire to bring Eurydice into the daylight, while its 
impossibility is his failure to obey the law of the gods. Orpheus is necessarily self-deluded in his 
desire, in that he forgets the stringent conditions of the law, and must necessarily do so if his 
journey is to occur at all. Both he and the artist are thus caught on the cusp of possibility and 
impossibility insofar as the Orphic failure (the impossibility of the work) is consequently bound 
to desire (the belief in the possibility of the work). Without desire, the work is not possible. 
Orpheus‘ inevitable failure limits his desire, which is what allows the work to exist at all. The 
impossibility of bringing Eurydice to the daylight, of rendering accessible the inaccessible, is 
explicitly related to Orpheus‘ desire to do so. 
Just as Orpheus‘ desire to see Eurydice renders her inaccessible, so too the writer‘s 
attempt to write destroys the work because this attempt ―is always in excess of the law‖ 
(Critchley 49). Although the law is the rational linguistic structure which allows the work to 
exist, the consequence of the artist‘s gaze is the work‘s very destruction, which renders the 
medium of language impotent. Due to Orpheus‘ failure to reveal her in the daytime, Blanchot 
argues that Eurydice ―is the instant when the essence of night approaches as the other night‖ 
(―Orpheus‘ Gaze‖ 171). While she is invisible in the night, and therefore cannot exist in the 
daylight, this is to say, Orpheus attempts to reveal her in her night-time truth, which is 
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invisibility, as visible in the daylight. In other words, Eurydice is the night that Orpheus sees and 
wishes to grasp. Ironically, though, his attempts displace her to the other, ungraspable night. 
In order to realise his desire to make the insubstantial substantial, Orpheus must render 
the invisible visible. Nevertheless, he, the artist, does not wish to alter the state of Eurydice in his 
artwork by making her visible – his actual desire is to possess her in her ungraspable, invisible 
state. He wants to reveal her invisibility in the night as invisibility in the daylight. Eurydice, then, 
is ―the furthest that art can reach‖ (171). According to Blanchot‘s allegory, under ―a name that 
hides her and a veil that covers her, she is the profoundly obscure point toward which art and 
desire, death and night, seem to tend‖ (171). Eurydice, as the desired and sublimely uncapturable, 
is beyond language and is what fuels the necessary, yet impossible, attempt at representation.  
The aporia of Orpheus, the striving artist, is that Eurydice cannot be retrieved from the 
Underworld because she does not contain the day within her and therefore cannot be revealed in 
the way in which Orpheus would like to reveal her. Since she cannot exist in the day, to inscribe 
her in the day would fundamentally alter the representation of her as a work. The nature of 
Eurydice thus reveals that the ultimate demand of Orpheus is not that the task be completed, that 
there be a work, but that he ―face this point, grasp its essence, grasp it where it appears, where it 
is essential and essentially appearance: at the heart of night‖ (171). In other words, Orpheus must 
see and accept the invisible as invisible, even though this means that the work must forever 
remain without conclusion and completion in the heart of night. 
Implicit, here, is a similarity between the writer‘s task and the dreamer‘s task. Just as the 
writer‘s attempt to represent destroys the work, so too the dreamer‘s dream cannot contain that 
which is real and rational because it belongs to the ―night,‖ which is that which neither the dream 
nor language can limit and destroy. Simply put, the writer and dreamer are limited by a similar 
jurisdiction to that of the law which restricts Orpheus. Eurydice cannot be placed as an object 
within the subject-object paradigm as this would require the presence of a subject which, as I 
have indicated, Orpheus is not. Similarly, that which the writer and dreamer attempt to represent 
cannot be positioned in relation to the il y a of expérience. 
As Blanchot aptly observes, despite its seemingly straightforward requirements, it is 
Orpheus‘ destiny ―not to submit to this ultimate law‖ and, in his failure, he inevitably ―betrays 
the work, and Eurydice, and the night‖ (172). The great tragedy of Orpheus is not that he fails in 
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his quest, but that his quest was doomed for failure from the outset by the fact that the ―heart of 
night‖ is invisible and inconceivable (171). What Orpheus does ‗achieve,‘ though, is the violent 
destruction of the work.
6
 Such violence and destruction are, however, absolutely necessary to his 
task as an artist, as, in their absence, he would cease to feel the desire necessary to create. 
Despite the futility of his quest and his inevitable destruction of the work, it is the possibility of 
the work that is at the root of his desire – not looking would be ―infidelity to the measureless, 
imprudent force of his movement, which does not want Eurydice in her daytime truth and her 
everyday appeal, but wants her in her nocturnal obscurity, in her distance, with her closed body 
and sealed face – want[ing] to see her not when she is visible, but when she is invisible‖ (172). 
In Blanchot‘s allegory of artistic representation, the paradox of Orpheus‘ endeavour is 
that ―the presentation or unconcealment of the beautiful form in the daylight [. . .] can only be 
achieved by submitting to the prohibition against looking Eurydice in the face, by recognizing 
that she can only be approached by turning away‖ (Critchley 49). If Orpheus ―did not turn his 
gaze on Eurydice, he would be betraying his desire and thus would cease to be an artist‖ (49). 
Like Orpheus, the writer, reader, and dreamer gaze at the other night. They turn towards the 
work and thus inevitably fail in their quest because language constitutes an otherness that both 
demands and interrupts representation. Their desire is the same as the artist since it is premised 
on a necessary self-deception. Although the artist, as il y a, believes that he/she has the agency 
with which to complete his/her task, it is the desire that destroys the work that is its source, and 
which therefore constitutes an (im)possible Orphic encounter. 
In addition to depicting Orpheus‘ failure as a necessity, Blanchot‘s allegory of artistic 
endeavour suggests that the artist is in a continuous state of turning. By this, he means that the 
artist is perpetually on the cusp of both possibility and impossibility. Indeed, Orpheus‘ 
transgression of the law reveals that he has, in fact, ―never ceased to be turned toward Eurydice‖ 
and, since his gaze has always been directed at her, that he perpetually forfeits his subjectivity 
(―Orpheus‘s Gaze‖ 172). Such knowledge also implies that his gaze has been directed at her 
from the moment that he sets out to retrieve her. Orpheus‘ loss of agency is necessary for his 
attempt to reveal Eurydice in her essence and absence. Like Orpheus, the writer cannot capture 
                                                     
6
 In this context, ‗violence‘ does not signify a physical force that is exercised with harmful intent. 
What is referred to is the ‗violence‘ with which language limits, defines and thus destroys the 
work it seeks to represent. 
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an absent work because the word ‗absence‘ itself is named, written, and read, which allows for 
variable interpretations by the imaginative mind of the il y a. That is, the work literally says the 
word absence and thus cannot be absence. The work always remains a representation. As il y a, 
the artist cannot make demands of the work because the work makes demands of him/her. By 
rendering subjectivity indeterminable, the work is able to surpass itself – that is, to be ―united 
with its origin and consecrated in impossibility‖ (174). The possibility of literature consequently 
lies in the impossibility of completing the work, and is the moment in which impossibility has 
not yet been faced by Orpheus. (Im)possibility is therefore the suspended moment before the 
gaze in which the artist deludes him/herself by attempting to deny the fact that the work is 
inevitably workless. 
In Blanchot‘s rendition of the myth, Orpheus, after the necessary failure of purposeful 
desire, becomes an aimless wanderer. This is pertinent to my discussion of dreamscape and death 
because, according to Blanchot, ―aimless wandering is already death‖ and is, furthermore, worse 
than death (―Death as Possibility‖ 102). By this, he means that the aimless artist, who lacks the 
necessary agency to complete his/her goal, perpetually encounters death through continual dying, 
which renders the representation of absence as absence impossible. In other words, as Critchley 
explains, Orpheus is always in a ―relation with death,‖ not only in his engagement with the 
Underworld – the very space of death – but also in his continual loss of agency (79). If this is so, 
it is necessary to discuss the inextricable link between death and the writer, reader, and 
dreamer‘s respective encounters with representation. In the next section of my discussion, I shall 
show that expérience and (im)possibility are fundamental to Blanchot‘s concern with death. The 
ultimate aim of the section will be to elucidate the paradoxical and complex nature of the 
(im)possibility of representing death through dreamscape. 
 
The Double Death 
 
In order to address the notion of death‘s (im)possibility, it is necessary to discuss Blanchot‘s 
notion of the ‗double death,‘ which juxtaposes the unknowability and otherness of death – 
otherwise understood as ungraspable absence – with the subjectless expérience of death that is 
dying. Ultimately, for Blanchot, as Critchley maintains, the (im)possible Orphic endeavour is in 
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a twofold ―relation with death‖ (79). In this section, I aim to discuss the aporia that the Orphic 
figure encounters in attempting to represent death – as absence – in dreamscape, while inevitably 
succumbing to continual dying in expérience. 
Garth Gillan explains that, in rejecting Martin Heidegger‘s conception of death as 
―ultimate possibility,‖ Blanchot‘s writing assumes death as ―non-truth beyond possibility‖ 
(―Levinas on Blanchot: Commentary‖ 50). Apart from rejecting Heidegger, Blanchot argues, in 
―Death as Possibility,‖ against the way in which the ―great religious systems of the West‖ 
conceptualise death as truth, since such systems describe death as ―an event of the greatest world, 
an event which can be located and which gives us a location‖ (96). By contrast, his 
understanding is that death is absence, non-place, and, as Levinas suggests, ultimately 
―uninhabitable‖ (qtd. in Gillan, ―Levinas on Blanchot: Commentary‖ 50). Additionally, for 
Blanchot, as Gillan explains, any attempt to locate or comprehend death is impossible because as 
an ―event‖ or experience it ―is anonymous: on meurt – one dies, the self is dissolved in an 
impersonal event which is the limit and the end of possibility‖ (―Levinas on Blanchot: 
Commentary‖ 50). Since death is no thing, and exacts an abandonment of subjectivity, it remains 
unknowable, incomprehensible, and unrepresentable. What exists, instead, is only a continual 
state of dying that occurs in expérience, which is the space of aimless ―wandering (errance)‖ 
(Gillan, ―Levinas on Blanchot: Commentary‖ 50). 
For Blanchot, death is unknown and cannot take place in a location or space that a subject 
might occupy. In the subject‘s absence or non-occurrence, that is, death becomes a space that is 
uninhabitable and absolutely other. Blanchot eloquently explains its unknowability, an ever-
present doubt for the living, as follows: 
 
No one is sure of dying. No one doubts death, but no one can think of certain death 
except doubtfully. For to think of death is to introduce into thought the supremely 
doubtful, the brittleness of the unsure. It is as if in order to think authentically upon the 
certainty of death, we had to let thought sink into doubt and inauthenticity, or yet again as 
if when we strive to think on death, more than our brain – the very substance of truth and 
thought itself – were bound to crumble. This in itself indicates that if men in general do 
not think about death, if they avoid confronting it, it is doubtless in order to flee death 
and hide from it, but that this escape is possible only because death itself is perpetual 
flight before death, and because it is the deep of dissimulation. Thus to hide from it is in a 
certain way to hide in it. 
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    So the ability to die ceases to be a meaningless issue, and we can understand how a 
man‘s goal might be the search for death‘s possibility. (―Death as Possibility‖ 95) 
 
The above passage emphasises the inevitability with which a subject doubts death. This 
doubtfulness, for Blanchot, is necessary because subjectivity and death do not occupy a space 
simultaneously: ―if you are, death is not; if it is, you are not‖ (101). According to him, death is 
an absence which a subject seeks to describe as absence. Yet, because he/she forfeits agency in 
any attempt to comprehend it as an unknowable phenomenon, a subject is always caught on the 
cusp of a paradox: the desire to name and ‗know‘ death intimately, and the inevitable 
impossibility of doing so. Indeed, it is the very absence of a subject in death that is the catalyst of 
the search for its possibility. As already noted, though, this search, in literature and dreams, is 
impossible because the subject is already absent from the expérience of writing, reading, or 
dreaming. For the subjectless writer, reader, and dreamer, who are transformed into the 
continually dying but never dead il y a, the concept of death and its representation as absence – 
which, as I have indicated, can only be a misrepresentation – is impossible. 
Like so many of Blanchot‘s aporetic arguments, dying is both the answer to and reason 
for the impossibility of death. Indeed, the il y a, as he explains, is afflicted with a ―sickness in 
which dying does not culminate in death, in which one no longer keeps up hope for death,‖ and 
in which death ―comes no longer‖ (―Death as Possibility‖ 103). For the artist, located in the 
expérience of the night and governed by desire, it is the il y a that makes death impossible. What 
remains instead of death is dying, a phenomenon ―stronger than death‖ that suspends the ―break 
between life and death‖ (Smock, Translator‘s Remarks x). Through the continual process of 
turning and dying, Orpheus both loses agency and never completes his task of revealing 
Eurydice as she exists in the Underworld. He cannot render the invisible visible. In the same way, 
the writer is in a continuous state of dying: for him/her, writing ―is the experience of language 
unworking itself in an irreducible ambiguity that points towards an exteriority that would scatter 
meaning – a dizzying absence, the space of dying itself‖ (Critchley 38). 
The space of dying is crucial to my study because the ‗I‘ that dies, like the ‗I‘ that is not 
in expérience, is not within dying and, consequently, cannot arrive at death or make of it an 
achievement. This problematic is essential to any consideration of the representation of death in 
dreamscape. As Critchley observes, within the other night, dying renders the subject unable to 
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rest since ―one can neither go to sleep nor unto death, for there is something stronger than death, 
namely the simple facticity of being riveted to existence without an exit, what Blanchot calls le 
mourir in opposition to la mort: the impossibility of death‖ (36). When le mourir, otherwise 
understood as dying, is placed in opposition to la mort, otherwise known as the absence or 
unknowability of death, the subject becomes indeterminable in that it becomes the il y a. While 
the Orphic figure may attempt to represent death, which is already unrepresentable, the il y a is 
already dying. 
Language reduces death to a concept and thereby forecloses on its absolute alterity. In a 
continuous state of dying, Orpheus can neither accomplish the completion of the work nor place 
death at a distance, which he has to do if he is to bring Eurydice to the daylight. He is caught in a 
paradox which is symptomatic of the worklessness of his endeavour. Worklessness, the 
impossibility of the work being completed, resides in the very possibility of the work. For 
Orpheus and the Orphic figure, any work, and any attempt at representation, is an attempt at 
denying, or rather forgetting, that worklessness is inevitable. The origin of the workless work ―is 
the experience of the other night,‖ which ―introduces not death, but the interminable facticity of 
dying‖ (Critchley 51). By implication, Orpheus‘ continual state of dying is both the reason and 
consequence for the worklessness of his endeavour. His desire, self-delusion, and forgetfulness, 
which drive him to complete his task, are the possibility of the work. Conversely, his continual 
death renders his attempts futile by placing at the centre of the work its worklessness – the 
impossibility of it ever being completed. Despite the impossibility of representation, the 
perpetual state of dying, of being on the cusp of living and death, the possibility of representation 
always simultaneously exists for the Orphic figure, thereby allowing for (im)possibility. 
In the same way that Orpheus cannot grasp Eurydice, the artist cannot represent death, 
since the moment pen touches paper, forming words in ink, death upon death upon death occurs. 
Rooted in what Blanchot terms ―the night,‖ death is impossible; yet, within the expérience of the 
night, dying allows for a literary work‘s possibility. Devoid of sleep, such expérience of the night 
is where dreams unfold for the absent subject, or il y a. Blanchot, with reference to the sleep of 
Dasein, that is, the sleep of existence, being, and subjectivity, speaks of the night as being 
transformed ―into a reserve of possibility‖ (see Critchley 36). His notion of the impossibility of 
sleep is thus related to the impossibility of rest: although they evoke a sense of conclusion and 
restfulness, both death and sleep are impossible. Whereas sleep lacks restfulness because it 
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cannot exist with the onset of the dream, death cannot provide rest because of the interminability 
of dying. 
I have explained how the (im)possibility of death can be understood through Blanchot‘s 
understanding of the double death, which juxtaposes the idea of death‘s unknowability and 
absence with the notion of continual dying. In relinquishing agency, the writer, reader, and 
dreamer, all Orphic figures, die continually, wander aimlessly, and are unable to comprehend or 
present death as unknowable non-place, or as absence. Furthermore, as subjectless il y a, they are 
delusional and unable to recognise the impossible worklessness at the heart of their endeavours. 
In the following section of my chapter, I shall discuss how Blanchot clarifies the double death in 
his reflection on the suicide‘s ironic attempt to assert and master death by claiming it as an act of 
subjective will. As I shall explain, he ultimately likens the goal of the suicide to that of the 
writer, who, by extension, as I have already indicated, is similar to the reader and dreamer. 
   
The Suicidal Writer 
 
The notion of the double death is concerned with a necessary self-deception on the part of the 
artist, who encounters both deaths, namely death as absence and dying, simultaneously in his/her 
attempt to represent death. This attempt is comparable to the suicide‘s desire to grasp death and 
make it a reality that can be located, decided upon, and mastered by a subject. Like the Orphic 
figure, the suicide inevitably fails, as all such attempts necessarily negate agency. The double 
death ultimately conflates possible death – suicide – with impossible death – dying. Blanchot 
suggests that suicide involves an attempt to make death a possibility open to an agent, that is, 
something that may be achieved or accomplished in an arena of action. For the suicide, like the 
Orphic figure, however, dying always renders death impossible because it is continuous and 
interminable: death cannot be a possibility when subjectivity is absent in dying. 
I have already argued that representation is deemed possible largely due to the Orphic 
figure‘s self-deception and forgetfulness of the worklessness at the origin of the work. In his 
discussion of the double death, Blanchot contends that the suicide is self-deceived in that to ―kill 
oneself is to mistake one death for the other [. . .]. I go to meet the death which is in the world, at 
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my disposal, and I think that thereby I can reach the other death‖ (―Death as Possibility‖ 104). 
Like Orpheus, who wishes to see the night as the other night, the suicide wishes to make death 
an experience while ignoring the trap of continual dying. By implication, the subject, who wants 
to choose death or make of death a choice, is self-deceived. Critchley explains that such self-
deception is ―to mistake the second conception of death for the first and hence to believe that 
death is a possibility‖ (84). He likens such bad faith to that of a writer ―who always mistakes the 
book that is completed and published for the work that is written‖ (84). When this logic is 
extended to the relationship between dreaming and dying, the self-deception here at stake is that 
of the dreamer who mistakes the dream for a subjective act in reality. The possibility of the 
dream, then, is an epiphenomenon of the dreamer‘s mistaken belief that possibility is his/hers to 
claim. 
The same goes for the artist. Just as Orpheus mistakes the other night for the first night 
and wishes to represent the invisible as invisible, so too does the artist attempt to grasp death by 
representing it, and thereby ignoring the fact that he/she is perpetually dying. In ignoring the 
expérience of dying, the artist deceives him/herself into believing that he/she is an agent and that 
his/her task is therefore achievable. Artistry is thus analogous to suicide, which, Blanchot argues, 
is characterised by a ―refusal to see the other death, the death one cannot grasp, which one never 
reaches‖ (―Death as Possibility‖ 106). In other words, he rejects death as a possibility open to a 
subject: ―when I kill myself, perhaps it is ‗I‘ who does the killing, but it is not done to me. Nor is 
it my death – the one I dealt – that I have now to die, but rather the death which I refused, which 
I neglected, and which is this very negligence – perpetual flight and inertia‖ (―Death as 
Possibility‖ 107). In short, Blanchot suggests that dying, as a perpetual instant, is the space in 
which death cannot be made an achievement, even by the suicide. By attempting ―to short 
change death and to experience it‖ on his/her ―terms,‖ Blanchot‘s suicide, like the Orphic figure, 
is led only to ―failure and perpetual wandering‖ (Gregg 50). 
Given its failure, suicide reveals itself to be a deluded fantasy of affirmation (Critchley 
81). Masquerading as a ―great affirmer of the present,‖ the notion of a voluntary or willed death 
deludes the artist into believing that one might ―kill‖ oneself ―in an ‗absolute‘ instant, the only 
one which will not pass and will not be surpassed‖ (Blanchot, ―Death as Possibility‖ 103). In a 
discussion of Franz Kafka‘s fiction and Fyodor Dostoevsky‘s suicidal character Kirilov in The 
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Possessed, Blanchot asks: ―Can I die? Have I the power to die?‖ (96), and answers this question 
as follows:  
 
you cannot write unless you remain your own master before death; you must have 
established with death a relation of sovereign equals. If you lose face before death, if 
death is the limit of your self-possession, then it slips the words out from under the pen, it 
cuts in and interrupts. The writer no longer writes – he cries out an awkward, confused 
cry which no one understands and which touches no one. Kafka feels deeply here that art 
is a relation with death. Why death? Because death is the extreme. He who includes death 
among all that is in his control controls himself extremely. (91) 
 
To strive to make of death a controlled choice is to desire the freedom it offers in opposition to 
life. Curiously, in this regard, Blanchot reflects as follows on Kafka‘s character depiction: 
―apparently while they are alive Kafka‘s heroes carry out their actions in death‘s space‖ (92). As 
established earlier, though, death is not a space but a non-space, and a subject lacks agency in 
expérience, which makes the choice to die redundant. This is the tenor of Blanchot‘s suggestion 
that Dostoevsky‘s Kirilov ―wants to know whether [. . .] he can render death active‖ (―Death as 
Possibility‖ 100). However, in believing himself capable of such action, he loses his ―ability to 
be able‖ (Critchley 84). Blanchot supports his argument that death cannot be an achievement by 
pointing to the example of the man who fails to experience the freedom of death in the act of 
committing suicide. The man ―who is hanging himself, after kicking away the stool on which he 
stood,‖ does not feel ―the leap which he is making into the void‖ (Blanchot, qtd. in Critchley 35). 
Rather, he ―feels only the rope which holds‖ and binds him, ―as he had never been before to the 
existence he would like to leave‖ (qtd. in Critchley 35). 
Insomnia too is riveted to existence: rather than releasing the subject into another world, 
it is, as Critchley maintains, ―a reluctant vigilance in the night, the night that slowly exhausts and 
sickens the body, thereby preventing sleep the following night and thus engaging insomnia‘s 
vicious circle‖ (36). The vicious circle of insomnia, an (im)possible space which is shared by the 
writer, reader, and dreamer, is one that death cannot inhabit, only dying. Dying both ensures 
death‘s impossibility and answers death‘s impossibility. 
With regard to the possibility of death, Blanchot revises his earlier question, ―Can I die?‖ 
(―Death as Possibility‖ 96), by placing the will to choose death at the heart of the impossibility of 
  
28 
 
death: ―Is suicide possible?‖ (102). The answer to his question is not a simple one. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, doubt overshadows ―the call of possibility in death‖ (102), and where 
suicide ―wishes to eliminate death as future‖ (104), it can in fact only ever ―want the borders of 
death,‖ not death‘s possibility (105). Thus, as Critchley argues, the ―contradiction of the suicide 
is analogous to that of the insomniac, who cannot will him or herself to sleep because sleep is not 
an exercise of the will – sleep will not come to the person who wills it‖ (80). When Blanchot 
writes of Orpheus‘ leap of desire, he ultimately describes the suicide‘s leap of possibility. As I 
have demonstrated, though, Orpheus necessarily fails in his task because he is bound by the law 
that makes the task possible. The writer, reader, and dreamer, who are all figured by Orpheus, 
also fail in their task because they too lose the means with which to grasp possibility as 
possibility. While invested with imaginative ability, and so desire, the artist is always limited by 
the rule that prevents the realisation of such desire. The Orphic figure, in engaging with the idea 
of death by attempting to comprehend and represent it in dreamscape as a space that one can 
approach, dies continually, and is therefore unable to complete his/her task to grasp the invisible. 
The writer, who does not make ―death his work of art‖ is ―linked to the work in the same 
strange way in which the man who takes death for a goal is linked to death‖ (―Death as 
Possibility‖ 105). Both the writer and suicide, that is, are deluded into thinking that their plans 
have direction and a goal (106). They are suspended in a paradox that renders their endeavours 
similar. By likening the suicide to the writer, Blanchot emphasises the ambiguous and 
(im)possible concerns at the heart of literary and oneiric representation, which is always in a 
relation to death:  
 
How is it possible to proceed with a firm step toward that which will not allow itself to be 
charted? It seems that both the artist and the suicide succeed in doing something only by 
deceiving themselves about what they do. The latter takes one death for another, the 
former takes a book for the work. They devote themselves to this misunderstanding as if 
blind, but their dim consciousness of it makes of their task a proud bet. For it is as if they 
were embarking upon a kind of action which could only reach its term at infinity. 
    This comparison of art to suicide is shocking in a way. But there is nothing surprising 
about it if, leaving aside appearances, one understands that each of these two movements 
is testing a singular form of possibility. Both involve a power that wants to be power even 
in the region of the ungraspable, where the domain of goals ends. In both cases an 
invisible but decisive leap intervenes: not in the sense that through death we pass into the 
unknown and that after death we are delivered to the unfathomable beyond. No, the act of 
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dying itself constitutes this leap, the empty depth of the beyond. It is the fact of dying that 
includes a radical reversal, through which the death that was the extreme form of my 
power not only becomes what loosens my hold upon myself by casting me out of my 
power to begin and even to finish, but also becomes that which is without any relation to 
me, without power over me – that which is stripped of all possibility – the unreality of the 
indefinite. I cannot represent this reversal to myself, I cannot even conceive of it as 
definitive. It is not the irreversible step beyond which there would be no return, for it is 
that which is not accomplished, the interminable and the incessant. 
    Suicide is oriented toward this reversal as toward its end. The work seeks this reversal 
as its origin. (106) 
 
In Blanchot‘s musings, the question of death is the source of the (im)possibility of literature. 
When he argues that the heart of the work is its own worklessness, he essentially suggests that 
death, as absence and other, is at the centre of the work. Worklessness, absence, and death are 
synonymous in that they are the impossibility of the work‘s finality and closure. Death is the 
very essence of the excessive nature of the literary work or dream. 
In his explanation of the double death and suicide, Blanchot‘s ultimate argument is that 
engagements with death in literature are inconclusive. Critchley succinctly explicates this 
argument as follows: first, ―writing has its unattainable source in an experience of worklessness 
and a movement of infinite dying,‖ which is ―described as the desire of Orpheus‘ gaze‖ and ―the 
impossibility of death‖ (84). Secondly, and conversely, ―the extremity of this experience cannot 
be faced‖ as ―it would be intolerable to the human organism‖ (85). As such, the writer, like the 
suicide, is ―necessarily blind‖ and ―experiences bad faith with regard to what takes place in 
writing‖ (84). In his/her attempt to write about death, the writer is ―maintained in an ambiguous 
relation, divided between two slopes, and drawn by two opposing temptations‖ (85). While 
Critchley goes on to say that it is perhaps ―the task of the reader [. . .] to see this ambiguity as 
ambiguity and to point towards its source‖ (85), this too is impossible because the reader, like the 
writer, forgoes agency in the process of interpretation, and so too continually dies. 
The impossibility of representing death both fuels and counters the desire of the Orphic 
figure to make death known, and to employ suicide as a means to ‗know‘ death in order to prove 
him/herself master over it. This unattainable goal is fundamental to my thesis in that the 
ungraspable and unrepresentable nature of death means that what is produced as a work is in fact 
a series of catachrestic ―misrepresentations‖ or ―representations of an absence‖ (Critchley 86): 
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Eurydice‘s ―death mask‖ is, as Critchley puts it, ―a face for that which has no face‖ (86). The 
work that is produced posits ―the necessary inadequacy of our relation to,‖ and the inadequacy of 
our representations of, death (86). In the night of the il y a, ―death is impossible‖ (77), and in its 
representation, when ―all familiar objects disappear, something is there but nothing is visible‖ 
(67). In representing death, the il y a, who is fuelled by imaginative desire, which is the 
possibility of the work or dream, only reduces it to existing as an excessive misrepresentation, 
which is the work or dream‘s impossibility, in the space of dying.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have discussed three foundational issues, namely the way in which expérience 
displaces the subject, the space of expérience as one of (im)possibility, and the dissolution of 
subjective rationality in the space of (im)possibility. Furthermore, I have established that 
expérience is always in a ―relation with death‖ because of the worklessness that exists at the 
heart of a work and the displacement of the subject by the continually dying il y a (Critchley 79). 
Through close readings of Blanchot‘s interpretation of the Orpheus and Eurydice myth, I 
have elucidated the concept of the (im)possibility of expérience and its relevance to dreams and 
literature. Apart from this, I have discussed the notions of the double death and the suicide so as 
to explain the relationship of the writer, reader, and dreamer to dying. I have contended that, for 
the artist, who is synonymous with the writer, death cannot be represented without self-
deception. By removing death from its traditional conception as a possibility open to a subject 
who is positioned in space to a non-position and non-place, Blanchot suggests that death evades 
categorisation.  
The problem of representation, I have argued, is even more pronounced when death is 
represented through dreamscape since such representations emphasise the limits of the 
imagination (which is compelled by desire) in the writing, reading, and dreaming expérience. 
Orpheus‘ desire governs both the artwork, which is inconclusive, as well as his continual death, 
which presupposes a forfeiture of agency that occurs before he has even set out on his journey to 
the Underworld. Orpheus‘ failure does not end with Eurydice remaining in the Underworld 
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either: after his doomed quest, he is ―finally torn to pieces by a band of Thracian women. 
Workless, his remains are scattered and his body thrown into the River Hebrus where it still 
mutters ‗Eurydice, Eurydice‘‖ (Critchley 51). His persistent voice is the excess of his 
simultaneously necessary and failed attempt, which was only ever inspired by his desire for 
Eurydice. That is, his mutterings from the River Hebrus may be regarded as the remnants or 
debris of his inability to finalise his objective. 
In the following chapter, my discussion turns to the ways in which dreamscapes in 
literature may be analysed in the context of Blanchot‘s notion of (im)possibility. The various 
works that I discuss all illustrate and problematise Blanchot‘s concept of expérience. Since 
expérience is the space in which (im)possibility occurs, the chapter will establish the foundations 
for my thesis‘ overriding argument on the (im)possibility of representing death. That death 
cannot be represented is a concern shared by all the texts under discussion. They all ask the 
following questions: if death is no thing, how can one represent it in literature? How can 
dreamscape represent death if the writer, reader, and dreamer are already in a relation with 
death? 
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Chapter Two: The Writer, Reader, and Dreamer of Expérience 
 
Oneiric narrative; let‘s say, rather: Imagination, freed from the control of reason and from 
concern for verisimilitude, ventures into landscapes inaccessible to rational thought. The 
dream is only the model for the sort of imagination that I consider the greatest discovery 
of modern art. But how can uncontrolled imagination be integrated into the novel, which 
by definition is supposed to be a lucid examination of existence? How can such disparate 
elements be united? That calls for a real alchemy! (Kundera 80–81) 
 
The epigraph to this chapter poses an important question about literary analysis when read in the 
context of Maurice Blanchot‘s notion of expérience. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Blanchot claims that the subject cannot exist within expérience and that, when attempting to 
express the limitless realm of the imagination, language fails as a medium of expression by 
virtue of its limitations. For this reason, the dreamscapes in the texts under consideration both 
manifest and seemingly problematise Blanchot‘s notion of expérience, particularly when 
considering the necessary presence of the reader. When Milan Kundera asks ―how can 
uncontrolled imagination be integrated into the novel, which by definition is supposed to be a 
lucid examination of existence?‖, the reader – who, as I have established in my previous chapter, 
is analogous to the writer – becomes all the more important since his/her expérience is essential 
for literature to ‗occur.‘  
With reference to writing and dreaming, this chapter will explore the loss of subjective 
agency, and with it the dissolution of rationality, as a consequence of the emergence of the il y a. 
The position of the reader, which is emphasised by all the works under discussion, will be 
examined in relation to Blanchot‘s notion that a loss of subjectivity is necessary in order to 
encounter the text. The aim of the analyses is to reveal that, whenever a subject engages with a 
literary work, the subjectless domain of the il y a arises. In other words, the purpose of the 
chapter is to provide readings of the works that call attention to interpretation‘s constant need for 
supplementation and therefore its continuous inconclusiveness. 
To this end, my analyses of the works will all focus on a loss of subjectivity and 
rationality. I shall begin with an assessment of the fluid states of the character Ovid, and his 
engagement with other characters‘ shifting positions, in David Malouf‘s An Imaginary Life – a 
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novel that draws attention to alterity and the process of becoming other. Following this, my 
attention will turn to the narrators‘ characterisation, their anonymity, and hallucinatory moments 
of irreality, in Alan Warner‘s These Demented Lands. Next, I shall discuss the nameless 
protagonist‘s entrapment in an interminable dream in Richard Linklater‘s Waking Life. Finally, I 
include in my chapter a discussion of Cormac McCarthy‘s The Road because it portrays a radical 
resistance to expérience. In this novel, the characters‘ attempts to defy a loss of subjectivity and 
rationality are shown to be delusional. 
 
An Imaginary Life 
 
The Writer, Reader, and Dreamer 
 
An Imaginary Life, which is written as ―the letter [he] will never send‖ to the reader (18), tells 
the story of Ovid, a ―cynical metropolitan poet‖ exiled from Rome to the rural lands of Tomis by 
Emperor Augustus (31). Denied his ability to write, speak, or be understood in Tomis, Ovid‘s 
progressive shift to a state of otherness is emphasised. In a foreign land, where his language and 
Roman culture are useless, and all value of his Roman self is lost, he encounters a wild boy – 
without language and raised by wolves – with whom he forms a bond. The relationship between 
the two characters, and their otherness to each other as well as to the native people of Tomis, 
exemplify Blanchot‘s notion of the loss of self in expérience and also the ways in which states of 
being may alter in dreamscapes. 
An Imaginary Life contains many parallels with Blanchot‘s reading of the Greek myth of 
Orpheus and Eurydice: like the artist Orpheus, Ovid is cast into a foreign realm where his 
language is useless to him. Where Orpheus pursues ―the night‖ in order to bring Eurydice into 
the light of day (Blanchot, ―Orpheus‘ Gaze‖ 172), Ovid wanders the wild lands and pursues a 
wild boy who he wants to know and to whom he wishes to teach Latin. Like Orpheus‘ failed 
quest, his pursuit of the wild boy reveals the limits of his rational Roman perception. Only 
through his subsequent loss of self is he freed from his cultural perceptions of reality and 
therefore of the confines of language. The night through which Orpheus travels in his quest for 
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Eurydice is mirrored by the landscape of Tomis that Ovid wanders. Furthermore, Blanchot‘s 
reading of Orpheus and Eurydice‘s story, where art ―is mind – which is nothing if it is not a 
work‖ (Blanchot, ―Death as Possibility‖ 88), resonates with Ovid‘s description of Tomis as ―a 
state of mind, no place‖ (Malouf 16). In this light, Tomis exists as a work of the imaginative 
mind that Ovid, as a dreamer and writer, dreams and writes into being. As an imaginative space, 
it allows for the dual possibility of events and impossibility of subjectivity, despite the irony of 
Ovid‘s deluded sense that he is able to perceive his self. 
Yet another similarity between the narratives of Orpheus and Ovid is their withdrawal 
from the rational world. As I have argued, when Orpheus descends into the night with the 
intention of retrieving Eurydice, he has already disobeyed the laws of the gods before he even 
sets out on his journey. In the same way, Ovid, as a wordsmith accustomed to Roman ways, is 
cast into a primitive land where the Roman rules of culture and language do not apply – so much 
so that they are useless to him. As a result of his linguistic and cultural isolation, his necessarily 
subjectless expérience is articulated as a withdrawal from the world (indeed ―from the universe‖ 
[Malouf 98]), which invokes Marshall‘s description of Blanchot‘s conception of writing as ―an 
alternative experience of withdrawal of and from the world‖ (231). Ovid‘s exile is thus in a 
relation to writing, and, since he is also a dreamer, the novel concerns itself with his relation to 
dreaming: Tomis, as the imaginative mind, is the space in which he wanders ―in a dream‖ 
(Malouf 17). Tellingly, Ovid, with reference to his writing and attempts to represent the 
landscape, wonders how long he spends ―half sleeping, half dreaming?‖ (112). 
As a writer and dreamer, this character‘s expérience is the space in which he loses 
subjective agency and encounters moments of becoming other than himself. Notwithstanding this 
depiction of his forfeiture of subjectivity, he still appears to know his self and to be aware of his 
loss thereof in expérience. Indeed, he muses about his legacy persisting in Rome in his absence – 
―Have you heard my name? Ovid? Am I still known?‖ – and questions whether he is 
remembered and his works still read: ―Have I survived?‖ (19). Given his awareness that he is no 
longer the man he once was, Ovid seems here to express both a willingness to, and a knowledge 
of having, become other than he is, even though this would be impossible in expérience. While 
he seems to know his self, and although this apparent knowledge drives him to become other, he, 
like Orpheus, cannot possess such knowledge and is thus doomed from the outset of his journey. 
Nevertheless, Ovid, unlike the protagonists of the other works under discussion, who remain 
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anonymous or oblivious of their subjectivity in the expérience of dreaming, seems able to allow 
his self an expérience of writing and dreaming. I discuss this paradox of a willed loss of 
subjectivity, of an ultimately impossible subjective experience of expérience, later in this chapter. 
As I have already noted, Ann Smock observes that, in dreams, ―one sometimes thinks one 
knows one is dreaming, but only dreams this‖ (Translator‘s Introduction 3). Ovid, in Malouf‘s 
novel, makes much the same point when he expresses his inability ―to tell [him]self this is a 
dream‖ (18). In expérience, there can be neither an ‗I‘ nor a self which can be called ‗mine.‘ 
Ovid‘s inability to distinguish between dreaming and waking states can thus be interpreted as a 
consequence of his loss of rationality in expérience and the emergence of il y a at the cusp of 
(im)possibility between states of dreaming and being awake. What is particularly interesting in 
the novel is not merely that he seems able to relinquish subjectivity, but that he appears to be 
able to situate his being as both a self and other. Through the dream expérience, Malouf explores 
―the path of identification‖ in which Ovid, identifying as self, willingly journeys into Tomis and 
the imaginative mind and assumes the position of being other to his self (Randall 52). As I have 
indicated, though, his ability to know his self in the dream and writing expérience is 
categorically impossible: like Orpheus, it would seem that he is deluded in believing he has 
agency. 
It must therefore be acknowledged that Ovid occupies no subject position, and is, instead, 
the il y a of expérience, which, as I have explained in my second chapter, is a space of 
heightened alterity. For instance, he relates a dream in which he is transformed into a pool of 
water that ―break[s] in circles‖ (Malouf 62). According to Don Randall, the image of ripples 
extending across the water surface allegorically represents the progression and disintegration of 
self to and in that which is other to Ovid: the ―circles of self are broken, the self breaks in circles, 
upon contact with the other‖ (49). In this sense, Randall suggests, the novel demonstrates a 
―strong tendency to find in otherness (or alterity) the stimulus and orientation for a creative 
unsettling of identity‖ (1). The next section of this discussion will expand on Randall‘s notion of 
concentric and disintegrating states of being by focusing on Ovid‘s alterity and the process 
through which he becomes other than himself in the expérience of dreaming and writing. 
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Becoming Other 
 
According to Randall, An Imaginary Life, while portraying ―encounters between self and other‖ 
(1), engages with alterity in a way that ―requires [. . .] a push beyond the realm of I-and-you‖ 
(56). In terms of Blanchot‘s formulation of expérience, this is inevitable since it is impossible for 
an individual subject to be aware of an encounter with that which he/she cannot know. In 
expérience, neither a self nor other can exist. Ovid‘s belief that he knows himself in dreaming 
and writing, and that he is able to become other and remain aware of having done so, would 
appear to negate this assertion were it not for the fact that in believing this he is necessarily 
deluded. As such, it is important to trace the ways in which he deludes himself in these 
encounters in order to arrive at an understanding of the text‘s conception of the (im)possibility of 
expérience. 
By pushing beyond the paradigm of ―I-and-you‖ (56), Randall suggests, the novel depicts 
the ironic moment when ―the ‗I‘ self-consciously‖ seems to engage ―in the processes of [. . .] 
becoming‖ other (3). Ovid appears to undergo a ―creative self-transformation, a self-
overcoming,‖ when encountering that which is other to him, that ―responds to and moves toward 
the version of being the other manifests‖ (1). Indeed, expérience, here, is not singularly 
concerned with loss of self or subjective agency, but extends to the ―not-I,‖ to ―all that stands 
beyond the tenuous and inescapably contingent border of the self‖ (2). Ovid‘s loss of subjective 
agency therefore indicates that expérience involves a concern with an implied other, a 
relationship between self and other, and the self‘s being surpassed through an encounter with the 
other. Indeed, it is only when he relinquishes his subjective position in expérience that Ovid 
recognises the meaning of the encounter between the self and its strangeness: ―something came 
out of the depths of my sleep towards the point where we stood facing one another, like a 
reflection to the surface of a mirror. It was there, outside me, a stranger. And something in me 
that was its reflection had come up to meet it‖ (Malouf 24–25). 
In his discussion of the relationship between the self and other, Gerard Loughlin suggests 
that Ovid‘s loss of self is intrinsically a part of becoming other in that ―[w]e become ourselves 
through losing ourselves, through becoming other and arriving elsewhere‖ (115). Like Orpheus, 
who continuously turns, looks back, and loses his self, Ovid‘s becoming other is an interminable, 
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thoroughly ateleological, process in which he forfeits control. His process of turning is therefore 
always a process of becoming through what Randall calls his ―dream-mediated encounter[s]‖ 
(52). As much becomes clear when he recounts a dream of centaurs: 
 
Suddenly, not out of the dust of the plain but out of the swirling sky, a hoard of forms 
came thundering towards me – men, yes, horses, yes, and I thought of what I do not 
believe in and know belongs only to our world of fables, which is where I found myself: 
the centaurs. But these were not the tamed creatures of our pastoral myths. They were 
gigantic, and their power, the breath of their nostrils, the crash of their hooves, the rippling 
light of their flanks, was terrible. These, I knew, were gods. 
In whom I also do not believe. 
I stood in silence in the centre of the plain and they began to wheel in great circles about 
me, uttering cries – not of malice, I thought, but of mourning. Let us into your world, they 
seemed to be saying. (Malouf 23–24) 
 
The liminal creatures of which Ovid dreams are what Randall calls ―figures of radical otherness‖ 
(52). In encountering the centaurs and becoming other through the process of dreaming, however, 
Ovid, like Orpheus, turns to look back and so loses control of that which he dreams. 
Besides representing the self/other dichotomy, Ovid‘s encounter with, and subsequent 
representation of, the centaurs as sublime beings that are not the tame, pastoral creatures depicted 
in Roman myth signifies an Orphic failure. His revelatory realisation indicates a disjuncture 
between the word ‗centaur,‘ bound to a categorical Roman logic and meaning, and the beings 
that evolve through the logic of the dream. Furthermore, his surprise at what he encounters 
means that his expectations are thwarted, and this, in turn, points to the reductive nature of 
linguistic signification. Much like the quest of Orpheus, in which he fails to bring Eurydice into 
the light of day, the centaurs cry ―Let us into your world‖ as they urge Ovid to represent them 
precisely because he has failed to do so. His very failure requires him to supplement his 
representation. 
Having established the novel‘s preoccupation with relations between the self and other, 
my discussion now turns to the way in which Ovid‘s expérience results in his loss of self and 
metamorphosis into the other – in the form of the landscape, the Child, and the animal. Through 
expérience, Ovid writes of possibilities which are limited by language and rationality: ―at night I 
discover in sleep what the simple daylight blinds me to: that the dark side of every object here, 
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and even more, the landscape itself when night shadows flow over it, is a vast page whose 
tongue I am unable to decipher, whose message I am unable to interpret‖ (17). In ―dream after 
dream,‖ in which he ―ventures out‖ into unknown lands (17), the landscape of Tomis comes to 
represent a ―state of mind‖ (16), emphasising that the work that is his writing and dreaming 
occurs in the limitless and imaginative mind of the il y a. 
Expérience, then, is the means by which Ovid‘s self is placed in an ―unrelating relation‖ 
with the landscape as other (Levinas 295).
7
 In writing of the landscape and human perception of 
it, he tells the reader that he/she, as with the tamed centaurs, knows ―only landscapes that have 
been shaped for centuries to the idea we all carry in our souls of the ideal scene against which 
our lives should be played out‖ (Malouf 28). After questioning the ordered, cultivated, and 
manicured nature of these landscapes, he then asks the reader the following: ―Do you think of 
[. . .] whatever land it is you now inhabit – as a place given to you by the gods, readymade in all 
its placid beauty? It is not. It is a created place. [. . .]. If the gods are there, it is because you have 
discovered them there, drawn them up out of your soul‘s need for them and dreamed them into 
the landscape to make it shine‖ (28).  
Proceeding from the premise that landscape is a created space of otherness, Randall 
observes that this passage, along with others in the novel, seeks not ―to resolve difference or 
assimilate otherness‖ but rather to recognise, acknowledge, and value it (12). Ovid‘s following 
words support this contention: 
 
Embrace the tree trunk and feel the spirit flow back into you, feel the warmth of the stone 
enter your body, lower yourself into the spring as into some liquid place of your body‘s 
other life in sleep. But the spirits have to be recognised to become real. They are not 
outside us, nor even entirely within, but flow back and forth between us and the objects 
we have made, the landscape we have shaped and move in. We have dreamed all these 
things in our deepest lives and they are ourselves. It is our self we are making out there, 
and when the landscape is complete we shall have become the gods who are intended to 
fill it. (Malouf 28) 
 
                                                     
7
 Levinas‘ term ―unrelating relation‖ posits that subject and other are always in a sense unrelated 
because they can never merge, never coexist as the same entity. 
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As this passage indicates, Ovid‘s loss of self is a function of the ‗I‘s‘ relationship to that which is 
other than itself. In order to become other, however, it is necessary for the self to become absent 
in expérience. The process of becoming the landscape, or rather of overcoming one‘s separation 
from it once its otherness is recognised, is described in another of this character‘s dreams: 
 
I dreamt, one night lately, that I walked out in the moonlight, down the street between the 
huts, hearing the little pigs grunting behind me, singing of their sucked bones, and out 
into the strange light of the marshes. The moon rode high over the reeds, its face halved 
by a line of cloud like a lidded eye – my own eye, half-waking, and open like an owl‘s 
eye, half-closed on the dark. 
    I walked on the river, which swirled like smoke under me, and I was moonlight. I came 
to the further bank. A vast plain stretched away, flat, flat, featureless, it was all dust, 
swirling beneath me, and out of the dust no creature stirred, not a serpent even. It was 
original. (23) 
 
Ovid, the ‗I‘ in this passage, becomes other by dissolving into the landscape, by transforming 
into moonlight. In a later dream, this metamorphic process recurs when he becomes the stars that 
―fade into‖ and ―through‖ him (53). Later still, he describes himself as a pool of water: ―still, 
reflecting starlight. I sleep. I wake‖ (62). In contrast to Blanchot‘s conditions of expérience, in 
terms of which the subject cannot exist, Malouf foregrounds Ovid‘s position through the 
repetition of the pronouns ―I,‖ ―my,‖ and ―me,‖ thereby suggesting that the ‗I‘ is a precondition 
for becoming other. Like Orpheus, who deludes himself into believing he can complete his work, 
Ovid manages to delude himself into believing he is able to know himself in expérience and thus 
willingly transform himself. 
The process of becoming other by merging with the landscape is mirrored in the 
contiguous relationship that Ovid develops with the feral child. Indeed, more so than any other 
figure in the novel, the Child represents otherness: ―[a]nd suddenly, as if my imagination had 
indeed summoned him up, I see the child, and stranger still, recognize him‖ (48). The Child, in 
this moment, is ―crouched like an animal, staring at us, a small boy as lean as a stick, with all the 
ribs of his torso showing under the tanned skin, bony elbows and knees, and straight black hair to 
the shoulders. He springs up at my cry and goes bounding away into the woods‖ (48–49). In 
describing the Child‘s stare as ―something I could not have imagined,‖ Ovid explains that he has 
―invented nothing like it‖ in his poems ―that were full of strange creatures caught between man 
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and some higher or lower creature‖ (50). He does, however, relate the Child‘s stare to a look he 
has seen ―from the eyes of‖ his ―Child, so many years ago‖ (50). Here, Ovid refers to the 
imaginary child who he remembers encountering in his years in Sulmo when he was himself a 
child. Indeed, in terms of his loss of self and the alterity of expérience, the similarity between the 
imaginary child and the feral child are important: firstly, the latter represents a site of alterity for 
Ovid, with whom he shares a similar state of otherness in Tomis amongst the Getae people, and, 
secondly, the former represents a childlike quality of imagination which he, as an adult in the 
present, encounters again. 
Ovid‘s affinity with childlike states is evident in his propensity to experience Tomis from 
a child‘s perspective and with a child‘s imaginative capacity. His foreignness in Tomis renders 
him akin to a child in that he is without language and a frame of reference. In comparing himself 
to a child, he writes ―I communicate like a child with grunts and signs, I point, I raise my 
eyebrows‖ (17), and he asks, ―[w]ill I have to learn everything all over again like a child? 
Discovering the world as a small child does, through the senses, but with all things deprived of 
the special magic of their names in my own tongue?‖ (22). Through likening himself to a child, 
Ovid thus relates himself to the Child and its otherness. Before the Child is taken into Tomis, he 
wonders whether he ―speak[s] to himself, having no other creature with whom to share his mind, 
his tongue? Being in that like myself‖ (52). In imagining the Child as being without language in 
the woods, Ovid recognises a similarity to his own experience, without the Getae tongue, in 
Tomis. The relationship between him and the Child indicates that their encounters, interwoven as 
they are with his memories of the imaginary child, proceed through his expérience of dreaming 
and writing, which is the space of alterity and engagement with otherness. Indeed, his initial 
confrontation with the Child appears ―as in a dream‖ (49). 
Throughout the novel, the Child, who is invested with otherness by both Ovid and the 
Getae people, possesses an element of transcendence, which derives not only from his ability to 
survive the harsh conditions in the environment, but also from the fact that he has ―no notion of 
the otherness of things‖ (96), that he ―has not yet captured his individual soul out of the universe 
about him‖ (95). Indeed, it is both his capacity to transcend into that which is other, as well as his 
own otherness, that inspire attempts by the Getae to understand him. When the Getae women 
show hostility towards him because he is not of their kind, they do so by investing him with an 
otherness akin to animals and the supernatural. According to Ovid, it is the Child‘s hirsute 
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appearance that disturbs the women the most and makes them unwilling to touch him. The 
character Ryzak reflects as follows on the powers that the Child may have: ―Might the boy [. . .] 
have the power to turn himself into a wolf in winter months? Is that how he survives? And where 
might we be then? Might he be able to creep out at night and open the gates to his brothers? Or is 
it some spirit even more terrible than wolves that has nursed him?‖ (66). More significantly, 
though, the Child‘s alterity, in his relationship with Ovid, consists in the fact that he constitutes a 
space of transformation. The captured boy‘s self is ―outside him, its energy distributed amongst 
the beasts and birds whose life he shares, among leaves, water, grasses, clouds, thunder – whose 
existence he can be at home in because they hold, each of them, some particle of his spirit‖ (95–
96). By contrast, Ovid recognises that, as time goes by, he increasingly loses his Roman self and 
moves into an othered, isolated state: ―[w]e are moving in opposite directions, I and the Child, 
though on the same path‖ (95). 
The path that Ovid shares with the Child is one of transformation. Both characters 
undergo processes of change and becoming other. Through their engagement with each other, 
these two alienated figures become spaces of transformation. I have already mentioned Ovid‘s 
dream in which his self ―break[s] in circles‖ as he transforms into a pool of water (62). In the 
same dream, he also encounters the Child who is instrumental in the destruction and assimilation 
of his self: the boy ―stoops towards me. He does not lap like the deer, but leaning close so that 
his breath shivers my surface, he scoops up a handful, starlight dripping from his fingers in 
bright flakes that tumble towards me, and drinks. I am broken again‖ (62). In this instant, the 
Child, who is dreamed and written into being, is imbued with a transformative adaptability in 
Ovid‘s expérience. 
Ovid‘s descriptions of the Getae people‘s superstitions, and of the Child‘s difference 
from village boys, emphasises the novel‘s concern with transformation: ―[t]hese people believe 
profoundly in sleepwalkers and stealers of souls‖ (75). Earlier, he reflects as follows on their 
belief that a being is capable of dreaming itself into the body of that which is other: ―as if each 
creature had the power to dream itself out of one existence into a new one, a step higher on the 
ladder of things‖ (28–29). When a local boy, Lullo, is struck with a fever, he ponders the 
villagers‘ suspicions:   
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Do they suspect, as I have begun to do, that the Child has lost his spirit, and may, while 
we see him curled asleep in his corner, be capable, like the shaman, of walking out of his 
body, through the walls into the next room, and into the boy Lullo‘s body while he is 
absent on one of those dream journeys small boys are accustomed to make, into the 
hunting woods or out over the river? (75–76) 
 
The Child‘s role as a site of transformation is further evident in the way in which he is likened to 
a wild animal or a wolf when Ovid tries to handle him while he is sleep-walking: ―he lashes out 
at me, spitting, tearing at my cloak, and runs to the wall of the stockade, scratching at the raw 
timber in his attempt to scale it. When I try to calm him he throws me off and begins to howl. It 
is the old howling from his days in the forest. He howls, scratching at the wall like an animal‖ 
(106). Becoming animal, then, is an important depiction of the process of transformation that is 
staged in the novel. In Ovid‘s expérience as a pool of water, a deer, like the Child, comes to 
drink from him (and so takes part of him into itself) (62). Similarly, in another dream, he 
describes his pursuit of the boy: ―I hunt the Child in my sleep. I warm him with my breath. Or is 
it the breath of some animal that warms him, wolf or deer, even there in my dreams?‖ (54).  
From these examples, it is clear that Ovid positions himself, as subject, in relation to 
animals, and, by encountering them, allows them to consume him. In encountering animals 
through writing and dreaming, though, he loses his self, and becomes a not-I. In these moments, 
when his inevitable loss of self occurs, the transformative ability of animals and the Child are 
akin to that of alterity. Where he encounters animals by dreaming of them, he becomes them, and 
vice versa – the point being that there are no subjective or objective entities in dreams. There is 
only the imaginative space with which to become that which is encountered. Indeed, Ovid writes 
as follows of this transformation: ―All day I wander in a dream, as isolated from the world of 
men as if I belonged to another species‖ (17).  
Malouf‘s depiction of animals as sites of transformation may be placed in relation to 
Blanchot‘s notion of dying. In the course of arguing that wolves, in An Imaginary Life, represent 
―alterity as a locus of misrecognition, a manifestation of othering that deforms‖ (46), Randall 
points out that these animals are not only a site of alterity, but also a manifestation of the way in 
which both the self and the other are absent in the moment of expérience. To become other, 
which is to say, to change, to transform, requires an accommodation of alterity. In this regard, 
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the figure of the wolf, like dying, emphasises the impossibility of ever ‗arriving‘ at a point of 
transformation because the process of becoming is always incomplete. 
The deforming and transforming quality of wolves clearly plays on the myth of the 
werewolf. Indeed, Loughlin writes that the transformative figure of the werewolf is, throughout 
the novel, ―the very figure of translation between animal, human and divine―that silently slinks, 
after Ovid‖ (114). From the first, wolves are related to the work‘s concern with transformation 
and alterity. In this regard, Ovid muses as follows: ―there is indeed some part of our nature that 
we share with wolves, and something of their nature that is in us, since there are men, at certain 
phases of the moon, who can transform themselves into wolves‖ (10). That he shares some of the 
animals‘ nature is evident when he recounts a dream in which he digs in the ground with wolves 
digging beside him: ―[w]e dig together, and they pay no more attention to me than they would to 
a ghost. But I know that whatever it is they are scratching after, I must discover it before them, or 
I am lost‖ (18). 
From this discussion, it is apparent that Ovid is aware of and accommodates his own 
expérience. As I have indicated, though, the problem with this depiction is that expérience 
precludes one from occupying the position of subject. Despite this contradiction, An Imaginary 
Life offers a sustained account of the self‘s continual transformation through its contact with 
alterity in the moments of dreaming and writing. In many respects, one finds a similar 
preoccupation with the dissolution of subjectivity in Alan Warner‘s These Demented Lands, a 
novel which depicts the moments of writing, reading, and dreaming simultaneously. It is to this 
novel‘s hallucinatory narrative and concern with the dissolution of rationality that my discussion 
now turns. 
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These Demented Lands 
 
The Writer, Reader, and Dreamer of Expérience 
 
Written as a sequel to Alan Warner‘s Morvern Callar and structured as a double narrative, These 
Demented Lands describes happenings on a remote island popular with honeymooners.
8
 The 
story begins with the protagonist and first narrator, Morvern, travelling to the island on a boat 
that is capsized by a car ferry. Struggling to the surface, the last thing Morvern sees of the ferry 
is the legend ―Psalm 23‖ on its stern (4). Since this psalm is traditionally read at funerals, the 
suggestion is that Morvern drowns and the subsequent narrative occurs in a kind of purgatory. 
After swimming ashore, she journeys to The Drome Hotel, meeting along the way strange 
characters who all warn of the hotel‘s disturbing proprietor, John Brotherhood. Prior to her 
arrival at the hotel, the narrative is narrated by Morvern. Thereafter, the reader is introduced to 
the second narrator, the Aircrash Investigator, who stays at the hotel while collecting debris from 
an aircrash that happened a decade ago in his attempt to solve the mysterious death of the pilot 
Carlton. The novel ends with Morvern writing ‗The Letter‘ – an epilogue reminiscent of Ovid‘s 
unsent letter to the reader in Malouf‘s novel – in which she describes her travels to her father.  
 The fact that Morvern Callar concludes with the protagonist writing in a large notebook 
leads the reader of These Demented Lands to assume that this novel is an edited manuscript from 
Morvern‘s notes. Indeed, this assumption is reinforced by the fact that the reader is aligned with 
an internal reader – the novel‘s unnamed editor – who interrupts the narrative at various 
moments with paratextual data such as the following: ―Editor‘s note: torn text glued to 
manuscript: WEDNESDAY 17TH‖ (17), and ―[Editor‘s note: three words illegible; possibly 
Villain once says]‖ (59). The latter citation appears at the end of a chapter that trails off in an 
                                                     
8
 The story of Morvern Callar is centered on the actions of the bored-numb Scottish protagonist 
and narrator, Morvern, who upon discovering the suicide of her writer boyfriend, hides his body, 
publishes his novel under her own name, and goes on vacation with the proceeds. Returning only 
to claim his inheritance, she then continues her travels for an undisclosed period of time. It is 
assumed that the island in These Demented Lands is the same one mentioned at the end of 
Morvern Callar. 
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incomplete sentence.
9
 As an internal reader, the editor is implicated in the text in the sense that 
his/her mediation of it cannot be ignored because it controls the reader‘s response. 
By drawing attention to the work‘s materiality through questioning the validity of 
Morvern‘s letter, the unnamed editor‘s ‗additions‘ preclude the reader from forgetting that he/she 
is reading a text, thereby effectively interrupting any illusion of realism staged by the text‘s 
putative writers, namely, Morvern and the Aircrash Investigator. This is to say the putative 
writers‘ positions as narrators are destabilised by the position and presence of the putative editor 
whose interpolations ultimately result in a fragmented, aleatory plot, which eschews any form of 
realism. The narrative‘s unreliability destabalises the putative writers‘ expérience of writing. As I 
explained in my first chapter, reading is a similar process to writing. Given that this is so, the 
putative writers‘ expérience of writing seeks to destabilise the reader in his/her vicarious 
engagement with the text. In other words, the editor‘s ability to alienate the reader of the text 
calls into question the text‘s reliability by drawing attention to its fabrication. By confounding 
and bewildering the reader, this strategy opens up the possibility of expérience in the reader‘s 
reading of the novel. 
Part of this confusion may be ascribed to the fact that we cannot tell whether or not 
Morvern is alive, which links the dreamer‘s expérience to that of the writer and the reader. When 
Morvern‘s journey to the island is interrupted by the sinking of her ferry, as Andrew Van der 
Vlies notes, ―the reader is invited to wonder whether [. . .] the ensuing narration is a fabrication 
in the consciousness of a character at the moment of death‖ (289).10 The dreamlike quality of the 
narrative also portrays the dream expérience of the writer-figures. Shortly after the oneiric 
beginning of the novel, one is reminded of the notion of irreality when Morvern describes the 
island as ―crazy‖ and her experience of it as being ―like a dream‖ (Warner 52).11 
                                                     
9
 Other examples of the editor‘s notes include inserted posters like those advertising a ―Drag 
Party‖ (118), and a ―Mosquito Bite Competition‖ (151). Another insert shows an ―Argyll 
Archipelago Records press release glued into manuscript‖ (119). 
10
 This ambiguity is reminiscent of William Golding‘s novel Pincher Martin, a link which I 
discuss in detail in my third chapter. 
11
 Morvern‘s arrival at the island after the ferry accident also echoes William Shakespeare‘s The 
Tempest, in which Prospero conjures a storm that shipwrecks the boat carrying his daughter, 
Miranda. When Prospero asks her ―[c]anst thou remember‖ the island (1.2.38), she replies that 
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Like Orpheus and Ovid, Morvern is a wanderer in a dreamscape. Unlike these wanderers, 
however, the Aircrash Investigator does not narrate his own dream life – indeed, he only has one 
dream in the narrative. Instead, his dream expérience is established through Morvern‘s letter: her 
re-telling of it invites the reader into the Aircrash Investigator‘s dream expérience. In the 
following passage, the reader is provided with Morvern‘s account of the Aircrash Investigator‘s 
dream of his own drowning: 
 
he leaned against the base of the wall, shivering till he slept. And dreamt his river-
dreams: 
    Dark water took him as he stepped forwards – the weight on his shoulders forcing him 
face-down and downwards, legs kicking, sinking, till his wide-open eyes reached the silt 
of the bottom, where he drowned – his body bloating up over the days, till its bags of 
swole air gently lifted the prop and all floated downriver, through the interior and out, 
into the sandy whorls of the delta, the ballooned Investigator turned with the propeller out 
into the bay where they swirled down among the burning phosphorous beds and twisting 
barnacled metal of Alpha Whisky. The distended corpse hanging, turning round slow in 
the sanded water, held up the propeller till the pincers of lobsters, caught in a force ten‘s 
up-swirl and briefly tangled in the body‘s mesh, snapped at the huge sac of rot-gas. 
Freeing a massive silver bubble and its satellites, which rolled surfacewards, the emptied 
corpse dove to the seabed till it became bones. A bubble of methane hoisted the skull 
surfacewards where a bobbing gull pecked out the remaining eye jelly, the heavy dunt 
driving the skull spinning down again, where it fell among the bubbling phosphorous 
bombs. Filling with their gas, the skull leapt to the surface once more, only to be cracked 
in two by the slicing prow of the Psalm 23. 
    All this he dreamed, before he picked his way through the night to the river‘s bank, 
illuminated by the burning islands of branches and twigs, circling down the glen. (193–
94) 
 
As previously noted, narrative perspective, here, highlights the dream‘s representation of both 
the writer and dreamer‘s expérience. However, the passage also emphasises the reader‘s 
expérience because he/she is made aware of his/her necessary passivity in reading the dream. 
While the reader attempts to comprehend the dream and by whom it is dreamed, this is no longer 
necessary because it is the reader who is the il y a of expérience. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
she can, and that although it is ―far off‖ in her memory (1.2.44), it is ―rather like a dream‖ 
(1.2.45).  
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When Blanchot discusses the necessary self-deception that occurs in expérience, he 
describes precisely a situation in which it no longer matters to whom the dream belongs because 
it simply occurs. In that the positions of the writer and dreamer are not clearly defined, the 
reader‘s expérience of the novel is characterised by bewilderment. As such, when Morvern 
narrates the dream of the Aircrash Investigator, the reader is incapable of ascertaining whether 
this moment of expérience belongs to the former or the latter. The novel‘s layered concerns with 
expérience thus question the assumption that a subject dreams, reads, or writes. Drawing on 
Blanchot‘s understanding of expérience as an event that denies the existence of an active subject 
who knows his/herself and is able to situate his/herself within a rational framework, the 
following section of my chapter discusses the way in which Warner‘s novel portrays a loss of 
subjective agency. 
 
The Il y a 
 
I have established that a loss of subjective agency occurs in expérience. In the novel under 
discussion, a concern with the loss of identity emerges in the depiction of the honeymooning 
couples at the hotel who are literally represented as duplicates of one another. The ―seething‖ 
honeymooners, as the Aircrash Investigator describes them, are always ―unhappy to be stuck for 
a fortnight with couples so identical to themselves‖ because they are ―ultimately unable to 
differentiate themselves from each other‖ (73). Similarly, Morvern and the Aircrash Investigator, 
who are both writer-figures, are unable to distinguish themselves from each other, and thus 
present the reader with the difficult task of doing just that. While their similarity is 
acknowledged when the Aircrash Investigator plainly tells Morvern ―you‘re the same as me‖ 
(141), the novel establishes such contiguity mainly through their anonymity, as emerges from the 
plurality of the names they are assigned. For instance, Morvern recites the many names of the 
Aircrash Investigator: ―the one they call the Aircrash Investigator,‖ ―the Failed Screenwriter, or 
the Man From The Department of Transport, even [. . .] Walnut or Warmer,‖ and ―Houlihan‖ 
(16). Later, he is also referred to as ―The One Who … etc … The Debris Man‖ (133). So, where 
naming traditionally reflects a subject‘s identity, the multiple names and ambivalent positions of 
the novel‘s characters point toward a loss of subjectivity since they remain anonymous until the 
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reader discovers Morvern Callar‘s signature at the end of her letter, which is also the novel‘s 
conclusion.
12
 
 Clearly, the assignation of multiple names complicates the notion that a name invests an 
individual with subjectivity. Since he is labelled as ―The One Who Walked the Skylines of Dusk 
with Debris Held Aloft Above his Head‖ (50), ―the Aircrasher,‖ the ―One Who Walked 
Skylines,‖ and ―Monsieur Debris‖ (137), the Aircrash Investigator is depicted as an individual in 
continuous motion – a wanderer. This character‘s many titles and multiple characterisations 
thwart the reader‘s attempts to know and thereby limit him. As a result, despite the presence of 
names, his identity is always hidden and his presence thus remains inconclusive and 
indeterminate throughout the novel. Similarly, Morvern, on encountering a nameless ―guy‖ on 
her journey to the Drome Hotel, considers assigning herself various names (34): she 
contemplates ―Lynniata, or Serenella Cerano Berniez or other of the names that I‘d used to 
amuse me‖ (36–37). After further thought, she adds that ―[i]n the end it was my own name I 
spoke out and that he spoke back, the vowels pushing from the end of his lips‖ (37). 
Significantly, her name remains unknown for the reader and this is evident when the nameless 
man‘s utterance of it is depicted by a blank space: ―______‖ (37). Emphasising the novel‘s 
concern with concealing her name, Morvern, in reference to the blank space indicating her name, 
writes the following: ―(and here he said my name)‖ (37). Like the Aircrash Investigator, she is 
portrayed as an anonymous wanderer, and, as she approaches the Drome Hotel, is simply called 
the ―Newcomer‖ (93). 
The anonymity of these characters makes it difficult for the reader to situate them in the 
narrative. From the moment of the ferry accident, which raises the question of whether or not 
Morvern has survived, the reader is placed in a dreamlike space, the irreality of which troubles 
his/her attempt to position him/herself as a subject. The anonymous narrators‘ significance thus 
lies in the fact that they draw the reader into the selfless il y a of the writer and dreamer‘s 
expérience. In These Demented Lands, the self-deluded reader is therefore made aware of his/her 
own ‗position‘ as il y a by the fact that the aleatory narrative occurs in his/her mind. Indeed, as a 
consequence of being placed but not positioned in a double narrative, the reader, like the writer 
and dreamer, cannot situate him/herself. Accordingly, his/her experience of reading is one of 
                                                     
12
 Despite their anonymity, I have, for the sake of clarity, used the names Morvern and the 
Aircrash Investigator in this analysis. 
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expérience – that is, the space in which subjective agency is lost. The dissolution of rationality, 
which necessarily accompanies this collapse of subjectivity, will be the topic of discussion in the 
next section of this chapter. 
 
The Dissolution of Rationality 
 
From the outset of These Demented Lands, ambiguity invests the narrative with a dreamlike 
quality and questions the degree of agency the characters possess. In itself, the nonsensical and 
aleatory nature of the plot emphasises the writer-figures‘ lack of control over what they 
putatively write, and therefore their inability to situate themselves in a rational framework. 
Accordingly, the novel stages the dissolution of rationality concomitant on the collapse of 
agency. In this section of my chapter, my concern is with the way in which this dissolution is 
depicted through imagery of phosphorescence and the novel‘s focus on the effect of 
hallucinogenic drugs. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines bewilderment as ―[c]onfusion arising from losing 
one‘s way; mental confusion from inability to grasp or see one‘s way through a maze or tangle of 
impressions or ideas‖ (―Bewilderment‖). Just such confusion is articulated in the Aircrash 
Investigator‘s following description of the simultaneous familiarity and strangeness of the 
surrounding landscape: ―But my familiarity with those dimensions, every piece of earth covered 
by my own feet – that certainty was gone for a bewildering instant, then just as suddenly it leapt 
back to me and I recognised this land I saw. I frowned and walked on‖ (94).13 Overwhelmed for 
a moment by complete unfamiliarity, he loses all of his sense of place within the coordinates of a 
rational framework. 
                                                     
13
 The novel‘s depiction of the landscape, in this instance, brings to mind Sigmund Freud‘s 
―concept of das Unheimliche,‖ which is ―a commentary on uncertainty,‖ and analogous to ―the 
Disquieting Strangeness, the Uncanny‖ (Cixous 525). As a ―domain‖ that ―remains indefinite‖ 
(528), the Unheimliche lacks ―any nucleus‖ (528), and signifies a subject‘s confusion in 
engaging with both ―the familiar and the strange‖ simultaneously (529). 
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In the case of Morvern, it is an encounter with ―phospherous bombs‖ that triggers such 
confusion (8). In the course of the ferry accident, she leaps into the Sound and, once immersed, 
describes the underwater scene: 
 
A landscape of colours was glissanding on the lunar seabeds way below; my black legs 
slowly kicking so thin in silhouette. [. . .]. A constellation of pinkish bubbles rose up 
under my feet then drifted, swole, each bubble‘s angle reflecting a diamond nova from 
both its north and south pole. In the furthest distances of this universe the rising planets 
and blue stars from seabed geysers, a huge surface of tiny bubbles, wobbled under us lit 
by deepest flaring below: a coral reef gone insane in the colours of these killing seas. (5–
6) 
 
The ―rising planets and blue stars‖ that she perceives are in fact phosphorescence, and it is her 
utter confusion that transforms each bubble of oxygen into planets with north and south poles. 
Her description of the ―lunar‖ reality, which contains various gases, spheres, and seabed 
organisms that reflect light and colour, clearly signifies that her rational self cannot grasp the fact 
that she is drowning since she is in the grips of an oxygen-starved hallucination. While she is 
immersed in ―the bright and coloured water,‖ surrounded by the ―coral reef gone insane‖ that 
suddenly ―flickered and switched off like swimming-pool lights‖ (6), her perception is situated 
not in the realm of reality or its opposite, but in the irreality of dreaming. 
In the description of Morvern‘s drowning, the underwater realm is a world intractable to 
rational comprehension. Her hallucinatory description underwater, which can also be seen as an 
Orphic descent, not only signifies her ambiguous death – thereby serving as a catalyst for the 
oneiric narration that follows – but also serves as a leitmotiv that reappears at points in the novel 
when both her reality and that of the Aircrash Investigator are questioned. For example, after 
observing a filmed documentary of a crashed aeroplane that ―seemed to create a faint 
phosphorescence in the plane‘s wake‖ (81), the Aircrash Investigator suggests that Morvern feels 
unsettled by living things and submerged plane parts because ―their constant immersion‖ makes 
them ―thresholds into that underworld,‖ ―where the seabed is the earth, the unsteady surface a 
new sky‖ (50). The leitmotiv of phosphorescence, as a threshold to the underworld, is again 
evident in a description of Morvern‘s CD collection. At the hotel, the Aircrash Investigator 
notices light, reflected from a CD that Morvern holds, on the ceiling above them. At first unsure 
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what it is, his irrationality is dispelled when he realises ―it was a CD‖ (85). This image of light 
reflected on the ceiling echoes the novel‘s opening scene in which Morvern, while underwater, 
notices CDs ―lying on the Sound floor, shiny-side-up, reflecting the searing phosphorus colours 
lifting above them‖ (11). 
The role of the leitmotiv of CDs and phosphorescence in signifying the dissolution of the 
characters‘ rationality, and enhancing the dreamlike, aleatory quality of the narrative, is again 
evident in the scene in which Morvern hikes up a hillside. In her description, the ―whole island 
seemed to slip down through me like a disc, spread out round, saw otherside from up there, 
distant mountains lifting up as if explosions of steam, cloud pillars like spring blossom‖ (49). 
Significantly, her confusion and inability to locate herself through the exercise of reason is 
mirrored by the reader‘s bewilderment, for the aleatory aspect of these descriptions ensures that 
he/she necessarily inhabits the same space. In fact, the reader‘s bewilderment never gives way to 
certitude as he/she is finally unable to determine whether or not the entire narrative is merely 
Morvern‘s dying dream. 
The images of phosphorescence and CDs is thus germane to discussions of subjective 
agency and the loss of rationality, and point to the ambiguous opening of the novel wherein 
Morvern either dies by drowning, or is in the process of Blanchot‘s dying, and therefore engaged 
in the expérience of dreaming. Moreover, Morvern‘s preoccupation with CDs also draws the 
reader‘s attention to the possibility that the aleatory, hallucinatory dimension of the novel is a 
result of her intoxication with hallucinogenic narcotics. The following section of my chapter 
deals with the nature of hallucination and its relation to the irreal. 
 
Hallucinating the Irreal 
 
Hallucination, which is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as an ―idea or belief to which 
nothing real corresponds; an illusion‖ (―Hallucination‖), features prominently and points toward 
the dissolution of rationality by calling into question the narrators‘ perception and ‗authorial‘ 
control. The connection that Warner draws between hallucinations and dreams in These 
Demented Lands is not new. Indeed, Allan Hobson argues that ―[t]hrough the ages many 
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philosophers and poets have celebrated a kinship between our nocturnal visions and the 
hallucinations and delusions that distort the waking consciousness of the fortunately much 
smaller number of us who become psychotic by day‖ (xi). Hobson also suggests that dreams 
contain hallucinatory symptoms such as ―visual hallucinosis, disorientation, and recent memory 
loss‖ (xiii). Similarly, Bert O. States argues that dreams are ―a weak form of psychosis because 
they are attended by the same discontinuities and hallucinations that one finds in psychosis and 
delirium‖ (―Dreams: The Royal Road to Metaphor‖ 106). This connection is of particular 
significance to Warner‘s novel because the narrative foregrounds dreams, which are linked to 
hallucination and psychosis, and also dramatises both the impairment of thought and those 
emotions that derive from a dislocation from ‗reality.‘ 
These Demented Lands continually questions the reader‘s ability to read as a rational 
subject. Its dislocated and a-temporal narrative attempts to effect a forfeiture of readerly 
subjectivity: since Morvern and the Aircrash Investigator have difficulty maintaining rationality, 
the reader struggles to make sense of the text‘s irrationality. In Blanchot‘s theoretical paradigm, 
the reader is similar to the writer and dreamer, and since both Warner‘s narrators (who are 
writer-figures and dreamers in expérience) lose their subjectivity, so too does the reader of the 
novel have his/her subjectivity called into question by trying to understand representations of 
hallucinations in which these characters‘ rationality is notably absent. One such example is an 
hallucination experienced by the Aircrash Investigator while wandering the island looking for 
airplane parts: ―[i]n the middle distance the small, black aircraft-shape silently ascended again 
above the dark pines then swooped with a wobbling, dreamy, stilted manner, like a hallucination: 
unnatural, not moving like a Real Thing, it came worrying down towards the walking figure‖ 
(64–65). In this passage, hallucination, which is represented as dreamlike, imagined, and 
irrational, is contrasted with the ―Real Thing,‖ and thus signifies the dissolution of the writer-
figure‘s rationality, as well as that of the reader‘s, in expérience. 
Morvern‘s use of hallucinogenic narcotics in both Morvern Callar and These Demented 
Lands is obviously germane to this discussion of hallucinations and the dissolution of rationality. 
In the latter novel, Morvern‘s eyes are described as ―darkest black‖ (86), alluding to the 
physiological ―dilation of the pupils,‖ which makes the eyes appear black, that is caused by 
narcotics such as lysergic acid diethylamide, psilocybin, and psilocin (Stafford 68). These 
references to alterations in the dimensions of pupils are clearly related to the novel‘s concern 
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with the dissolution of subjective reality because perception is based on how much light the eye 
receives. After consuming narcotics available at the ―holistic escapist theme park‖ at the Drome 
Hotel on New Year‘s Eve (135), Morvern describes her eyes as ―bright below the tripping skies 
that were starting to shuffle in plains of stars‖ (127). Later that same evening, she hallucinates 
again as she looks at the stars: 
 
the telly repairers had got flashing semaphores diving and dotting, up and down and up 
and down the enormous aerials – each mast lighting up in different rhythm: chaos of 
blinkings, dyings and flourishings like God‘s Christmas tree: the entire sky seemed to be 
doing press-ups. I could see the stars lurking beneath the pulsars of masts and when I 
looked back at the Aircrash Investigator, a fantastic column of flame and smoke was over 
his shoulder. (215) 
 
The Aircrash Investigator also experiences the effects of hallucinogenic narcotics, as is evident 
in his following description of an hallucination that he experiences on a boat: ―the stars [. . .] 
were wobbling above us unsteadily‖ (165). The image of shifting and unsteady stars also relates 
to the underwater stars that Morvern sees at the beginning of the novel. 
In These Demented Lands, disorientation, the discontinuity of dreams, and hallucinations 
all contribute to emphasising the nonsensical and aleatory quality of the narrative, and so the 
writer-figures‘ forfeiture of selfhood. In the next section of this chapter, I discuss Waking Life, a 
film that shares with Warner‘s novel a preoccupation with oneiric and bewildering narrative. In 
this film, the protagonist, despite his inability to do so in the dream, attempts to resist expérience, 
and so exercise agency. As I argue, the inevitable futility of his attempts is emphasised by his 
anonymity. Unlike These Demented Lands, where the writer-figures become anonymous by 
virtue of their multiple names, this film‘s protagonist is completely nameless from beginning to 
end. 
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Waking Life 
 
Ambiguous Individualism 
 
The protagonist of Waking Life is a dreamer trapped in a lucid dream and left to wander the 
streets of an unknown city, conversing with strangers. Lucid dreams are characterised by the 
dreamer‘s apparent awareness that he/she is dreaming and is therefore able to exercise some 
degree of control over the dream environment. In Waking Life, there are several instances in 
which the protagonist seems to become aware that he is dreaming. However, his attempts to 
escape the dream end with him ‗waking‘ into another dream. This interminable process bears a 
strong relation to Blanchot‘s theory of the impossibility of sleep, in terms of which, as I have 
explained in my first chapter, the subject is unable to rest because he/she is essentially lost in the 
dream expérience and replaced by the ―obscurity of the Neuter‖ or il y a (Gillan, ―Levinas on 
Blanchot: Commentary‖ 50). 
As I have argued, in expérience, a subject cannot exist, and so the protagonist in the film, 
who continually dreams, has no agency with which to locate his self in the dream. In other words, 
the dream in which he is trapped cannot be identified as a dream which is dreamed by him 
because it is anonymous and impersonal. As il y a, the protagonist problematises the film‘s focus 
on individualism in that, although it seems to suggest that self-creation is a valid possibility in 
dreaming, this process requires a knowing subject who is aware of itself as an active agent. Since 
the protagonist is unable to waken from expérience, and therefore does not possess the agency 
with which to create his self, the film stages an idea that relates to Blanchot‘s notion of 
(im)possibility. While dreams seem to suggest that a subject may be able to create his/her self, 
the protagonist‘s dream expérience prohibits precisely this. 
Throughout, the film emphasises the ways in which dreamscape seemingly enables an 
individual to create his/her existence. In one such example, the protagonist is presented with the 
notion of existentialist self-invention when a university professor observes that ―your life is 
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yours to create‖ (Linklater 3),14 suggesting that an individual subject in its own dreamscape has 
the freedom and capacity to both know its self and control its actions as an agent. Self-awareness 
in dreams would therefore allow for an infinite array of possibilities for a subject‘s ―dream-
body‖ (16). Indeed, in the film, dreaming is seen as an imaginative act of freedom synonymous 
with self-creation, as is made clear by a nameless character whom the protagonist meets on a 
bridge and who reflects as follows: ―as one realizes that one is a dream figure in another person‘s 
dream, that is self-awareness‖ (15). Moreover, the possibility of self-awareness in dreams is 
described as freedom that is not ―landlocked‖ by the restrictions of dreams, the implication being 
that a subject, through acting outside of the dream‘s limitations, is free to ―[c]olor right off the 
page‖ (2). 
In terms of Blanchot‘s notion of the loss of subjectivity within the dream, this apparent 
self-invention is, however, no more than delusion and self-deception. Part of this delusion is the 
belief that, for the protagonist in the dream, ―everything is possible‖ (12). In a scene in which he 
does not appear, the viewer is invited to listen to a group of men having a conversation in his 
dream. Significantly, in this instance, the viewer shares the protagonist‘s perspective as il y a of 
the dream. In the scene, the men walk about uttering proverbial statements that resemble a 
manifesto of sorts. While the first man posits ―[t]he contrast between what life presently is and 
what it could be,‖ the last talks of ―[a]n affirmation of freedom so reckless and unqualified, that 
it amounts to a total denial of every kind of restraint and limitation‖ (12). The men‘s manifesto 
speaks to the notion of self-creation in that, if a dream could be grasped as a dream by the 
dreamer, the possibilities for the subject would be infinite. Nonetheless, this idea, which assumes 
that the dreamer is an active agent able to grasp the dream, is subtly undermined by the tension 
in the film between freedom and dream: despite the pervasive theme of freedom, the dreamscape 
always remains in the dream of the protagonist where he exists, without control, as an ever-
wandering il y a of expérience. 
Wandering is a pervasive theme in Waking Life, as is evident from both the ―meandering‖ 
nature of the narrative and the fact that the protagonist does not go anywhere (Speed 98). Unlike 
the hero of a Bildungsroman, who undergoes a development and reaches a point of conclusive 
                                                     
14
 All references to Linklater refer to the scene number from which the quotation is derived. In 
certain citations of the screenplay, I have omitted unnecessary punctuation marks due to the fact 
that the transcription on the Waking Life Movie website has not been edited. 
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retrospection, the unnamed protagonist of Waking Life is perpetually trapped, and never achieves 
the kind of ―recognition of one‘s identity and role in the world‖ that is typical of the 
Bildungsheld (Abrams 193). While the Bildungsroman is irrevocably teleological, the wandering 
that is staged in the film is, by definition, ateleological. By remaining anonymous, this character 
draws attention to the importance of names and naming in establishing an identity. This 
departure from standard forms of identity formation is visually represented with the word 
―maverick,‖ which is one of the few readable words in the film. Throughout the narrative, the 
protagonist wanders an unknown and unknowable land. Accordingly, the film also makes of the 
reader a wanderer and maverick. Given its structure of ―irresolution‖ (Speed 98), he/she, like the 
character, is lost as il y a in an interminable dream, unaware of any particular objective. In other 
words, the film‘s structure ensures that interpretation can only ever be indeterminate and so 
ateleological. 
Being lost is a strong indicator that the dream is always beyond the control of the 
character, despite its apparently lucid nature. He is ―passive‖ and ―listens‖ to others as opposed 
to grasping his self-aware identity (Cooper). So, for example, one of the other characters tells 
him that ―you haven‘t met yourself yet. [. . .] You might find yourself walking through a dream 
parking lot. And yes, those are dream feet inside of your dream shoes, part of your dream self, 
[but] the person that you appear to be in the dream cannot be who you really are. This is an 
image, a mental model‖ (Linklater 16). Since he does not know himself, it is not surprising that 
the protagonist remains unable to act decisively upon these words. He is, in fact, so removed 
from himself that he cannot remember his name or address, and this suggests that he is not a 
―clearly defined, goal-orientated‖ figure at the centre of a narrative in which someone does 
something (Speed 98). Indeed, the film‘s focus on the protagonist shifts constantly to other 
characters who are ―dramatically and compositionally central to the scenes in which they appear‖ 
(Speed 101), but who ―hinder the easy summarization of plot‖ (99). By never conclusively 
defining the protagonist‘s position, the film foregrounds the circularity and inconclusive nature 
of the dream, and hence the fact that the represented subject‘s self is taken hostage by the il y a. 
Without agency, and therefore the ability to act, the protagonist cannot create. While it 
would appear that he becomes more aware of his position as dreamer, he is never able to grasp 
the dream as a subject who knows that he is dreaming. At one point in the narrative, he converses 
with a character who he has previously encountered: ―I‘m beginning to think that it‘s [that is, the 
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dreamscape in which he finds himself] something that I don‘t really have any precedent for. [. . .]. 
It‘s like something outside of myself, like something transmitted to me externally. I don‘t know 
what this is‖ (Linklater 14). In the course of the same conversation, he goes on to say that ―this is 
the most in myself I‘ve been so far‖ (14). The fact that this is the first time that he speaks in the 
film emphasises his attempt to assert himself and to escape the passivity of the dream. Although 
he attempts to claim the dream as his own, he fails to do so since he cannot remember his name 
or address, let alone know his self. His attempts at agency are again evident in the final scenes of 
the film, in which he asks another character how he might escape the dream and ―really wake 
up‖ (18). What he is really asking is how he might restore his subjectivity. Read in terms of 
Blanchot‘s notion of the impossibility of sleep in dreams, the protagonist‘s attempts to wake 
from the dream and regain subjectivity are futile: he perpetually emerges into yet another dream, 
and thus never gains agency. 
 
The Dissolution of Rationality 
 
As is the case in These Demented Lands, Waking Life uses visual distortion to draw attention to 
the irreality of dreamscape and the accompanying loss of self. In the film, devices such as visual 
effects, sound effects, and the fracturing of linear time intimate the protagonist‘s awareness that 
he is ―not in an objective, rational world‖ (14). Linklater makes use of a finishing technique 
known as rotoscoping, a strategy through which animation is traced over live action film, thereby 
creating a composite image (see Gilbey). Owing to this layered finish, the film gains an 
otherworldly, disorienting quality similar to that of the world depicted in These Demented Lands. 
Linklater uses the same technique in a later film, A Scanner Darkly, in which, as Gilbey explains, 
the ―wobbly lines and shifting skin tone reinforce the impression of a world where divisions 
between reality and fantasy [. . .] have been gently eroded.‖  
Since it erodes the boundary between dream and reality, rotoscoping visually captures the 
wavering lucidity of the protagonist and the viewer in a world ―constantly in motion, [with] both 
the background of buildings and trees, and people themselves, all gently oscillating, pulsing, and 
vibrating‖ (Cooper). Linklater‘s use of sound effects also emphasises the dissolution of the 
protagonist‘s rationality. In the opening scene, a musical ensemble, overseen by a conductor, 
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warm up and tune their instruments before progressing to rehearsal. The conductor then instructs 
the musicians to play the piece in a different manner so as ―to sound rich and maybe almost a 
little wavy due to being slightly out of tune‖ (Linklater 1). Throughout the film, the music that is 
repeated is slightly discordant, even ―detached,‖ and therefore, like rotoscoping, engenders a 
sense of being on the threshold of dreaming and waking (1).  
This sense of dislocation and discontinuity is heightened by Linklater‘s subversion of 
narrative linearity. In the film, narrative time does not follow a logical, linear progression but, in 
Lesley Speed‘s words, is presented as a ―fragmented alternativ[e] to classical narrative 
temporality‖ (104). When time is fractured, a subject is unable to locate its self within logical 
frameworks and rationality thus collapses. In various encounters with other characters, the 
protagonist of the film is introduced to the idea that ―a second of dream consciousness‖ is 
―infinitely longer than a waking second‖ (5), and that time is the Eternal Present, a reference to 
Nietzsche‘s notion of the Eternal Return, which posits that ―in reality all events that constitute 
the order of the universe repeat themselves, in the same order, in a vast cycle, forever‖ (Burnham 
83). As Rand Richards Cooper maintains, the mention of the Eternal Return in the film 
emphasises the atemporality of the dreamscape, and, ultimately, that the protagonist is confined 
to a never-ending dream in which he cannot position himself in relation to a rational sense of 
linearity. 
Interestingly, too, the protagonist is unable to read the time on clocks or watches, which 
continually appear, because of their ever-shifting numerals. Images of clocks and watches thus 
also suggest the fact that time in the dream is unstable, opening only to an ever-present moment, 
which emphasises the protagonist‘s inability to situate himself with the coordinates of a rational 
framework. That the protagonist dreams of the instruments that measure time, but which cannot 
progress teleologically, is therefore highly ironic, and serves to enhance the ateleological nature 
of the narrative. Significantly enough, the film begins with the protagonist as a young child 
wearing a watch. Given that he admits that he has not worn a watch since the fourth grade, the 
age difference between the child and his present self, in itself, points to the film‘s non-linear 
nature (Linklater 14). 
From the above discussion, it is plainly evident that the nameless, wandering protagonist, 
despite the film‘s focus on his individualism and attempts to resist the expérience of dreaming, is 
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limited by his loss of agency and rationality. Troubled by the dislocation of linear time, and in an 
environment with which he is unfamiliar, the protagonist is precluded from grasping the dream 
as his own, and occupies the liminal space – irreality – between dream and lucid reality in which 
he is perpetually lost. In the next section of this chapter, I discuss the way in which Cormac 
McCarthy‘s The Road resists the moments of reading and dreaming. Unlike the other texts that I 
have discussed, this post-apocalyptic novel, when read in light of Blanchot‘s theory, significantly 
problematises the notions of subjectivity and expérience. Whereas the protagonist of An 
Imaginary Life appears to accommodate expérience, and that of Waking Life resists it, albeit 
unsuccessfully, the main characters in The Road reject it outright. As such, this novel, in which 
the characters inevitably forgo subjective control in dreaming and story-telling, offers an 
interesting perspective on Blanchotian notions of self within dreamscape. 
 
The Road 
 
Resisting the Moments of Reading and Dreaming 
 
The Road tells the story of a nameless father and son travelling in a barren landscape after a 
cataclysmic disaster has left the earth almost devoid of life – save for isolated bands of 
wandering cannibals who attack those who are exposed and vulnerable. Holding onto the belief 
that they are the ―good guys‖ (McCarthy 196), who are ―carrying the fire‖ of humanity (87), they 
journey south towards the coast in the hope of finding more hospitable lands and people like 
themselves. Tragedy haunts the novel from the outset, where the reader learns that the father – as 
sole guardian of the boy – is afflicted with a sickness that will lead to his death, and that the 
boy‘s mother, overwhelmed by the desolation after the cataclysm, has taken her own life some 
years after giving birth to him. In this desolate landscape, where survival depends on rationality 
and agency, the characters necessarily reject dreams and stories, as these hamper their chances of 
survival by providing a deleterious form of escapism that detracts from the constant vigilance 
that their context demands. In other words, dreams and literature, like the more literal threats 
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such as cannibals and starvation, are perceived as dangers to the characters‘ survival because 
they have the potential to imperil their sense of reality and agency.  
An interesting dichotomy exists between the two characters‘ response to dreams and 
stories, though, in that the father dreams of his lost wife and a time before the cataclysm, and 
attempts to tell stories to his son, whereas the boy, born into a cold, dark and ash-filled land, and 
knowing nothing of the world other than what is before his eyes, rejects the stories his father tells 
him, judging them as untrue. For this reason, the boy is more resistant to moments of story-
telling and reading than is the man, who frequently struggles with dreams of a lost world. So, 
while the landscape in which they find themselves is perceived as being abnormal and aberrant 
by the father, it is the land of which the father speaks and dreams that is perceived as such by the 
boy. Despite the fact that each of their struggles with stories and dreaming differs from that of 
the other, the characters‘ endeavours to avoid expérience expose a problematic disjuncture. 
While both seek not to surrender to expérience so as to retain agency, a prerequisite for 
remaining vigilant, they, nonetheless, engage with dreams and stories, which presupposes a lack 
of subjective control. In other words, the characters, even as they attempt to grasp agency by 
resisting expérience, succumb to it. For the man, this happens because dreams and story-telling 
are the only way of gaining some relief and reprieve from the stark apocalyptic environment. In 
the case of the boy, it is necessary to keep in mind that even though his dreams are more faithful 
to reality, he still dreams of this reality, which ironically emphasises that he is unable to avoid 
the subjectless space of expérience. Ultimately, the characters cannot keep constant vigilance in 
their reality by controlling expérience because, in their attempts to do so, they limit themselves 
to the subjectless realm of the il y a. 
Through foregrounding the role that literature plays in their lives, the novel positions 
these two characters as reader-figures. When the boy, at the beginning of the narrative, asks his 
father to read him a story (6), we are introduced to their divergent stances on reading. In telling 
the boy stories (42), the father willingly enters into a process of reading, thereby becoming a 
reader, and so encountering a loss of self. The boy, however, remains vigilant and separate from 
the experience, and merely hears (as opposed to engaging vicariously with) a story that is about a 
time and place beyond his frame of reference, and which is therefore ungraspable and untrue. 
The following dialogue exemplifies the characters‘ respective positions: 
  
61 
 
 
You have stories inside that I dont know about. 
You mean like dreams? 
Like dreams. Or just things that you think about. 
Yeah, but stories are supposed to be happy. 
They dont have to be. 
You always tell happy stories. 
You dont have any happy ones? 
They‘re more like real life. 
But my stories are not. 
Your stories are not. No. 
The man watched him. Real life is pretty bad? 
What do you think? 
Well, I think we‘re still here. (287) 
 
From this conversation, it is clear that the boy believes that the relation between story and reality 
should be premised on truth, whereas the father maintains that story-telling offers the kind of 
escape from reality that he seeks to avoid in dreaming. For the boy, stories that bear no relation 
to their desperate struggle for survival are simply useless (see 287). On the other hand, the father 
counters this position by asserting that narratives ―dont have to be true. They‘re stories‖ (286). 
His nostalgia enables him to conceive of a space in which literature offers a kind of fulfilment. 
Importantly, the novel presents literature as defunct in that it no longer possesses 
representational validity. Given that the entire world has changed and that nothing is 
recognisable, literature can no longer reflect the reality in which the characters find themselves. 
It has altogether lost whatever referential function it possessed prior to the cataclysm, and is 
nothing more than an ironic misrepresentation of their reality. As much becomes clear when the 
pair searches through an abandoned house and finds a collection of ―[s]oggy volumes in a 
bookcase‖ (138). After removing one from the shelf, and noticing that it resembles the 
surroundings, ―damp‖ and ―[r]otting,‖ the man replaces it unread (138). Later, the boy and he 
find an old wrecked boat with ―books in spanish strewn across the berth, swollen and shapeless. 
A single volume wedged in the rack against the forward bulkhead‖ (241). The point is again that 
literature is useless, and this is emphasised by its rotting and formless nature.  
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In recalling the following memory about books from the past, the man draws attention to 
the fact that literature relies on that which is now absent from his world, that is, the possibility of 
hope, of imagining a reality that is better than that which exists in the present: 
 
Behind him on a wooden table a small lamp burned. On the table books and papers. It 
had begun to rain and a cat at the corner turned and crossed the sidewalk and sat beneath 
the cafe awning. There was a woman at a table there with her head in her hands. Years 
later he‘d stood in the charred ruins of a library where blackened books lay in pools of 
water. Shelves tipped over. Some rage at the lies arranged in their thousands row on row. 
He picked up one of the books and thumbed through the heavy bloated pages. He‘d not 
have thought the value of the smallest thing predicated on a world to come. It surprised 
him. That the space which these things occupied was itself an expectation. He let the 
book fall and took a last look around and made his way out into the cold gray light. (199) 
 
From this passage, it is clear that literature is expected to say something, rather than nothing, 
about life – hence the destruction of the library, and the ―rage at the lies‖ that the books have 
come to embody. Having lost all representational validity, they have become mendacious. 
To an extent, then, the creative capacity of story-telling and literature is irrelevant 
because it no longer relates to the novel‘s post-apocalyptic landscape. As a defunct idea, 
literature belongs to a lost past, and serves no purpose in the reality of the characters. While it 
conducts a dialogue with their reality, it does so only insofar as its absence is noticeable. 
Ironically, in this regard, it follows that the readers of the novel are engaged in an enterprise that 
its characters find otiose and so reject. By representing literature as purposeless, the novel simply 
emphasises the reader in reading an impossible representation of absence. While the stories of a 
lost world are resisted by the man‘s replacement of the book on the shelf unread, the reader‘s 
expérience is ironically heightened since he/she encounters this act through reading. 
Although my discussion has so far focused on the characters‘ necessary attempts to resist 
literature in order to survive in their hostile reality, what is finally revealed is that these attempts 
not to surrender to expérience through story-telling are futile. But the protagonists also reject 
expérience in dreaming so as to protect themselves from their reality. For the most part, the 
expérience of dreams is far removed from the characters‘ unforgiving, horrifying reality. 
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While searching for food and supplies in an abandoned pharmacy, the man sees a ―human 
head beneath a cakebell at the end of the counter. Dessicated. Wearing a ballcap. Dried eyes 
turned sadly inward‖ (195–96). For him, this sight is juxtaposed with his dreams: ―[d]id he 
dream this? He did not‖ (196). Indeed, dreaming poses a threat to the man‘s presence in reality 
because he has dreams from which he is ―loathe to wake‖ (139), and, which he, upon waking, 
rejects as useless imaginative constructions that do not resemble his reality. Such disparity 
between dreams and that which is real is reminiscent of Caliban, in William Shakespeare‘s The 
Tempest, who describes as follows the frivolity of dreams and their unfaithful relation to reality: 
―Sometimes a thousand twangling instruments / Will hum about mine ears; and sometime voices, 
/ That if I then had waked after long sleep, / Will make me sleep again; and then in dreaming, / 
The clouds, methought, would open and show riches / Ready to drop upon me, that when I 
waked / I cried to dream again‖ (3.2.137–43). For Caliban, like the man, dreams provide a space 
for conjuring that which cannot, by any means, exist in reality. For the latter, the numerous 
dreams he has never redeem his waking reality and, instead, serve as perfidious reminders of a 
lost world that reinforce his sense that he is himself a ―being from a planet that no longer 
exist[s]‖ (163). 
Images belonging to the lost world, particularly those of his deceased wife, haunt the 
man‘s dreams: ―sometimes [. . .] he‘d wake in the black and freezing waste out of softly colored 
worlds of human love, the songs of birds, the sun‖ (291–92). In the following passage, the 
mendacity of literature is linked with the seductions of dreams that are removed from the reality 
of the characters‘ world: 
 
He mistrusted all of that. He said the right dreams for a man in peril were dreams of peril 
and all else was the call of languor and of death. He slept little and he slept poorly. He 
dreamt of walking in a flowery wood where birds flew before them he and the child and 
the sky was aching blue but he was learning how to wake himself from just such siren 
worlds. Lying there in the dark with the uncanny taste of a peach from some phantom 
orchard fading in his mouth. He thought if he lived long enough the world at last would 
all be lost. Like the dying world the newly blind inhabit, all of it slowly fading from 
memory. (17) 
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In a landscape of such dire circumstances, this mistrust of expérience forces the characters to 
reject what Blanchot terms ―insomniac vigilance‖ (qtd. in Farbman 121). Whereas insomniac 
vigilance suggests that, in expérience, the il y a keeps vigil while the subject sleeps,
15
 the 
characters are acutely aware that dreaming of anything other than reality ―is the call of languor 
and of death‖ (McCarthy 17). For them, a man in peril should only dream of peril in order to 
learn how to wake and restore his self. Since vigilance, which is to say active agency, is required 
in order to survive their perilous reality, the man and boy resist expérience. 
The man‘s attempts to avoid expérience are, however, futile as he lacks the ability to 
choose to wake from his dreams. As much emerges from the following passage, in which he 
daydreams about his wife: ―[f]rom daydreams there was no waking. He plodded on. He could 
remember everything of her save her scent. Seated in a theatre with her beside him leaning 
forward listening to the music. [. . .]. She held his hand in her lap and he could feel the tops of 
her stockings through the thin stuff of her summer dress‖ (17–18). Despite being awake and 
therefore ostensibly in control of his self, the man is betrayed by his imagination, lost in a 
daydream. He wakes from another dream in a basement that he and the boy have discovered and 
which is described as a ―tiny paradise‖ (159), a ―refuge‖ stocked with food and water: 
 
When he woke [. . .] he thought the rain had stopped. But that wasnt what woke him. 
He‘d been visited in a dream by creatures of a kind he‘d never seen before. They did not 
speak. He thought that they‘d been crouching by the side of his cot as he slept and then 
had skulked away on his awakening. He turned and looked at the boy. Maybe he 
understood for the first time that to the boy he was himself as alien. A being from a 
planet that no longer existed. The tales of which were suspect. He could not construct for 
the child‘s pleasure the world he‘d lost without constructing the loss as well and he 
thought perhaps the child had known this better than he. He tried to remember the dream 
but he could not. All that was left was the feeling of it. He thought perhaps they‘d come 
to warn him. Of what? That he could not enkindle in the heart of the child what was ashes 
in his own. Even now some part of him wished they‘d never found this refuge. Some part 
of him always wished it to be over. (163) 
 
                                                     
15
 If it is the il y a that wakes in the dream, then it is the self‘s subjectivity that wakes from the 
dream. 
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Since the world he once lived in is lost forever, his dreams of it serve only to haunt him and 
create distance between himself and the boy, for whom he is ―an alien‖ from a place that no 
longer exists (163). Although he resists the expérience of dreaming, he clearly lacks control over 
his dreams. This is further evident in the fact that, once awake and therefore restored as a subject, 
he cannot remember the dream, which emphasises his lack of agency since he, as a subject, could 
not be present to witness it, and therefore to remember it. 
When he is struck with a fever, the man‘s inability to choose expérience is again 
apparent:  
 
Rich dreams [. . .] which he was loathe to wake from. Things no longer known in the 
world. The cold drove him forth to mend the fire. Memory of her crossing the lawn 
toward the house in the early morning in a thin rose gown that clung to her breasts. He 
thought each memory recalled must do some violence to its origins. As in a party game. 
Say the word and pass it on. So be sparing. What you alter in the remembering has yet a 
reality, known or not. (139) 
 
The reality that is not yet known, or else simply denied, by the protagonists, is that the man is 
journeying towards death itself. While his journey and relation to death will be discussed in 
detail in my final chapter, mentioning it here is necessary because the closer that he comes to 
death – an ultimately unknowable, absent, and alterior state, which serves as an avenue of escape 
that is more possible than dreams – the more frivolous and removed from reality his dreams 
become. At the same time, of course, the disjuncture between reality and dreams grows more 
pronounced. When he is stricken with fever towards the end of the novel, his illness 
―brighten[s]‖ his dreams and makes the vanished world return (199). The suggestion, here, is not 
only that the man loses subjectivity in dreaming, but also that this relinquishment is intensified 
by his inevitable death. He dies, inevitably so, and, because he is already an Orphic figure, is also 
continually dying and therefore cannot resist expérience. 
That the man does not seek out dreams provides an interesting contrast to the myth of 
Orpheus. Whereas Orpheus pursues Eurydice and tries to capture her essence and represent her, 
the man actively attempts to avoid an Orphic encounter in dreams. While Orpheus seeks to see 
the invisible as invisible, the man, upon waking, knows that his restored self desires to forget the 
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absence as absence. Nevertheless, these two figures do have something in common, namely that 
neither achieves his goal. Orpheus fails to see Eurydice in the daylight and the man fails to resist 
dreaming and the loss of subjectivity. 
The differences between the man‘s dreams and those of the boy shed light on the 
alienating distance that exists between the characters. Unlike the man‘s frequent dreams, which 
are recollections of the past, the boy‘s seem to be less frequent as well as more faithful to the 
reality in which they find themselves. Indeed, the reader is only aware that the boy has dreams at 
all because he speaks about having ―some weird dreams‖ (269), the contents of which are 
disturbing and ―always about something bad happening‖ (288). The boy‘s experience confirms 
the man‘s sense that his son knows ―better than he‖ does that the lost world cannot be 
constructed ―without constructing the loss as well‖ (163). His recognition that the boy‘s dreams 
are ones of peril emphasises the man‘s attempt to resist the frivolity of dreams in order to 
survive: ―[w]hen your dreams are of some world that never was or of some world that never will 
be and you are happy again then you will have given up. Do you understand? And you cant give 
up. I wont let you‖ (202). As I have repeatedly indicated, though, such attempts at avoiding 
expérience are futile as the man, who has no control over what he dreams, inevitably and 
necessarily foregoes subjectivity and therefore succumbs to expérience. 
My reading of The Road shows that this novel, despite its ostensible rejection of literature 
and dreams, stages the inevitability of the loss of selfhood in expérience. In this respect, it has 
much in common with the other texts discussed in this chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through analysing their relation to Blanchot‘s notion of expérience, this chapter has established 
the status of the works under discussion as dreamscape narratives. Albeit in varying degrees, 
each stages a loss of subjectivity as an inevitable consequence of expérience. So, for instance, 
my analysis of Ovid‘s expérience in An Imaginary Life as writer and dreamer shows that this 
character undergoes a process of becoming other than himself. Similarly, my discussion of the 
anonymous writer-figures, hallucinations, and the fractured narrative of These Demented Lands 
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has revealed that this text too is concerned with the dissolution of subject-centred selfhood. With 
regard to Waking Life, I have argued that the protagonist‘s perpetual and involuntary dreaming 
may be read as an exemplification of Blanchot‘s notion of the impossibility of sleep. Finally, I 
have established the characters‘ futile attempts to resist expérience in The Road. While the man 
and boy attempt to survive by keeping constant vigilance, the agency that their endeavour 
requires is inevitably foregone in their engagement with dreams and stories.  
In each section of this chapter, I have focused on Blanchot‘s understanding of the 
moments of writing, reading and dreaming, and the ways in which they effect a loss of subjective 
agency and, with it, a dissolution of rationality. I have also traced the manner in which the 
various texts draw the reader into an experience of expérience in his/her encounter with them. 
Blanchot‘s theory of the reader‘s loss of subjectivity in reading suggests that even the most self-
reflexive and vigilant reader is lost to the il y a. Like the dreamer who wakes from a dream, the 
reader‘s subjectivity can only be restored to him/her once the book is closed and his/her 
engagement with the text ceases. But Blanchot‘s notion of expérience extends to more than just a 
discussion of subjective agency. The il y a, which replaces the subject in expérience, is caught on 
the cusp of (im)possibility – the ambiguous space in which the literary work and the dream 
‗occur.‘ Furthermore, as I have already intimated, Blanchot maintains that this ambiguity is 
―ultimately an ambiguity about death‖ (Critchley 77), in that the il y a of expérience is always in 
a ―relation with death‖ (79). With this in mind, I discuss, in the next chapter of this study, the 
relevance of Blanchot‘s notion of the (im)possibility of death in expérience to the literary and 
cinematic dreamscapes under examination in this study. 
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Chapter Three: Death and Dying in Dreamscape 
 
The very condition of literary language is that it can do indefinitely what man can do only 
for a definite period of time. It always already has the capacity to go beyond the limit that 
the living cannot. Language‘s function resembles that of Charon. Whereas mortals are 
obliged to take one final trip across the Styx, Charon‘s work is never done. Like the self-
contestation that is present at the origin of language, Charon continually conveys 
passengers to the other side and returns alone. Like language, he can go to the other side 
of death and come back. The writer, by accepting the conditions of the approach of the 
literary space, participates for a time in this movement, but in the end, his books carry on 
without him. (Gregg 57–58)16 
 
For Maurice Blanchot, the ambiguous and (im)possible concerns at the origin of the work have a 
relation to death. Furthermore, as Critchley argues, the ambiguity of literature is ―ultimately an 
ambiguity about death‖ (77). Such ambiguity can be understood through Blanchot‘s notion of the 
double death, which forms the crux of his theory of the (im)possibility of representing death. As 
previously discussed, this notion pertains to the unknowability and otherness of death. It 
juxtaposes the voluntary death of suicide with the continual death, or dying, of the Orphic figure, 
which, in turn, is related to the idea of the impossibility of sleep or rest. My following discussion, 
which forms the final chapter of my thesis, will build on the explication in my first chapter of the 
difference between the conception of death as absence, which is impossible to represent, and the 
continual dying of the il y a, which is the self-deluded belief in death as possibility. Integral to 
this chapter‘s discussion of ambiguity in literary and oneiric encounters with death is Blanchot‘s 
reading of Orpheus‘ journey to the Underworld, since he, like writers, readers, and dreamers, 
engages with the (im)possibility of death in that he attempts to grasp it, deluding himself into 
believing he can do so, even as he is continually dying. To the extent that it thematises this 
aporia, the Orphic encounter serves to explain the ambiguous (im)possibility of Blanchot‘s 
double death. 
                                                     
16
 In Greek mythology, Charon is ―the ferryman who conveyed the dead in his boat across the 
river Styx to their final abode in the Underworld, provided they had received the proper rites of 
burial and paid the fare‖ (―Charon‖). John Gregg‘s mention of Charon brings to mind Orpheus‘ 
journey in which he crosses the Styx into the Underworld. Like Charon, Orpheus also goes to 
―the other side and comes back alone‖ (58). 
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It should by now be clear that the notion of the (im)possibility of death presupposes the 
emergence of the il y a as continually dying in writing, reading, and dreaming. Fundamental to 
this final argument, then, is my second chapter‘s discussion of the way in which Blanchot‘s 
expérience is manifested specifically in each of the works under analysis. It is from an 
understanding of the ways in which these works‘ characters are presented as dying that a 
discussion of their (im)possible representations of death may proceed. In short, all the analyses in 
this chapter will focus on the assumption that the characters‘ forfeiture of subjectivity in 
expérience ensures their continual dying, which is ambiguously juxtaposed with their attempts to 
grasp death – outside of their already inevitable dying – and to hold it at a distance in order to 
resist it, merge with it, or understand it. 
In all the works examined in this thesis, one encounters characters who not only are 
writers, readers, and dreamers, but also appear to be approaching a horizon of death, although 
this is never certain: their encounter with death is always on the cusp of possibility and 
impossibility. As such, they appear to exist in a kind of inescapable purgatory – a space between 
the impossibility of being physically dead and the possibility of continual dying. My discussion 
will commence with a consideration of the nightmarish dreamscape of Richard Linklater‘s 
Waking Life, in which the protagonist‘s ambiguous death, at the beginning of the film, 
emphasises his inability to escape dying by continually waking into another dream until both he 
and the viewer are led to question whether the dream itself is a manifestation at the moment of 
death. I shall also show how the protagonist‘s dying results in his inability to rest or sleep, both 
of which, as I have previously indicated, Blanchot relates to death. Following this, I shall analyse 
Alan Warner‘s depiction, in These Demented Lands, of Morvern‘s ambiguous death and the 
Aircrash Investigator‘s attempt to reconstruct death. Thereafter, I shall discuss the way in which 
Ovid‘s expérience of becoming other, in David Malouf‘s An Imaginary Life, ultimately involves 
a metamorphosis into the unknowable otherness of death. Lastly, I shall examine Cormac 
McCarthy‘s The Road, in which the characters‘ environment constantly threatens them with 
physical death, thereby emphasising their attempts to resist moments of writing, reading, 
dreaming, and, finally, death. 
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Waking Life 
 
An Ambiguous Death 
 
In my second chapter, I focused on the position of Waking Life‘s protagonist as il y a by 
analysing his ambiguous individualism and the dissolution of both his subjectivity and rationality. 
I emphasised that this character is clearly depicted as an aimless wanderer who has neither 
agency nor control, and is therefore unable to wake from his dream. In this section of my chapter, 
I shall argue that his ambiguous individualism – evident in his paradoxical position of being 
without agency in his dream, yet deluding himself into believing he is an agent – both stages, and 
results in the film‘s representation of his death as ambiguous and (im)possible. 
The viewer is first introduced to the idea of the protagonist‘s ambiguous death at the 
beginning of the film, when, after a car ride from an airport to a random destination, which is 
offered to him by a man whose vehicle looks like a boat, he pauses in the middle of a street to 
pick up a folded note. As he bends down, the viewer is able to read the note‘s content, namely 
―look to your right‖ (Linklater 2). On complying with this instruction, the protagonist sees a car 
speeding towards him. An instant before it hits him, the scene cuts, and he wakes up in a bed, the 
implication being that the collision occurred in a dream, which is now supposedly over. As I 
have discussed at length, the protagonist, however, does not wake up since he remains a 
subjectless dreamer, and this status consigns him to never-ending Orphic encounters with 
dreaming, which are referred to in the film as ―false awakenings‖ (18). What is particularly 
germane to my discussion, though, is not simply that he is trapped in a dream, but that this 
ambiguous scene poses the question of whether or not the dream is caused by, and manifested in, 
the moment of his death. That the film begins by suggesting the protagonist‘s ambiguous death 
sets the tone for the remainder of its narrative progression. Whether or not he dreams about death 
or dreams because he is dead is a question that is ultimately rendered unanswerable by the film‘s 
inconclusiveness. 
 On the one hand, for instance, it seems possible that the protagonist avoids the car 
accident, and is physically unharmed, with all the events therefore having occurred in a dream. 
On the other hand, though, the sudden whiteout and fragmented change of scene prompts the 
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viewer to question the protagonist‘s state of consciousness, with the result that he/she cannot be 
sure whether, as Cooper suggests, the proceeding narrative is a dream or ―possibly a last, 
slippery, extended moment of consciousness between a car accident and death.‖ The ambiguity 
of the protagonist‘s death is a result of his self-deluded attempt to understand if he has indeed 
died or remains dreaming. As indicated in my previous chapter, his conflict is caused by his 
attempts to resist his being il y a or dreamer, and, by extension, the inevitable process of dying. 
While the protagonist, like the viewer, attempts to comprehend whether he is dreaming that he is 
dead, or actually is dead (that is, dreaming at the moment of his death), he is already dying by 
virtue of being a dreamer, and thus lacks the agency with which to resolve this indeterminacy. In 
terms of Blanchot‘s theory of the double death, his ambiguous death is a result of the 
juxtaposition of his inevitable continual death, or state of dying, which is the imaginative 
possibility of death, with the idea that he might die a death outside of dying, that is, a death 
which is physical, cannot be an experience, and is therefore absolutely unknowable and 
impossible. The protagonist‘s death is impossible, yet he encounters certain dream episodes that, 
like the car accident, contribute to his uncertainty as to whether he is dreaming or the dream is 
occurring at the moment of death. He ultimately lacks the ability to acknowledge that he already 
dies continually in the dream. 
Later in the film, the protagonist, who is seated on a couch, flipping through television 
channels, happens upon a woman speaking about death and dreams. Her questioning tone argues 
for the possibility that death is experienced as a never-ending dream:  
 
down through the centuries, the notion that life is wrapped in a dream has been a 
pervasive theme of philosophers and poets. So doesn‘t it make sense that death too would 
be wrapped in dream? That after death, your conscious life would continue in what might 
be called a dream body? It would be the same dream body you experience in your 
everyday dream life. Except that in the post-mortal state, you could never again wake up, 
never again return to your physical body. (Linklater 16) 
 
Like Cooper, the woman suggests that the narrative that proceeds from the film‘s opening scene 
occurs at the moment of the protagonist‘s death and that it depicts an unending and circular 
dream from which he can never awake. However, if her hypothesis is accurate, it is only relevant 
insofar as the protagonist deludes himself into believing that he has the agency required to 
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grapple with such a theory. By now, quite ironically, he has no agency precisely because he is a 
dreamer, and is therefore already dying. In short, the woman‘s hypothesis posits the possibility 
that the protagonist dreams at the moment of death, but, because he is already dreaming, he is 
continually dying, and can therefore only entertain the self-deluded possibility that he might 
attain affirmation of the fact that he is dreaming, or that he is dead. All that he can do is dream 
and die continuously and simultaneously, while never being able to know that this is so, and thus 
never seeing his ambiguous position on the cusp of (im)possibility. He is always caught on one 
side of the paradox – either he dreams, or he dies – without being able to realise that his 
expérience, as il y a, is paradoxical, and that dreaming and death are not mutually exclusive 
dichotomies. 
The protagonist‘s ambiguous death is foregrounded by the mirroring or duplication of 
one of the film‘s opening scenes, which depicts him as a young boy walking through a yard and 
then beginning to levitate and float up into the sky. However, he manages to grab hold of the 
door handle of a car, which stops him from floating away. Similarly, the final scene of the film 
depicts the protagonist, now an adult, walking through the same yard (although the technique of 
rotoscoping renders the landscape more unstable), and then beginning to levitate into the sky. 
Unlike the earlier scene, though, this one depicts the failure of his attempts to grasp the ever-
shifting door handle of the car. He drifts further and further away, until the viewer can no longer 
see him. Both these scenes present the protagonist as a dreamer of unending dream episodes. 
Nevertheless, the slight changes in the second one render ambiguous his impossible physical 
death. After all, the final scene may depict just another dream episode, thereby implying that he 
continues to dream, although the viewer is unable to witness his dream. Or, perhaps, his inability 
to hold onto the door handle, and subsequent disappearance from view, suggest that he has 
finally died a physical death, with the end of the dream signifying the end of his life. Like the 
entire film, then, this final scene is ambivalent and therefore inconclusive. 
Such inconclusiveness, of course, serves further to emphasise the ambiguity of the 
protagonist‘s relationship with death. As I have argued, the recurrent point is that, although it is 
possible that he might be dead, he is already dying, and therefore cannot acknowledge or 
distinguish death, as absence, from dying. Ultimately, death as absence, which would end the 
dream, is not a representational possibility in the dream. The only conclusion that can therefore 
be drawn at the close of the film is that the protagonist is in an unending instant of dying because 
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he has no control over his dream, and that neither he nor the viewer has access to any experience 
of death beyond the imaginative and subjectless endeavours of the il y a. He occupies an 
ambiguous space in which he is able to actualise neither death as absence nor dying.  
It should now be clear that, although the protagonist attempts to wake up from his dream, 
regain subjectivity, and so cease dying, his attempts are futile, for, as long as he dreams, he dies 
continually, which is to say, inhabits a space where self-delusion is necessary. This is the ever-
present conundrum at the centre of his inconclusive and ambiguous death. His futile wish to 
wake up and thus cease dying is reminiscent of Blanchot‘s notion of the suicide‘s attempt to 
achieve freedom in death, as well as Orpheus‘ efforts to see the invisible as invisible. Common 
to each endeavour is the desire to make of death a conceptual possibility rather than to 
acknowledge its inevitable impossibility in dying. (Such an acknowledgement would itself 
require an agent, which is already absent.) Nevertheless, unlike the suicide, who wants to choose 
to die in order to make of death an act of freedom, the protagonist of Waking Life seeks to deny 
or resist death. Whereas the suicide wishes to grasp death in order to become death, the 
protagonist wishes to grasp it in order to discard it. His attempts are obviously futile, firstly, 
because death, as non-space and absence, cannot be reduced to a tangible state of being, and, 
secondly, because he is already dying in dreaming and therefore cannot actualise death. 
Like Orpheus, who desires to unveil Eurydice, a shade from the darkness of the 
Underworld, in the daylight, and to see her invisibility as invisibility, the protagonist desires to 
see the dream as a dream that is dreamed by him. He wants to understand that he has died, and 
rationally to situate himself at a distance from his dream (in which he deludes himself into 
believing he is already dead) in order to resist a tangible conception of death that is impossible. 
In the following section of this chapter, I shall discuss the ways in which this character‘s 
inevitable failure to achieve his impossible desire is related to his inability to rest in sleep. 
 
The Impossibility of Rest 
 
For Blanchot, sleep and death as absence are similar in that they both imply restfulness, 
blankness, and the night that is impossible to grasp as invisible. Linklater‘s protagonist‘s 
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inability to sleep and to die is connected inasmuch as he, as subject, is unable to achieve rest. 
Both sleep and death are impossible for him as the former presupposes an active agent who can 
define the dream as separate to the sleeper who dreams, and the latter, being unknowable, only 
enables continual dying in engaging with it. 
As a dying dreamer, the protagonist is an aimlessly wandering il y a of an ungraspable, 
autonomous, and inconclusive narrative. Significantly, ―aimless wandering‖ is, for Blanchot, 
―already death‖ (―Death as Possibility‖ 102), in that death, as a space inhabited by the il y a, is 
the non-place and ―non-truth of the wandering (errance) of being‖ (Gillan, ―Levinas on Blanchot: 
Commentary‖ 50).17 For the aimlessly wandering dreamer, death is not a representational 
possibility, and there is therefore no rest for a sleeping subject, only dying. Trapped inside an 
unending dream, the protagonist‘s continual oneiric encounter is one which occurs in the 
expérience of the il y a – the imaginative mind. Precisely because he dreams, his mind cannot 
rest in sleep. His existence is mind, and his dream cannot be positioned in relation to his sleeping 
self since the space of the il y a is not one in which a subject can relate the dream to any other 
reality. In short, the dream precludes a sleeping subject. The protagonist cannot sleep because he 
is not a subject, cannot rest because he continually dreams, and cannot die because he is already 
dying. 
The film‘s concern with the protagonist‘s anonymity, his inability to self-invent, and his 
aimless wandering in a narrative that fractures linear time, serves to stage his inability to rest in 
the dream. While my second chapter has discussed several of these aspects in detail, it is 
necessary briefly to mention them here as they contribute to this character‘s dissolution of 
rationality and consequent frustration with his inability to position his dream in relation to his 
sleeping self. Quite simply, this bewildered character has no authorial control in the unending 
dream, and is unable to rest in sleep because no conclusive reasonable logic about his position 
exists in the intangible mind of the il y a. 
That the protagonist can neither rest in sleep, nor wake from the dream (both of which 
presuppose agency) is particularly apparent in the penultimate scene in which he encounters a 
                                                     
17
 ‗Errance‘ is a term which is obviously related to Blanchot‘s conceptualisation of wandering. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the etymology of the word ―err‖ includes the 
origins ―to stray,‖ ―to roam,‖ and ―to wander‖ (―Err‖). 
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nameless character playing pinball on a machine. The character in question suggests that time is 
a perpetual instant, and that life is a continual rejection of death: in each instant, one rejects 
death‘s eternal invitation by saying ―no thank you, not just yet‖ (18). Here, the protagonist is 
invited to believe that he has a choice to reject death and to say ―no thank you,‖ while wandering 
in, as Speed notes, ―a series of separate, dreamlike episodes‖ that imply ―a perpetual evasion of 
an unspecified, absolute boundary,‖ that is, death (105). Even as he attempts to evade death and 
dying by waking up, his inevitable failure to choose not to die is exemplified by his continual 
wandering as dreamer, which precludes him not only from waking but also from resting. So, 
although his primary desire in the film is to awake from his interminable dream, the rest of his 
conversation with the pinball character only emphasises his inability to do so. 
When the protagonist first approaches the pinball machine, he recognises the character 
playing the game as one of the people in the boat-like car from which he disembarks shortly 
before he is knocked over by another vehicle. Confused by the fact that the man is unable to 
recall the moment that introduces his ambiguous death, the protagonist prompts him as follows: 
―No, you see, you guys let me off at this really specific spot that you gave him [the driver] 
directions to let me off at. I get out, and end up getting hit by a car. But then I just woke up 
because I was dreaming, and later than that I found out that I was still dreaming – dreaming that 
I‘d woken up‖ (18). In response, the man explains that such an encounter, in which one awakes 
from one dream into another, is called a false awakening (18). He also nonchalantly adds that he 
―used to have those all the time‖ (18). Evidently exasperated by the character‘s somewhat 
indifferent response, the protagonist proceeds to emphasise the frustrating severity of his dream:  
 
But I‘m still in it [the dream] now. I, I can‘t get out of it. It‘s been going on forever. I 
keep waking up, but, but I‘m just waking up into another dream. I‘m starting to get 
creeped out, too. Like I‘m talking to dead people. This woman on TV‘s telling me about 
how death is this dreamtime that exists outside of life. I mean, I‘m starting to think that 
I‘m dead.‖ (18) 
 
After listening to the protagonist‘s slightly flustered explanation, the pinball man ceases his 
game and recalls, at length, a dream he once had in which he claims to have gone to ―the land of 
the dead‖ (18). 
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The protagonist listens to the character‘s story of the dream, and asks the following 
questions: ―so what happened? I mean, how did you finally get out of it?‖ (18). The man 
responds inconclusively: ―Oh man. It was just like one of those like life-altering experiences. I 
mean I could never really look at the world the same way again, after that‖ (18). At a loss for a 
solution to his conundrum, the protagonist repeats his question concerning the way in which the 
man finally escaped his dream, and again explains that he is ―trapped,‖ that he wants to ―wake up 
for real,‖ and, for the last time, asks ―how do you really wake up?‖ (18). His frustration is met 
only with more inconclusiveness: ―I don‘t know, I don‘t know. I‘m not very good at that 
anymore. But, um, if that‘s what you‘re thinking, I mean you, you probably should. I mean, you 
know, if you can wake up, you should, because you know, someday, you know, you won‘t be 
able to. So just, um ... But it‘s easy. You know. Just… just… wake up‖ (18). 
When the pinball character says ―wake up,‖ he clicks his fingers, thereby suggesting that 
waking up is easy, and that the protagonist should be able to do so at will. Obviously and 
ironically, though, the protagonist is not an active agent, and therefore cannot comply with this 
simple instruction: he does not wake up, his subjectivity is not restored, and he inevitably only 
emerges into another dream. Not only are the pinball man‘s responses elusive, evasive, and 
inconclusive, thereby reinforcing the protagonist‘s inability to grasp his position, but his very 
existence is bound to the latter‘s dream expérience. So, while the man presents the possibility of 
waking up as a simple act of will, this is inevitably impossible since he only exists in the dream 
of an aimless wanderer who is trapped, already dying, unable actively to avoid death, and 
therefore neither able to awake nor rest. It is shortly after the scene with the pinball character that 
the protagonist wanders into the same yard in which he levitates at the beginning of the film. 
Like the pinball character‘s responses, the film‘s ending offers no clarity on the fate of the 
protagonist. The narrative ends as it begins, that is, in ambiguity: the protagonist, attempting to 
grapple with his possible death by car accident, is precluded from doing so because, by dreaming 
continually, he is already dying, can neither wake nor rest, and, as il y a, cannot position himself 
in relation to anything outside of his dream expérience. 
As with Waking Life, the narrative of These Demented Lands is aleatory and 
inconclusive. Indeed, the latter also begins with an ambiguous death: as I have already intimated, 
Morvern‘s moment of drowning, or near drowning, stages the novel‘s (im)possible 
representation of death. Moreover, the Aircrash Investigator‘s encounter with death, in his 
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attempt to ‗solve‘ the mysterious death of a pilot, is also significant. In my next section, I shall 
discuss these two characters as Orphic figures, who, in their writing and dreaming expérience, 
are depicted as aimless wanderers. Significantly, for Blanchot, aimless wandering is already an 
encounter with death or dying. 
 
These Demented Lands 
 
Morvern’s Double Death 
 
The beginning of These Demented Lands provides an ambiguously doubled depiction of 
Morvern‘s death by drowning. As a dreamer and writer-figure in the aleatory narrative, she is 
already dying, and thus her drowning remains an elliptical and inconclusive representation that 
cannot be death. The narrative that follows her drowning is a bewildering and oneiric Orphic 
journey in which she aimlessly wanders, positioned between the possibility and impossibility of 
death. She describes her drowning in the Sound at ―neardark‖ (3), after the ferry has sunk in the 
―killing seas‖ (6), as follows: ―the night [. . .] had come to spread out and fill my whole life with 
the events of those few minutes in the darkness‖ (80). By implication, the ensuing dreamscape 
hinges on the moment of her death. Indeed, the narrative that succeeds this description occurs at 
the moment of death, and unfolds as a journey through a ―netherworld; purgatory‖ (212). 
Nevertheless, the fact that Morvern dies continually as il y a in writing and dreaming 
presupposes the impossibility of her drowning since death, as absence, cannot be represented, 
and the narrative accordingly depicts only her continual Orphic expérience, an imaginative 
encounter that cannot be rationally understood in relation to anything else. Like the protagonist 
of Waking Life, this character‘s ambiguous death remains a paradoxical (im)possibility. 
When the ferry sinks, and Morvern finds herself immersed in the waters of the Sound, 
she contemplates drowning: ―I‘d heard around that the drowning could be no so bad but there 
was that book that had scared me: the Pincher Martin book; the book of drowning‖ (6). The 
reference is, of course, to William Golding‘s survival narrative in which a naval lieutenant, 
Christopher ‗Pincher‘ Martin, survives the sinking of a vessel in the ocean. Golding‘s novel, like 
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Warner‘s, begins with its protagonist in the midst of a calamity at sea. The parallels continue: 
Martin also wakes in darkness, and, completely submerged, ―his consciousness [. . .] suspended 
between life and death,‖ is thrown by the ocean‘s waves into the side of an islet (Golding 8). In 
addition, the narrative of Pincher Martin, apart from occurring on an island, also proves to be 
ambiguous and (im)possible. At the end of the novel, for example, it becomes evident that 
Pincher‘s corpse was found after his accident at sea. (Im)possibly, this is the very same instant in 
which the narrative begins to unfold. Krystal Hart explains Pincher‘s ambivalent death as 
follows: he ―dies at the beginning of the novel but does not know he has died. Neither does the 
reader realize this until the end of the novel, when we find his existence has been in his own 
mind‖ (72). Pincher‘s story, like Morvern‘s, is thus bound to death, and, by referring to it, 
Warner reveals its relevance to his character‘s double death – the fact that she drowns, but 
cannot die because she dies already as a writer and dreamer. 
Morvern‘s ambiguous and double death is alluded to throughout the novel. For instance, 
shortly after the ferry accident, she meets an unnamed character who describes her as having 
come ―striding out of the dark East with some water stars over [her] shoulder‖ (Warner, These 
Demented Lands 38), a reference to the underwater phosphorescence in the Sound, which 
Morvern likens to a ―constellation‖ of stars (5). Later, Brotherhood draws attention to the 
ambiguity of her death by telling her she is ―already dead,‖ that she has drowned and only exists 
in ―netherworld; purgatory‖ (212). Similarly, Morvern describes herself as having ―kicked free‖ 
from ―the earth long ago‖ (39), and later explains her near drowning to the Aircrash Investigator 
as follows: ―[i]f you come ashore in that darkness [. . .] it crosses your mind you‘re back from 
the dead‖ (89). Her emphasis on her own ambiguous death indicates that she is ironically aware 
of her simultaneous dying in the moment of drowning. That her being is bound to her drowning 
is, of course, delusional: she cannot have ―kicked free‖ from the earth, and cannot already be 
dead precisely because her existence depends on the imaginative mind of the il y a, which 
presupposes continual dying. Any indication that she is dead is therefore ultimately impossible. 
But the impossibility of her drowning is where the possibility of her dying, and by extension the 
narrative, resides. She is always positioned on the cusp of death and dying simultaneously, and it 
is because of this ambivalent position that her relation with death is excessive and inconclusive. 
She cannot be dead because death cannot be represented. In other words, if she were dead, her 
narrative would simply not exist. 
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That death is ultimately unknowable, absent, and not a representational possibility as 
absence, is indicated in the novel by a road sign ―in the shape of a crucifix or cross‖ that 
signposts the ―Inaccessible Point,‖ ―Far Places,‖ and the ―Outer Rim‖ (16). Of these places, 
Morvern only visits The Outer Rim, a bar described by a character called Halley as the ―‗Outer 
Rim of everything‘‖ (169). The Inaccessible Point and Far Places remain inaccessible, and allude 
to the unrepresentable absence of death. For Blanchot, death is non-place, and it is exactly this 
that is staged by Morvern‘s narrative, which, as I have indicated, is generated by her paradoxical 
relation to death. Quite simply, her death cannot be represented as nothing. When placed in this 
context, the road sign clearly comments on the novel‘s inability to represent that which is 
unknowable and inaccessible by pointing to, indeed ironically signposting, an absence and 
otherness which she cannot encounter beyond dying. 
When Morvern leaps into the Sound from the ferry, she saves the life of the small 
Grainger child. While talking about Carlton‘s ―choice to be dead,‖ she tells the Aircrash 
Investigator that had it not been for the child, she might have chosen to disappear, that is, drown 
on purpose: ―It‘d crossed my mind if she wasn‘t with me I‘d be free. Free to vanish‖ (90). Her 
statement reveals that she cannot have died in the water, and that she has deluded herself into 
believing that she has the agency with which to choose death by committing suicide. This idea, 
of course, resonates with Blanchot‘s suicide, who wishes to make of death a choice. For Morvern, 
as for Blanchot‘s suicide, death cannot be a choice or decision because such an act of will 
requires subjectivity that, first, cannot exist for the dying il y a, and, secondly, cannot be present 
to experience absolute absence. Morvern can only die continually, and, by dying, be deluded in 
thinking that she can control death. Thus her death remains ambiguously (im)possible in her 
writing and dreaming expérience. 
 Like Morvern, the Aircrash Investigator encounters death as doubled. As a writer and 
dreamer, he is also dying and depicted as aimlessly wandering, an ateleological activity that is 
juxtaposed with his teleological investigation to solve the mysterious cause of Carlton‘s death by 
airplane accident. His attempts to find the cause of the accident by reconstructing the planes‘ 
debris are, however, futile because his lack of agency precludes him from accomplishing his 
objective. As such, his attempts inevitably remain inconclusive, and, insofar as representation is 
a process of reconstruction, are symptomatic of the novel‘s concern with the (im)possibility of 
representing death. 
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The Aircrash Investigator’s Reconstruction 
 
In ―The Dream Narratives of Debris,‖ Peter Schwenger posits that the reading of a literary work, 
and by extension the dreaming of a dream, are similar to the collection of debris in that an 
arrangement of debris fragments ―mimics not only the processes by which dreams are assembled 
but also those by which narratives are assembled, blurring the line between them‖ (76). Dreams 
and literature are forms of representation that are enabled by a process of re-arrangement and 
reconstruction. Furthermore, this process of assembling debris, a ―trash phenomenon‖ (84), to 
use Schwenger‘s phrase, is an imaginative and representational endeavour which exists only in 
the sphere of the mind, and ―does not end until the mind does‖ (83). That such dream and 
narrative reconstruction occurs wholly in the mind of whomsoever engages in it, may be related 
to Blanchot‘s argument, explained in my first chapter, that the writing, reading, and dreaming 
expérience occurs in the imaginative mind of the il y a, and, indeed, that ―it is mind‖ (―Death as 
Possibility‖ 88). The reconstructive processes of literary and oneiric representation always exist 
as an additional excess to their origin, which is not a representational possibility. 
The idea that narratives and dreams are imaginative and excessive reconstructions of 
debris is of particular import when considering the Aircrash Investigator‘s character and agenda. 
He seeks to ‗solve‘ the mystery of an airplane accident that occurred a decade ago, and which 
was the cause of Carlton‘s death, by delineating ―the crash site‖ with ―blue plastic ribbons‖ and 
collecting and re-figuring the wreckage of both airplanes, named Hotel Charlie and Alpha 
Whiskey (110). Significantly, though, his attempt to find ―the answers‖ that he believes are 
―always in the wreckage‖ is futile, and gestures towards the novel‘s own concern with the 
(im)possibility of representing death (77). His task inevitably remains incomplete because he is a 
writing and dreaming il y a of expérience, which presupposes that whatever occurs in his 
expérience is inconclusive because he lacks the subjective agency with which to fulfil his task. 
Furthermore, by virtue of his being il y a, the Aircrash Investigator continually dies. That is, his 
attempts at comprehending the death of Carlton by reconstructing airplane debris are inhibited by 
the fact that he is already dying despite his delusional, yet necessary, belief in his own agency. 
His belief in his task, irrespective of his inevitable failure to complete it, emphasises his relation 
to Blanchot‘s double death: he attempts to reconstruct and thus represent the absence of death 
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when he is already dying. In short, the ―whole story‖ that he seeks is an enactment of a 
delusional sense of possibility in the space of dying (201). 
The Aircrash Investigator‘s completion of his task of physically reconstructing the 
airplanes in Brotherhood‘s hangar is further complicated by the difficulty of collecting all the 
scattered ―bits of planes‖ from the island (97). In order to obtain an airplane door, he needs 
permission from a character named Gibbon. Despite presenting a ―compensation form‖ (97), a 
forged and illegal document, he is ―separated‖ from Gibbon by ―the door of the Hotel Charlie‖ 
itself (96). And even though he does eventually succeed in claiming the door, it is partly ―rusted‖ 
with ―sorry, drooping stains trailing downwards,‖ which suggests the impossibility of 
reconstructing the planes, and therefore the impossibility of discovering exactly how Carlton 
died (97). 
At the end of the novel, and after having searched for it for months, the Aircrash 
Investigator locates the wrecked propeller of one of the airplanes in the possession of Gibbon. 
After this, it is tied to his body by Brotherhood: ―He lashed the propeller to my back so its 
weight was across my shoulders; a burning point of pain at the base of my spine started straight 
away‖ (178). An obvious allusion to Christ bearing his cross, the propeller tied to the Aircrash 
Investigator‘s back is here depicted as a burden and an affliction. While the propeller, for him, 
represents the possibility of completing the reconstruction, it is, in fact, a liability that signifies 
the impossibility of his task. As much is again evident at the end of the novel when it is revealed 
that a ―fragment‖ of debris, which itself is figured as unknowable and ever-changing, has 
secretly been buried, thereby preventing him from completing his task (213). 
The futility of his efforts to fulfil his assignment is also emphasised by the suggestion 
that the Aircrash Investigator is a fraud, which emerges in Morvern‘s description of him as ―the 
one who pretended to be the Aircrash Investigator‖ (189). A false investigator, he lies about his 
occupation and illegally forges documents in order to salvage ―sunken spoil‖ from the island 
(163). So, apart from lacking agency due to his being il y a, he also lacks the necessary authority 
with which to conduct a proper investigation. Although the falsity of his effort raises the question 
of the actual motive for his investigation, the novel never provides an answer, and this, in itself, 
is further evidence of its own concern with incompletion. 
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The Aircrash Investigator‘s investigations are inhibited not only by his impersonation of 
an official from ―the Department of Transport,‖ and the logistical difficulty of reconstructing the 
accident debris, but also by Brotherhood‘s intolerance and antagonism towards his endeavours 
(56). For instance, when he tells a story in wonderment about another airplane accident and the 
―little notes‖ written by its terrified occupants shortly before their deaths, Brotherhood irritably 
asks ―Have you quite finished?‖, and then states that there is ―nothing more revolting than 
hearing death sentimentalised‖ (78). Thereafter, he adds that ―[i]f the shitbang had gone up in 
flames those notes would have twirled heavenwards as ash. And your masterpiece? Incomplete‖ 
(78). While the Aircrash Investigator‘s story is not of Hotel Charlie and Alpha Whiskey, 
Brotherhood‘s dismissive response to it clearly applies to the Aircrash Investigator‘s own 
investigation. As much is implied by his argument that a quick turn of events may have rendered 
the latter‘s ―masterpiece [. . .] [i]ncomplete.‖  
Apart from being hostile towards the Aircrash Investigator, Brotherhood is aware of his 
mendacity, as is evident from his following question: ―How is,‘ and he paused to curl up his lip, 
‗Work going?‖ (76). On another occasion, when the Aircrash Investigator asks how he may 
complete his work, Brotherhood shouts ―What work!‖, and then adds ―Jesus Christ, man, I prefer 
the freedoms of my dreamscapes as well, but you‘re crazy‖ (145). Upon realising that his farce is 
no longer a secret, the Aircrash Investigator admits that he ―always wanted to know about that 
crash, about Carlton‖ because he ―always had an interest,‖ to which Brotherhood responds with 
the words: ―What kind of person are you? Men. All devils‖ (108). The latter‘s sarcastic and 
hostile assaults on the former‘s illegitimate attempts to reconstruct and thus understand the death 
of Carlton stress the pointless nature of his undertaking, and so foregrounds the novel‘s concern 
with the futility and inconclusiveness of any attempt to know or represent death. 
His sarcasm and cynicism disguise Brotherhood‘s own role in contributing to the cause of 
Carlton‘s death. Importantly, in this regard, he conceals the location of a missing piece of 
shrapnel, which is only retrieved from Carlton‘s ―now-robbed grave‖ at the end of the novel 
when Brotherhood flees the island and his burning hotel (211). From this series of events, it may 
be deduced that he is somehow involved in the airplane accident, and that he may even have 
orchestrated it. 
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After he has escaped from the island and hotel, the actions of Brotherhood, who is now 
on a boat with the missing piece of wreckage, emphasise the novel‘s preoccupation with the 
impossibility of death. Aside from the fact that his escape makes it impossible for the Aircrash 
Investigator to complete his task, his actions mirror Morvern‘s ambiguous death at the beginning 
of the novel. So, for example, he jumps into the Sound once his boat starts to sink. Unlike 
Morvern, though, he swims, with the debris, ―not back to the island, but [. . .] out onwards to the 
uninhabited banks below the mountain range‖ (214). Given that Morvern‘s death is ambiguous 
and inconclusive, the parallels between her actions and Brotherhood‘s escape further emphasise 
the novel‘s concern with the impossibility of death. 
Tellingly, too, Brotherhood‘s departure from the island also mirrors Carlton‘s own 
actions after the airplane accident. His reasons for leaving, like those that ―chased Carlton up that 
dark hillside,‖ and the Aircrash Investigator‘s lies, are never divulged and remain a mystery 
throughout the novel (108). What is clear enough, though, is that Brotherhood‘s actions and 
attitudes, in preventing the Aircrash Investigator from completing the reconstruction of the 
airplane, stress the impossibility of the latter‘s task – his desire to know death. 
 The missing piece of shrapnel, with which Brotherhood absconds from the island, points 
to the novel‘s preoccupation with the inconclusiveness of death. It is described, in Morvern‘s 
letter, as an ever-changing ―fragment,‖ which ―hit the ground and seemed to bounce once, then 
suddenly [. . .] went rigid like metal, but at first [. . .] had changed shape with the impact‖ (213). 
While its discovery would enable the Aircrash Investigator to complete his investigation, it is not 
only physically inaccessible but also evades definition and interpretation through its ever-shifting 
form. Accordingly, it serves only to emphasise the impossibility of the Aircrash Investigator‘s 
task.
 
 
Carlton‘s death, and its inconclusiveness, may be explained in terms of Blanchot‘s notion 
of suicide. In a conversation, or rather narrative reconstruction thereof, the Aircrash Investigator 
and Morvern speculate that Carlton may have committed suicide. Five months after the air crash, 
his body was found on the island‘s hillside, which suggests that he survived the accident, and 
therefore chose to die, a decision that Morvern describes as a ―choice to be dead, to be ghost‖ 
(90). To this, the Aircrash Investigator adds that Carlton ―chose himself but it was death‖ (90). 
This hypothesis resonates with Blanchot‘s description of the suicide who wishes to choose death, 
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to make of it a decision which endorses agency and freedom. As should be clear by now, 
Blanchot‘s depiction of the act of suicide is ironic insofar as the suicide is continually dying and 
therefore any other conception of death is delusional for him/her. In this context, Morvern and 
the Aircrash Investigator‘s reading of Carlton‘s death stresses its impossibility and 
unknowability. Nevertheless, their narrative reconstruction of what happened to him can only 
ever be speculation since reconstruction is synonymous with representation, and death is not a 
representational possibility but that which always exceeds the attempt to represent it. 
The Aircrash Investigator‘s impossible endeavour to reconstruct the airplanes and to 
understand what is unknowable can only result in excess. In my first chapter, I discussed the way 
in which the excess of interpretation haunts the origin of the work or dream. In Warner‘s novel, 
the excess of the Aircrash Investigator‘s futile efforts to complete his task is signified by the 
―figure‖ of Carlton‘s ghost, which haunts the writing and dreaming figures (126). Because death 
is not a representational possibility, Carlton‘s death, as absence, cannot be represented as such, 
and any attempt to do so is inevitably haunted by the inability of doing so. Like Orpheus, who 
desires to see the invisible as invisible by bringing Eurydice‘s shade into the light of day, the 
Aircrash Investigator desires to bring to light the cause of Carlton‘s death, an endeavour which 
can only result in excessive interpretations. Carlton‘s ghost haunts the impossibility of any 
representation or reconstruction of his death. 
Although already discussed in my second chapter, the representation of the Aircrash 
Investigator‘s dream of his own death, which is then represented in Morvern‘s letter, is also 
germane to my present discussion. Morvern describes his death in a way that mirrors her own 
ambiguous death at the beginning of the novel. Like her, he is submerged in ―[d]ark water‖ (193), 
and drowns in the presence of the ―Psalm 23‖ ferry amongst ―the burning phosphorous beds‖ 
and the ―satellites‖ of bubbles, and ―phosphorous bombs‖ (194). This representation points not 
only to his continual dying (by virtue of its being a dream that is also written), but also to the fact 
that his death ‗occurs‘ underwater. In the description, the ―weight‖ of the airplane‘s propeller ―on 
his shoulders‖ forces ―him face-down and downwards‖ into the water where lies the ―twisting 
barnacled metal of Alpha Whiskey‖ (193–94). The fact that his death mirrors Morvern‘s 
ambiguous moment of drowning indicates that his endeavours, like Brotherhood‘s, are bound to 
death and dying. Significantly, in his dream, he is submerged and dies underwater with the very 
airplane debris, which, when awake, he attempts to reconstruct. So, in the dream, he dies beside 
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that which precludes him from completing his task.
 
This instant of his death manifests as an 
(im)possible encounter with a double death. As a dreamer, he is dying continually, which is the 
very space that presupposes the futility of his task. That is, he cannot understand Carlton‘s death 
because he himself is dying. He is always positioned on the cusp of the self-deluded possibility 
of dying and the impossibility of understanding death. Albeit in passing, I should add that my 
speculation on the inhibited and impossible nature of the Aircrash Investigator‘s task is required, 
even forced, by the novel‘s indeterminacy, which is a point that I made in my second chapter. 
The reader‘s interpretative role, it would seem, is analogous to that of the Aircrash Investigator. 
In this section of my chapter, I have discussed the novel‘s concern with the 
(im)possibility of representing death. I have shown how Morvern‘s ambiguous death and the 
Aircrash Investigator‘s impossible task manifest the (im)possibility of death in literary and 
oneiric encounters by presenting it as doubled. My attention now turns to An Imaginary Life. 
Whereas, in my second chapter, I focused on Ovid‘s self-deluded process of becoming other by 
writing and dreaming, I shall now discuss his process of becoming the ultimate other, that is, 
death. I shall argue that his transformation into death is inevitably also self-deluded in that he is 
already dying as a writer and dreamer. 
 
An Imaginary Life 
 
The (Im)Possibility of Becoming Death 
 
In my second chapter, I examined the ways in which An Imaginary Life is concerned with the 
―collapse of the border between self and alterity‖ in its (im)possible representation of Ovid‘s 
becoming other in dreamscape (Randall 54). Proceeding from this analysis, I shall now focus on 
the novel‘s (im)possible preoccupation with this character‘s becoming the ultimate other, namely 
death. In the novel, moments of death are largely represented as journeys in which a subject is 
able to transform into that which is other – either an animal form or the landscape – in order to 
arrive at death. Indeed, this text is preoccupied with depicting death as a place which one can 
reach, as emerges from various characters‘ crossing of physical borders and boundaries in the 
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landscape in their journeys towards it. All instances of death in the novel are bound to an 
(im)possible paradox. On the one hand, death is assumed to be a possibility in the self-deluded, 
imaginative desire of Ovid, the writing and dreaming il y a, for whom all depictions of death 
‗occur‘ in expérience. On the other hand, these depictions are impossible because their 
representation always remains representation inside the space of subjectless, artistic endeavour. 
As il y a, Ovid already dies continually, and therefore lacks the agency with which to realise that 
his desire to represent death, and, in doing so, to become other in order to arrive at it, points only 
to self-delusion and the inevitable futility of his goal. 
More so than any of the other works under consideration in my thesis, An Imaginary Life 
seems to manifest the least resistance to expérience. Seemingly self-aware, Ovid defines himself 
as a writer and attempts to acknowledge the possibility of imaginative endeavour in the act of his 
writing. One consequence of such self-deluded awareness is his belief and desire to 
conceptualise and imagine death in dreamscape. That is, in writing and dreaming, he believes 
that he has the agency with which to realise the imaginative possibility of becoming death. But it 
is precisely because he writes and dreams that he lacks agency, which itself presupposes that he 
is already dying. He is unable to imagine and arrive at death since it is not a representational 
possibility. Although he claims to be aware of his imaginative endeavour, he also believes that 
he is able to reach beyond what is imaginable in writing and dreaming. He attempts to 
acknowledge that which is ultimately unknowable as ultimately unknown. All that he achieves, 
though, is a representation of his effort. For as long as he is a writer and dreamer, he limits death 
to an oneiric linguistic expression. Quite inevitably, he is unable to make of death an experience 
by imagining it in expérience, and, furthermore, he necessarily lacks the agency to recognise as 
much. 
The novel‘s concern with the (im)possibility of representing death may be read in the 
context of Blanchot‘s paradox of the double death. As should be clear by now, Ovid, due to 
being a writing and dreaming il y a, is continually dying. Moreover, the other characters whose 
moments of death are represented as dreamlike episodes also exist as dying dreamers within the 
space of Ovid‘s expérience. While the novel represents the moment of death as both a 
metamorphic process of becoming other, and a journey towards a place which is ultimately other, 
it inevitably remains inside the realm of the il y a for whom it cannot be an experience, and a 
place at which a subject can arrive. The moment of death is absent, an unknowable non-place, 
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and therefore not a representational possibility. So, while death is imaginatively staged as a space 
into which one can transform and a place to which one can journey, the characters who are 
represented as doing this are already encountering a continual death which precludes the 
actualisation of any other form of death. Ovid‘s depiction of death, which takes the form of an 
imaginative representation of an absolutely impossible reality, is the most that dreamscape can 
attain. 
 
Believing that Death is Possible 
 
Through writing and dreaming, Ovid believes that it may be possible ―for him to face death‖ 
(Byron 85). He trusts that, by acknowledging its inevitability, he can conceptualise death as a 
space for which he can prepare. It follows that, for him, death is tangible. Since it is absence and 
therefore not an experience open to an already dying subject, it, however, also follows that this 
belief is a product of self-delusion. 
When Ovid writes of the ―power in us that knows its own ends,‖ he is referring to the 
possibility of realising what one ―must finally become‖ through imagining it (Malouf 64). He 
also emphasises that, even though this power is akin to belief, it is sufficient to actualise that 
which is imagined: ―[w]e have only to conceive of the possibility and somehow the spirit works 
in us to make it actual‖ (64). Indeed, for him, belief is the possibility of becoming. It is ―the true 
meaning of transformation‖ or ―the real metamorphosis‖ (64). Ovid suggests that a subject is not 
only able to realise that which is imagined through belief alone, but also that whatever it 
imagines, and is therefore able to actualise, is already quintessential to subjectivity. In the novel, 
that which is imagined, and the belief that its manifestation will come to fruition in reality, is 
depicted as a matter of fate, and therefore inevitable. For instance, Ovid explains that one‘s task 
is only to ―find the spring and release it,‖ implying that one‘s further self is already ―contained 
within [. . .], as the leaves and blossoms are in the tree‖ (64). Although the process of 
transforming into what one imagines is ―slow,‖ he maintains that ―it works,‖ as is evident from 
the fact that ―[w]e are already the product of generation after generation of wishing to be thus‖ 
(64). What Ovid ultimately suggests is that, in writing and dreaming, a subject is invested with 
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the power to transform into that which is beyond the imagination, and that such processes of 
becoming other are inevitable. 
  The possibility of making real that which is imagined, and the belief that whatever is 
imagined is inevitable, is a consequence of self-delusion. This delusion is fundamental to Ovid‘s 
representation of death, which is impenetrable. Quite simply, he cannot realise death as a lack. 
But because he acknowledges that death is inevitable, he is forced to imagine it, and therefore to 
conceive of it as a possibility. As much can be seen in his representation and recollection of his 
brother‘s death. While his brother lies on his death bed, Ovid fulfils his ―duty‖ in the Parilia 
ceremony (86). He explains his intuition that his brother has died in terms of his belief in the 
possibility of death: ―I have let some grain of belief in all this sprout in my mind, and killed him. 
My brother is dead‖ (88). Because his ―moment of belief‖ has been translated into a palpable 
reality, he believes that he has ―run [his] brother‘s death,‖ and explains that he must atone for 
this (88). 
The delusional belief that a subject is able to make death a tangible possibility is 
fundamental to my following analysis of two of the novel‘s representations of death. Both 
instances are depicted as dreamlike episodes in which a subject supposedly transforms into an 
animal spirit or the landscape in journeying towards and ultimately arriving at death. 
 
The Deaths of Two Villagers 
 
In the devastatingly cold winters in Tomis, the Getae villagers ―climb the ladder inside the byre 
to the upper room‖ where they must keep warm (107). This room is portrayed as an oneiric space 
in which the villagers‘ ―winter dream begins,‖ and it is here that Ryzak dies (111).18 His moment 
of death is depicted as a dreamlike encounter, which includes the perceiving villagers who enter 
his ―nightmare‖ as though it is a public space (129). While they watch his body and 
                                                     
18
 When the villagers climb the ladder into a room depicted as a dreamlike space, their actions 
are reminiscent of Ovid‘s likening of a subject‘s imaginative endeavour to climbing up ―through 
a hole‖ in one‘s head (20), as if ―each creature had the power to dream itself out of one existence 
into a new one, a step higher on the ladder of things‖ (28–29). That Ryzak‘s metamorphic death 
‗occurs‘ in this room, a space to which the villagers must climb, is significant in that it 
emphasises that the possibility of death is limited to its representation in dreamscape. 
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consciousness succumb to a high fever, the onlookers are described as ―participants suddenly in 
the same dream, waking together in [. . .] sleep‖ (129–30). That Ryzak‘s nightmare ―has its own 
momentum‖ indicates that it exists autonomously as a space which is not controlled or directed 
by subjective agency, and is therefore limited to oneiric representation (129). The instant of 
death is only a possibility insofar as it exists in expérience for the participating dreamers, whose 
own impossible shared dream expérience exists inside Ovid‘s writing expérience. But it is in this 
space that Ovid deludes himself into believing that death is a possible reality by attempting to 
conceive of it in writing and dreaming. Interestingly, the villagers‘ involvement in the episode 
emphasises their own delusion that they can control the way in which Ryzak dies by performing 
ceremonial rituals. 
Once the villagers acknowledge the inevitability of Ryzak‘s death, they conduct certain 
rites in an attempt to control the way in which he dies. As with the depiction of his death as an 
oneiric experience, the rites, in which the villagers ―conduct‖ his ―spirit out of the house,‖ are 
―enacted as in a dream‖ (131). In order to usher his spirit away and ensure that he does not die in 
a way ―that would leave him vulnerable at last to the demons who are hovering there in the 
darkness,‖ Ryzak is ―savaged to death‖ by the men of the village (132). They take his life ―by 
force, beating and shaking the last breath out of his tough old body so that he will die fighting‖ 
(132). The villagers do this because they believe that ―his dying spirit‖ can ―be raised to such a 
pitch of violence that the dark ones will quail before it and he may pass unharassed on the air‖ 
(132). Ryzak‘s death is ultimately an impossible representation of becoming other than he is 
through a ―terrible process‖ of transformation (129). In order for him to arrive at death, the 
villagers believe that his ―human energy‖ must undergo a ―transfusion‖ into ―its animal form‖ 
(129). 
In carrying out the death ritual, the villagers, who are already engaged in the space of 
expérience as dreamers, ultimately attempt to make of Ryzak‘s death an experience. Their aim is 
to prepare him for a space for which he would apparently otherwise not be ready. They endow 
him with the ability to transform into an animal spirit, for which they attempt to ensure a safe 
passage to death. Once their death rites have been completed, Ryzak‘s spirit, in Ovid‘s 
description, has ―already arrived‖ (133). His death is not only imbued with a transformative 
quality in which he becomes other than he is, an animal spirit, but also figured as a place that one 
can reach. As dreamers in Ovid‘s writing expérience, the villagers are deluded in their belief that 
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they can ensure Ryzak‘s safe passage towards death because, firstly, it is not a space at which his 
spirit can arrive, and, secondly, they lack the agency required to realise as much. Ultimately, his 
death can only exist outside of death, in the realm of the il y a or imaginative mind, which is a 
space of delusional possibility. In order to become death, one must be able to experience death as 
absence – a possibility which can only exist inside the realm of its inevitable impossibility. 
Like Ryzak, whose death occurs in a dreamlike fever, another of the villagers, who is 
shot with a poison-tipped arrow, is taken over by ―delirium‖ (55). Significantly, his death is also 
represented as a process of becoming other than himself in order to arrive at death. Unlike 
Ryzak, who is depicted as transforming into an animal spirit, this villager becomes the 
landscape. He is described as ―slowly‖ making his way past the walls of the village ―out into the 
grasslands beyond the river‖ to an undefined ―place‖ of restfulness ―where the earth will receive 
him‖ (56). By implication, the landscape is invested with the ability to accommodate him, 
thereby suggesting that he is able to become part of it. Ovid depicts his death as a process of 
morphing into the land, and this emphasises the novel‘s concern with representing death as a 
place at which one can arrive. The villager, though, cannot transform into death because he dies 
continually as a dreamer, and lacks the agency to arrive at a space which is non-place. In the 
following section of my chapter, I discuss Ovid‘s own (im)possible process of becoming ―[w]hat 
it is out there that is waiting to receive‖ him by transforming into the landscape, and ultimately 
arriving at death, which, like the Getae villager who travels beyond the village, is depicted as a 
crossing of borders (25).
19
 
 
Ovid’s Death 
 
Ovid‘s journey towards death commences with his memory of crossing ―the boundary stones‖ 
(87), which delineate his childhood farm in Sulmo, ―into the city, into the state‖ of Rome (86). 
At this early stage in his life, Rome is unknown to him and the place ―where the world‖ and the 
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 In a discussion of An Imaginary Life, Bridget Grogan remarks that much of Malouf‘s writing 
is concerned with a ―postcolonial appropriation of the Aboriginal philosophy‖ of Dreamtime or 
the Dreaming, in which death is understood as ―an open-ended return to the land and an entry 
into the perpetual present.‖ 
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―mystery begins‖ (87). For him, the crossing of borders is a process that is related to the 
possibility of imaginative endeavour. In crossing them, he encounters that which is unknown, as 
emerges from his description of his departure from the farm as an imaginative journey: ―My 
mind ventures out, touches the old worn boulders for luck, and then goes on in the dark, 
populating the unknown with what must be imagined since it cannot be seen‖ (87). Thus begins 
his dreamlike voyage, which is both bound towards and indeed about death, the ultimate 
unknown. It is through writing about his death as a journey that he attempts to make it real. 
Despite describing Rome as unknown and mysterious, Ovid, after having spent much of 
his life there, comes to see it as the known ―universe‖ (98). It is from here that he is exiled to 
―the last outpost‖ of Tomis, a new space designated as ―unknown‖ (16). It is also here, at ―the 
ends of the earth,‖ where Ovid‘s narrative occurs (15). For him, just as unknown Rome becomes 
known, so too does unfamiliar Tomis become familiar. In turn, that which lies beyond the village 
is now deemed a new obscurity. As he is about to journey away from Tomis, he explains that he 
is ―going out now into the unknown, the real unknown, compared with which Tomis [is] but a 
degenerate outpost of Rome‖ (135). By the time he plans to ―cross the river while it is still frozen 
and escape into the steppes,‖ Tomis is no longer unknown because he has discovered it through 
writing and dreaming about it (135). The fact that Ovid comes to know certain spaces, which he 
has previously classified as unknowable, only then to delineate yet another area beyond them as 
unknown, suggests that he is eventually able to discover, name, and materialise any 
unknowability imaginable. Clearly, the possibility of demarcating and crossing borders has 
implications for his endeavour to imagine and write his own death. He deludes himself into 
believing that by imagining death he can come to know and arrive at it. It is by crossing borders 
that he ventures beyond the known world into the unknown, and towards death, which, as he 
believes, he will come to recognise as familiar. 
  In his depiction of death as a destination, the most that Ovid can accomplish, though, is 
its representational limitation in the form of writing and dreaming. He describes himself 
voyaging in dreams as he searches for his own death: ―I think of my dreams. Of all those nights 
when I made my way out there in sleep to scratch in the earth for my own grave‖ (135). By 
searching for his death through dreaming, he imagines it as an inevitability that he is driven to 
reach by following ―the clear path‖ of his ―fate‖ (135). It is only in dreaming that he is able to 
journey beyond Tomis to the real unknown, in preparation for death. Ultimately, while he aims 
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to represent and so make tangible that which he imagines, this is impossible. And yet it is 
impossibility itself which necessitates his desire to represent that which he is inevitably unable to 
make a quantifiable reality. 
For Ovid, the desire to write and dream the unimaginable is uncontrollable. In the 
following passage, he likens the crossing of borders to the enterprise of the imagination in that 
they are both attempts at transgressing limits: ―Always to be pushing out like this, beyond what I 
know cannot be the limits‖ (135). Dreams are like a series of ―painful settings out into the 
unknown,‖ where we can only push off ―from the edges of consciousness into the mystery of 
what we have not yet become, except in dreams that blow in from out there bearing the fragrance 
of islands we have not yet sighted in our waking hours‖ (135). Crossing boundaries in dreams 
thus provides the possibility of ―voyaging‖ to the unknown (135). Here, dreaming is related to 
travelling over the ocean on a sea vessel. Writing and dreaming enable imagining ―the first 
blossoming branches of our next landfall‖ as they ―come bumping against the keel, even in the 
dark, whole days before the real land rises to meet us‖ (135–36). 
In attempting to acknowledge dreams and the imagination as possibility, Ovid asks ―what 
else should a man‘s life be?‖ (135), a question reminiscent of Blanchot‘s postulation that ―a 
man‘s goal might be the search for death‘s possibility‖ (―Death as Possibility‖ 95). Ovid‘s goal, 
like that of Blanchot‘s artist, who is allegorised by the Orphic figure, is only made possible by 
self-deluded desire. Significantly, the tasks of both Ovid and Orpheus are bound to death. 
Whereas Orpheus sings because he must sing, and Ovid writes because he must write, each dies 
continually in his journey toward death. That is, the possibility of each of their aims is dependent 
on the very structures which limit it. As such, death is only made possible in dying, and it is 
precisely this limitation that catalyses the desire of both Orpheus and Ovid to sing and write 
about it. 
The last stretch of Ovid‘s journey is his fording of the river Ister and crossing over into 
the Scythian steppes. As his journey is ending, he writes that ―I no longer ask myself where we 
are making for‖ (144). For him, the ―notion of a destination no longer seems necessary‖ (144). 
He explains that his need for a destination ―has been swallowed up in the immensity of this 
landscape, as the days have been swallowed up‖ by his sense ―of a life that stretches beyond the 
limits of measurable time‖ (144). That he no longer has a nameable objective emphasises his 
attempts to define death, which is non-place, as non-place. In crossing borders, the closer he 
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comes to approaching death, the less he feels he needs to define and thereby grasp it. Ironically, 
though, his attempts are met only with their impossibility because he still says that death cannot 
be named as a knowable destination. So, while his purpose is to represent death as unknowable 
non-place – which is similar to Orpheus‘ plight of representing invisibility as invisibility – he 
limits it by delineating it and reducing it to language. 
When Ovid crosses the river, he explains that he has ―[n]o more dreams‖ (141). He 
describes his approach to death as a journey which has ―passed beyond‖ the necessity of dreams 
―into the last reality‖ (141). As in his attempts to define it as an unknowable non-place, he here 
describes death as a space in which oneiric representation is absent. However, his journey only 
lacks dreams until the moment when he begins to transform into the landscape in order to 
become death: ―I enter the first dream, almost feel it begin to happen, feel my individual pores 
open to the individual grains of the earth, as the interchange begins‖ (147). So, while he attempts 
to represent it as a space which lacks definition or imagining, he has no option but to write and 
dream about death because it is not a representational possibility outside of dying. 
Ovid‘s (im)possible instant of death is depicted in his arrival at ―the point on the earth‘s 
surface‖ where he ―disappear[s]‖ (150). His narrative ceases after his utterance ―I am there‖ 
(152). Loughlin suggests that, in the instant that Ovid utters his last words, An Imaginary Life 
poses ―death as a kind of birth, of arriving elsewhere‖ (115). Similarly, Randall proposes that ―in 
making his passage toward death,‖ Ovid ―becomes other than himself, discovers the site of the 
other, transports his consciousness (in its final moment) from the ‗here‘ of self to the ‗there‘ of 
the other‖ (46). Their postulations, however, are impossible. It is only once he has ceased his 
final utterance, which renders him silent, that Ovid‘s death ‗occurs‘ as absence and as silence. At 
the end of his last statement, he, no longer il y a, cannot dream or write because his absence is 
not a representational possibility. For so long as he writes, he lacks the agency with which to 
become what is already absence and cannot be a place at which a subject can arrive. In short, he 
cannot become death and write about it simultaneously. 
This section of my chapter has focused on the novel‘s preoccupation with (im)possible 
imaginative endeavours to become death in dreamscape. In the process, it has shown that, while 
the text seems to manifest little resistance to expérience, Ovid‘s representation of death is 
inevitably limited to the space of dying. The following section of my chapter will explore the 
ways in which the characters in The Road are in a relation with Blanchot‘s double death. 
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Whereas Ovid attempts to imagine death by dreaming and writing in order to prepare for and 
arrive at it, the characters in The Road – particularly the man – attempt to conceptualise it as a 
space which can be controlled. In recognising its inevitability, the man‘s ultimate endeavour is to 
direct the way in which death ‗occurs.‘ Despite his efforts, he lacks the agency necessary with 
which to position it in relation to his reality. 
 
The Road 
 
The (Im)Possibility of Resisting Death 
 
While An Imaginary life seems to manifest little resistance to expérience, The Road is 
preoccupied with its radical avoidance. As already discussed in my second chapter, the 
characters in this novel cannot resist expérience because they are dreamers and story-tellers. This 
section of my chapter will discuss the way in which this inability to resist expérience relates to 
death. Exactly this relation is suggested when, in reference to dreaming, the man asks ―[h]ow 
else would death call you?‖ (20). By virtue of the fact that they are il y a, it can be assumed that 
the characters are also continually dying. The difficulty that they – particularly the man – 
encounter in attempting to avoid death is emphasised, first, by the fact that they are subjectless in 
the space of dying, and thus unable to position death in relation to themselves, and, secondly, by 
its absence, and therefore its inability to be an experience. Any attempt to conceptualise death as 
a space that can be resisted, controlled, or directed by a subject is impossible, and this is evident 
both in the man‘s ―terminal illness‖ (Mallard), and in the terminal decline of their planetary 
environment, the ―intestate earth‖ (McCarthy 138). 
Despite the man‘s resistance of death, which is largely for the sake of his son, it is 
inevitable. I shall demonstrate that his endeavour is compelled by delusion and denial by 
examining McCarthy‘s depiction of landscape as a place of impenetrable ―darkness and 
depravation‖ (Mallard), in which the characters‘ hopeful attempts to light their way in order to 
survive is suggested by the image of ―carrying the fire‖ (McCarthy 87). Following this, I shall 
discuss the ways in which the novel‘s conception of suicide emphasises the impossibility of 
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death. For Blanchot, as I have noted often enough, a subject who wishes to choose death by 
committing suicide is delusional because death cannot be an achievement. My argument on the 
novel‘s (im)possible concern with representing death will conclude with an analysis of the man‘s 
inevitable death. He suffers from chronic tuberculosis, which is evident from the very beginning 
of the text. Despite its inevitability, he struggles to accept that he cannot control the way in 
which death ‗occurs.‘ Also significant to my concluding discussion is the boy‘s dream of his 
father‘s death, which I read in relation to Blanchot‘s theory on the similarity of sleep and death. 
Ultimately, the boy‘s dream emphasises the impossibility of representing death. What is revealed 
in my discussion of the novel, then, is that all attempts to position death relative to a subject, in 
order to resist, control, or prepare for it, are delusional impossibilities that are limited by 
representation. 
The man‘s paradoxical attempts at convincing himself that death can be countered, even 
though he is dying, are evident from the outset. On the one hand, there are few nights that he, 
waking from his dreams, ―[does] not envy the dead‖ (245). On the other hand, he cannot ―face 
the truth‖ of his reality (71). So, even though he acknowledges the futility of doing so, he 
attempts to survive regardless. What is revealed by this aporia is that his hopeless delusion and 
refusal to admit ―how the story ends,‖ is a consequence of his inability to accept that the boy 
faces the same fate that he does (78). In this regard, Michael Chabon describes the novel as ―a 
testament to the abyss of a parent‘s greatest fears. The fear of leaving your child alone, of dying 
before your child‖ (qtd. in Mallard). The man resists death in order to ensure that the boy 
survives, and as much is implicit in his wife‘s following words: ―The one thing I can tell you is 
that you wont survive for yourself. I know because I would never have come this far‖ (59). 
Emphasising the futility of the attempt to survive alone, she explains that a ―person who had no 
one would be well advised to cobble together some passable ghost‖ and to ―[b]reathe it into 
being‖ by coaxing ―it along with words of love‖ (59). Indeed, the boy is all that stands ―between 
him and death‖ (29). 
Although the boy‘s survival depends on his father‘s, he seems to acknowledge the reality 
of their hopeless situation. For instance, he mentions the probability of death to the man, who 
reprimands him with the words ―[d]on‘t say it. It‘s a bad thing to say‖ (57). When the boy asks 
the man whether or not he would tell him if they ―were going to die,‖ the latter‘s denial of 
death‘s inevitability is evident in his response: ―I don‘t know. We‘re not going to die‖ (99). At 
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one point, after days without food, the boy stops walking and stands waiting. Without being 
prompted, the man asks him if he believes that they are going to die (105). Notwithstanding his 
son‘s noncommittal response, ―I don‘t know,‖ the father again assumes a position of outright 
denial when he states ―[w]e‘re not going to die‖ (105). Once the boy again acknowledges the 
probability of their deaths by pointing out that they ―dont have anything to eat,‖ his father 
immediately responds with the reassurance that they will ―find something‖ (106). He also adds 
optimistically that they have water, which is ―the most important thing‖ because ―[y]ou don‘t last 
very long without water‖ (106). Despite this, he clearly assumes that his son has no faith in their 
survival, as emerges when he asks him if he thinks that he ―might lie‖ about ―dying‖ (107). 
Ultimately, the man‘s fear indicates that he is conscious of his son‘s awareness of his delusion. 
Indeed, the boy suggests as much, and the man‘s response, in turn, emphasises the extent of his 
denial because, although he initially admits that he might be lying about dying, he then counters 
this by saying ―[b]ut we‘re not dying‖ (107). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the man endeavours to survive for the sake of his son, his 
efforts to provide hope in their hopeless circumstances only reveal that the boy seems to accept 
what he cannot. His attempts to convince him that there is something to hope for are 
unsuccessful because he himself struggles to do as much.  
 
“Carrying the Fire” in Darkness 
 
The desperate nature of the characters‘ situation emerges from descriptions of their environment 
as a space of ―blackness‖ that is ―without depth or dimension‖ (70). In the darkening land, where 
everything is ―shadowless and without feature‖ (189), the nights are ―blinding cold and casket 
black‖ (137). The days too are dark, with ―the banished sun‖ circling ―like a grieving mother 
with a lamp‖ (32). Even ―the noon sky‖ is described as being ―black as the cellars of hell‖ (188). 
The characters, however, resist the pervasive darkness of their bleak and hostile surroundings, 
which signify the futility of survival, by figuring themselves as carriers of ―the fire‖ (87).20 Fire 
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 As Barbara Bennett states, most ―reviewers have generally agreed that the ‗fire‘ is hope, 
spiritual belief, or truth‖ in the novel. With reference to her focus on the text‘s Celtic influences, 
she adds that fire provides ―warmth, light, and food.‖ 
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and light, then, symbolise their hopeful endeavour to resist confronting the inevitable futility of 
their efforts.  
The hope for survival that the light of fire signifies is tenuous, though. At one point, for 
instance, the ―sparks‖ from a fire that the characters have started are described as rushing 
―upward‖ and dying ―in the starless dark‖ (31). Elsewhere, a fire‘s sparks are depicted as rising, 
dimming, and then dying ―in the eternal blackness‖ (101). The permeating darkness of the 
environment dwarfs the characters‘ attempts to dispel it. Significantly, too, fires, notwithstanding 
their symbolism, are hazardous as they may attract the attention of possible enemies. 
Shortly after he finds a candle in an abandoned house, which he, however, fails to light, 
the man walks ―out in the gray light‖ and recognises the pointlessness of trying to survive: ―he 
saw for a brief moment the absolute truth of the world. The cold relentless circling of the 
intestate earth‖ (138). In this moment, for him, the ―universe‖ is a ―crushing black vacuum,‖ and 
in its ―implacable‖ darkness, he and the boy are but ―hunted animals trembling like ground-
foxes‖ (138). The ineffectual nature of their attempts to survive, which is indicated in this 
instance by their inability to produce enough light in order to banish the darkness, serves to 
emphasise their increasing vulnerability. 
In a dream that the man has at the very beginning of the novel, he and the boy journey 
inside a dark cave opposite ―a black and ancient lake,‖ their ―light playing over the wet 
flowstone walls‖ (1). Though darkness permeates the cavity, their light reveals an ominous 
creature on the ―far shore‖ that stares not so much at them as ―into the light with eyes dead white 
and sightless,‖ and which lopes ―soundlessly‖ away ―into the dark‖ (2). In the dream, their light 
reveals nothing but an endless journey in which they are met with only further sightlessness, 
hopelessness, and dim obscurity. As Alex Hunt and Martin M. Jacobsen maintain, ―McCarthy‘s 
allegory of the cave‖ is about being ―lost in the darkness with a fading light‖ (157). Ultimately, 
the characters‘ endeavour to light their way merely indicates the futility of doing so, as becomes 
apparent when the man wakes from his dream into a night ―dark beyond darkness‖ (McCarthy 1). 
In a related scene, the man, shortly before he dies, wakes into ―darkness‖ from a feverish 
dream (299). In this dream, which occurs at the very end of the novel, there is a ―[d]rip of water‖ 
in a ―cave,‖ and a ―fading light‖ coming from a ―candle which the boy‖ bears (299). The 
reference to ―[t]racks of unknown creatures in the mortified loess‖ recalls the creature that 
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appears in the earlier dream (300). Whereas, in the first dream, they journey into the cave until 
they see the creature, in this one, they walk down the ―cold corridor‖ of the cave to ―the point of 
no return which was measured from the first solely by the light they carried with them‖ (300). So, 
while the initial dream reveals to them the sightless and hopeless journey ahead, the subsequent 
one indicates that they have reached a point from which they can journey no further – an 
inevitability that is made clear by their ineffectual efforts to light their way. 
Both dreams evoke the impossibility of death. As I explained in my second chapter, the 
man is a dreamer and therefore dies continually and so lacks the agency necessary to control 
death, which itself is not tangible as absence, and is always limited to expérience. Any 
endeavour to resist it only results in hopelessness and obscurity, which, as should be clear by 
now, can be seen in the depiction of the characters as carriers of fire in an ever-dark reality. 
The fact that the man has his second cave dream at the coast, shortly before he dies, is 
also significant, because his hope that he and the boy may resist death is related to his delusion 
that moving ―south‖ along the coast will provide them with some reprieve from the inevitable 
(2). As Mallard suggests, for the man, the ―southeastern coast‖ is ―ostensibly warmer‖ and ―more 
hospitable.‖ Despite the fact that he attempts to convince himself and the boy that survival 
depends ―on reaching the coast,‖ the man wakes ―in the night‖ knowing that his wishes are 
―empty‖ with ―no substance‖ (McCarthy 29). The pointlessness of his delusion is clear when, 
arriving at the coast, they find that it is ―gray‖ and desolate (230), providing no promise in the 
permeating ―cold darkness‖ (234). 
In this section of my chapter, I have focused on the (im)possibility of resisting death 
through an analysis of the novel‘s depiction of the characters as carriers of fire in a relentlessly 
dark landscape. I now wish to turn to the ways in which certain characters delude themselves 
into believing that death is a choice made possible by committing suicide. Whether their aim is 
to escape their bleak reality or to control the way in which they die, they conceive of death as a 
decision, and a space that they can attain – which, in turn, emphasises the text‘s concern with its 
impossible representation. 
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The Impossibility of Suicide 
 
From my argument, it should be clear that death is inevitable for the characters in the novel. 
Through acknowledging that there is nothing to live for, certain of them delude themselves into 
believing that it is possible to escape their reality by choosing to die. I have repeatedly explained 
that, for Blanchot, suicide is a consequence of a deluded subject mistaking continual dying – 
where death is limited by expérience – for death as absence. By conceptualising death as a space 
which can be reached, the suicide, like the Orphic figure, relinquishes subjectivity, and, as il y a, 
thus limits his/her definition of it. The suicide ultimately wishes to make the impossibility of 
death possible. 
In the novel, the man recollects a conversation that he had with his wife before she 
walked into the darkness, presumably in order to commit suicide. Despite ―[t]he hundred nights 
they‘d sat up arguing the pros and cons of self destruction with the earnestness of philosophers 
chained to a madhouse wall,‖ he recalls that, in this particular conversation, ―[t]here was no 
argument‖ (60). For her, the reason why she and the man no longer argue or ―talk about death‖ is 
that ―[t]here is nothing left to talk about‖ – death is already ―here‖ (58). In explaining that death, 
as absence, is present, she adds that she no longer dreams. This is significant because death, 
which does not allow for representation, presupposes the absence of dreams: one cannot be dead 
and dream simultaneously. While she does not dream, the woman, nonetheless, still says as much 
to the man, which emphasises the impossibility of presenting and re-presenting absence. In 
addition, she personifies death as a ―lover‖ (58), who has the ability to fulfil her ―hope‖ for 
―eternal nothingness‖ (59). Unlike the man, who resists it for the sake of the boy, she wants to 
choose death so that she no longer has to suffer in a hopeless wasteland, haunted by the fact that 
she has nothing to live for. The woman‘s goal, however, is delusional. Death, as I have 
frequently noted, cannot be a decision, an object for presentation, or a person. Like the goal of 
the suicide, which, as Blanchot explains, is to grasp absence, she wishes to make the 
―nothingness‖ of death a tangible experience.  
On another occasion, in which the impossibility of controlling death by committing 
suicide is again evident, the man prepares the boy for the act of killing himself. While hiding 
from cannibals, with only a ―single round left in the revolver‖ (71), the man tells his son that he 
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is ―going to have to do it‖ – that is, shoot himself – should he be found and caught (119). For the 
man, suicide, as an experience of death, is preferable to dying at the hands of cannibals. Death, it 
follows, is here conceived of as an experience that allows for choice. However, death is not a 
possibility open to a subject in a world of action and cannot be manipulated as an experience. 
Differently put, an individual cannot choose how death ‗happens.‘ The man is ultimately unable 
to control the way in which his son will die, and is deluded into believing that death can be 
approached as a decision that differs from any other experience. 
Whereas this section of my chapter has discussed the impossibility of suicide, my next 
one will focus on the impossible representation of the man‘s death. 
  
The Man’s Death 
 
Early in the novel, the man is described as descending ―into a gryke in the stone‖ where he 
coughs ―for a long time‖ (10). This is the first of many indications that he suffers from a chronic 
illness. It is shortly after a coughing fit ―in the dark‖ at the coast that he tries to think ―about his 
life,‖ only to find that ―there was no life to think about‖ (254). Despite its depiction of the 
inevitability of his death, the novel is concerned with the impossibility of representing it as a 
space that may be resisted or controlled. Death cannot be positioned in relation to a subject, and 
any attempt to do so is futile. Moreover, death is not an object that may be presented and 
represented by a subject. It inevitably exceeds all such attempts. With this in mind, my following 
discussion will analyse four moments in the novel that emphasise the impossibility of the man‘s 
death. 
  The first of these is a scene in which the boy dreams about his father‘s death. As 
mentioned in my second chapter, the boy‘s dreams are more faithful than the man‘s to their 
reality, and yet, although the dream in question foretells the latter‘s death, it ultimately remains 
an impossible oneiric representation. In the dream, the boy is crying but his father does not 
―wake up‖ (195). When the boy tells him about his dream, the man, who thinks that he is 
referring to an actual event rather than a dream, apologises. In response, the boy explains that he 
―meant in the dream,‖ the suggestion being that he could not awaken his father because the latter 
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had died (195). What is here implied is that his father‘s death is impossible because its 
representation is limited by the boy‘s expérience as il y a. Interestingly, too, sleep is aligned with 
death in the dream: the boy‘s father sleeps, but cannot be woken from sleep because he is dead. 
In emphasising the impossibility of representing death, Blanchot, it will be remembered, argues 
that it and sleep are similar insofar as both imply a restfulness which is impossible in dreaming 
expérience. Because the boy, in dreaming, inevitably relinquishes agency, he is a dreaming il y a 
for whom death is not a possibility. The man‘s death, in the dream, therefore exists only insofar 
as it is excessive. 
Later in the novel, the two characters, who are struck with fatigue, are depicted as 
experiencing the ―sleep of death‖ (216). The phrase suggests an impossible paradox: death, as 
absence, cannot ‗occur‘ in sleep because it disallows the existence of a sleeping subject. Quite 
simply, sleep and death cannot occur simultaneously. When a dream opens in sleep, a state in 
which the subject becomes il y a, encounters with death are limited to the space of dying in 
expérience. 
The second scene in which the text emphasises the impossibility of the man‘s death 
focuses on his preoccupation with how to die. When he wonders ―[h]ow many days‖ there are 
―to death,‖ he conceives of death as an ‗occurrence,‘ something that he must actively encounter, 
even though he does not yet know how this may be done (141). Indeed, as much emerges from 
his following reflection: ―I am going to die [. . .]. Tell me how I am to do that‖ (187). Death, for 
him, cannot be escaped and is therefore an undertaking that must be fulfilled. Ultimately, though, 
death is not a task, and any attempt to make it one is delusional. The man‘s preoccupation with 
how to die brings to mind Blanchot‘s question on whether a subject has the ability to die, that is, 
―Can I die?‖ (―Death as Possibility‖ 96). For this thinker, as I have argued, a subject cannot 
engage with death. Dying cannot be ‗carried out‘ by a subjective ‗I.‘ In questioning his ability to 
fulfil the task of dying, the man only encounters the difficulty at the heart of death – that it is 
impossible to prepare for because it is absence, does not ‗occur,‘ and cannot be a point that a 
subject can face. In short, the man cannot govern the way that his death will happen because it is 
something that happens to him rather than an action that he undertakes and over which he is able 
to exercise control. 
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In the third scene under discussion, the man again attempts to control death. This time, 
though, he seeks to position himself in relation to it when it is the boy who becomes ill, vomits, 
and begins to burn with a fever (264). Terrified that his son will die, he speaks into the darkness 
as follows: ―I will do what I promised, he whispered. No matter what. I will not send you into the 
darkness alone‖ (265). Faced with the possibility that his son will die, the man believes that he 
can choose to experience death alongside him by committing suicide. Ultimately, though, as I 
have already established, suicide is an impossibility that is only made possible by delusion. The 
man cannot choose to accompany his son, to treat death as a destination that allows for a fellow-
traveller. His explanation that they have arrived at the ―[l]ast day of the earth‖ merely reduces 
death to a linguistic expression that exists outside of its origin in absence (267).  
Significantly, it is after ―sobbing in rage,‖ during his son‘s illness, that the man falls into 
―a dreamless sleep‖ (268), which is reminiscent of the scene in which his wife chooses to die. As 
I have noted, her conception of death as an event that is already present is emphasised by the fact 
that she no longer dreams. Similarly, the man‘s reflection on suicide positions death both as a 
space which is at a reachable distance for a subject and one that lacks dreams because it is 
absence. Ironically, though, death cannot be depicted as a space of absence and nothingness, and 
any attempt to do so is confined by the limitations of expérience. As much is evident when, once 
it becomes obvious that the boy will survive, the man is able to dream again. Being a dreamer, he 
lacks the agency necessary to fulfil the task of committing suicide, of controlling death by 
positioning it in relation to himself.  
After the boy recovers from his illness, the man‘s condition worsens until he dies. His 
death, which is narrated from the boy‘s perspective, is described in the last of the scenes 
discussed in this section: ―He slept close to his father that night and held him but when he woke 
in the morning his father was cold and stiff. He sat there a long time weeping and then he got up 
and walked out through the woods to the road. When he came back he knelt beside his father and 
held his cold hand and said his name over and over again‖ (301). In this scene, it is the shift in 
point of view to the boy‘s perspective that again emphasises the impossibility of representing the 
man‘s death as absence. Instead of a representation of his death, we are provided with a 
description of his body lying on the beach. In other words, his death exceeds this description, 
which therefore succeeds only in gesturing to its absence. Like Orpheus, who mutters Eurydice‘s 
name as his decapitated head floats down the river Hebrus, the boy repeatedly utters his father‘s 
  
103 
 
name in his struggle to accept his death, which remains an inevitability that cannot be resisted, 
controlled, or grasped. 
In my reading of The Road, I have sought to show that, although death is inevitable for 
the man, he attempts not only to resist it, but also to control the way in which it ‗occurs.‘ I have 
analysed the hopelessness of such efforts in the context of the novel‘s depiction of the characters 
as carriers of fire in an impenetrably dark reality. In addition, I have discussed the idea of suicide, 
which stresses the text‘s preoccupation with death as a voluntary act. Where relevant, I have also 
argued that the portrayal of the two characters as dreamers of expérience emphasises the fact that 
they lack the agency, and therefore ability, to resist death. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this final chapter of my thesis, I have discussed the ways in which the (im)possibility of death 
is manifested and problematised in the chosen works. Because death is absence, and therefore 
not a representational possibility, any attempt to depict it remains excessive to its origin. 
Furthermore, any representational engagement with death can only ‗occur‘ for the il y a, or 
imaginative mind of expérience, who is already continually dying. Notwithstanding the 
inevitable failure of representing the nothingness of death in dreamscape, I have explained that 
delusion inspires the belief that precisely this may be accomplished. In order to elucidate this 
paradox, I have referred to Blanchot‘s notion of the double death, in which the Orphic figure is 
―suspended between two rights to death, death as possibility and death as impossibility‖ 
(Critchley 77–78). Where necessary, I have also explained the various works‘ problematic 
relation to death in terms of Blanchot‘s understanding of the suicide‘s impossible endeavour, and 
his comparison of sleep with death. 
It is necessary for me to acknowledge that I have not discussed the role of the 
viewer/reader of the works in relation to Blanchot‘s theories in this chapter. The reason for this is 
that my first two chapters explain, at some length, that the reader/viewer, like the writer and 
dreamer of expérience, foregoes subjectivity, dies continually, and can only relate to death 
through the medium of its (mis)representation. By implication, all representations of death with 
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which the viewer/reader engages are limited to his/her interpretational expérience, where the 
work ‗occurs‘ as an excessive addition to reality. The viewer/reader‘s role emphasises the 
(im)possibility of representing death insofar as his/her expérience is both limited and unlimited 
in the moment of interpretation. Since this is necessarily the case in all the texts under discussion, 
reference to it in each of my analyses would simply result in unnecessary repetition. 
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Conclusion 
 
After dying, now alone, torn apart, and rejected by his body, he fell asleep. When he 
woke up, his usual habits and customs were waiting for him. He told himself that he 
shouldn‘t think too much about what happened the night before and, spurred on by this 
resolution, he dressed in a leisurely fashion. At the office, he went about his tasks 
efficiently enough, though he had the unsettling impression that he was repeating 
something that had already been done before, caused often by fatigue. He had the sense 
that the others were avoiding looking at him, perhaps because they knew that he had 
already died. That evening his nightmares began and though he could retain nothing the 
next morning, he was still fearful that there would be more. After a while, this fear was 
justified; it came between him and the page he was working on or the book he was 
attempting to read. The letters on the paper slithered and pulsated, and some faces 
familiar to him grew indistinct, men and objects gradually drifted away from him. His 
mind gripped on to these changing forms as if in a frenzy of tenacity. 
      As strange as it might seem, he never suspected the truth; it came to him all at 
once. He finally understood that he could not remember shapes, sounds, or colors in his 
dreams, that there really were no shapes or sounds or colors, and that they were not 
dreams at all. They were his reality, a reality well beyond silence and sight, and therefore 
beyond memory. This perturbed him much more than the fact that after dying he had 
been fighting against a chaos of senseless images. The voices he had been hearing were 
echoes; the faces, masks. The fingers of his hand were shadows, blurry and unreal, but 
still familiar and recognizable to him. 
      Somehow though, he knew that it was his duty to leave behind all those things. He 
now belonged to another world, detached from past, present, and future. Gradually this 
new world began to surround him. He underwent much agony, went through regions of 
despair and solitude. These wanderings were particularly atrocious, because they went 
beyond all of his former perceptions, remembrances, and hopes. All their horror came 
from being so new and splendorous. He was worthy of Grace – all that time since death 
he had always been in heaven. (Borges, ―His End and His Beginning‖ 297) 
 
My thesis has investigated the (im)possibility of representations of death in selected dreamscapes. 
I commenced my discussion with an assessment of Maurice Blanchot‘s thought on the 
―question‖ at the heart of literature (―Literature and the Right to Death‖ 21), arguing that, for him, 
this question results in an ambiguity that cannot be divorced from the moment in which literature 
‗occurs‘ for the writer in his/her attempt to represent. As I have repeatedly maintained, the writer, 
who is troubled by a fundamental loss of subjective agency in writing, emerges as the 
imaginative mind of the il y a or the Orphic figure, and inhabits the space of expérience. My 
study has made clear that such loss of agency, which is a prerequisite for writing expérience, also 
presupposes a dissolution of rationality, in which the il y a is unable to situate him/herself in 
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relation to any reality outside of his/her literary engagement. Expérience, then, as I have 
indicated, is a space of irreality in which the il y a is bound to a continual process of aimless 
wandering, which precludes him/her from representing adequately and conclusively. I have also 
explained that the writer is similar to the reader and dreamer, in that they too undergo a loss of 
subjectivity in the moments of reading and dreaming, and are therefore troubled by the inability 
to realise that which is read or dreamed. With specific reference to dreaming, I have elucidated 
Blanchot‘s thought on the incapacity of a subject to rest in sleep. 
I have also demonstrated that, in necessarily relinquishing agency, the writing, reading, 
and dreaming il y a undergoes a continual process of dying, which complicates any presentation 
and representation of the impersonal non-experience of death, which is absence and non-place. 
In explaining this complication, I have employed Blanchot‘s notions of the double death, the 
suicide, and the affinity between sleep and death. My study has revealed that the (im)possibility 
of representing death involves a radical paradox: on the one hand, the agentless il y a is unable to 
realise or control death, which is an absence. On the other hand, the il y a is necessarily deluded 
into believing that death is a possibility. In other words, delusion precludes the il y a from 
acknowledging that his/her task is inevitably impossible. All that the Orphic figure can achieve 
in his/her literary and oneiric endeavour is an excessive (mis)representation of death, which 
remains absolutely elusive. Each of the works under discussion in my thesis is inconclusive 
about death, which cannot be distanced from the moment and space of necessary delusion and 
paradoxical (im)possibility in which literature and dreams ‗occur‘ for the imaginative mind of 
the il y a.  
Thus, for example, I have shown how the nameless protagonist‘s death, in Richard 
Linklater‘s Waking Life, is depicted as ambiguous, despite the fact that he is trapped in a dream. 
Ultimately, he is unable to die or sleep because he dreams continually. Similarly, I have 
demonstrated that, in Alan Warner‘s These Demented Lands, Morvern cannot be dead, even 
though the novel provides a representation of her ambiguous death, as she remains a dreamer and 
writer of expérience. I have also discussed the implications for this text‘s treatment of death of 
the inconclusive nature of the Aircrash Investigator‘s investigation into the cause of Carlton‘s 
death. My reading of David Malouf‘s An Imaginary Life has focused on Ovid‘s delusion that he 
is able to arrive at death through a process of becoming other than himself in writing and 
dreaming. His attempts to do so, as I have indicated, are impossible because death is not a place 
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at which a subject can arrive. Finally, I have examined the problematic efforts of the man, in 
Cormac McCarthy‘s The Road, to control and resist both expérience and death. 
The epigraph to my conclusion is intended to serve as an impossible ‗last word‘ about 
death and dreamscape. In various ways, Borges‘ prose-poem ―His End and His Beginning‖ 
encapsulates my study‘s preoccupations with Blanchot‘s theories. Significantly enough, the 
protagonist is anonymous, and is depicted as having already ‗experienced‘ death before the 
dreamscape narrative begins. While he is described as falling asleep, dreaming, and awaking 
―[a]fter dying,‖ it is eventually revealed that his dreaming and waking states are a continual 
nightmare, a space of shifting states ―beyond silence and sight,‖ in which the ―letters‖ in a book 
he reads slither and pulsate, and the fingers of his own hand seem like ―shadows, blurry and 
unreal‖ (297). At first, he is troubled by the fear of having to fight ―against a chaos of senseless 
images,‖ but, after attempting to rationalise his waking nightmare, comes to accept it as his 
―reality‖ (297). Intriguingly, too, his reality is described as a place called ―heaven‖ in which he 
has been ―wandering‖ ever ―since death‖ (297). 
The nameless protagonist‘s story is deeply ironic, and manifests the paradox of the 
(im)possibility of death in dreamscape. By virtue of being a dreaming il y a, he immediately 
relinquishes subjectivity – as is emphasised by his anonymity – and so dies continually. His 
attempts to rationalise the dream in relation to himself is thus delusional: he is able neither to 
accept nor to deny the dream as an experience or reality that is dreamed by him. The character‘s 
troubled uncertainty, or dis-ease, which is a consequence of ―fatigue‖ (297), signifies a loss of 
agency, if placed in the context of what both Borges and Blanchot term ‗insomnia‘ – a state in 
which the dreamer is denied any subjective experience, including sleep and rest, except for the 
expérience of dreaming. In short, Borges‘ character lacks the ability to make his dream an 
experience precisely because he dreams. His ‗reality‘ is therefore limited by his loss of selfhood, 
which means that he dies continually in the realm of irreality. 
Borges‘ protagonist cannot be present to witness death, which is absence and non-place. 
His dream, which represents his death as having already happened, as well as an experience that 
ensues in a place at which he has already arrived, that is, heaven, is ultimately impossible. Like 
Blanchot‘s suicide, he lacks the agency with which to comprehend death on his terms. And like 
all the writers and dreamers that I have discussed in my thesis, the possibility of this character‘s 
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death is governed by delusion: he is ultimately unable to make of death an experience, and it is 
precisely his attempt to do so that limits his efforts to the subjectless realm of expérience. He 
cannot make death real by dreaming about it, and is ultimately unable to recognise as much.   
Like Borges‘ character, all the Orphic figures that I have discussed in my study are, in 
their engagement with death through dreamscape, limited to writing and dreaming in expérience. 
Bound to their literary and oneiric endeavours to represent, which are inevitably always rendered 
incomplete and excessive (mis)representations, they, as il y a, are only destined to die 
continually and wander aimlessly. They all unavoidably inhabit a space of irreality, where they 
are unable to locate themselves in relation to any other reality outside the work or dream, where 
invisibility cannot be seen as invisible, and where the intangible remains absolutely elusive, ―at 
the heart of night‖ (Blanchot, ―Orpheus‘ Gaze‖ 171). 
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